Reconnecting to Work: Policies to Mitigate Long-Term Unemployment and Its Consequences by Appelbaum,, Lauren D., Editor
Upjohn Press Upjohn Research home page 
1-1-2012 
Reconnecting to Work: Policies to Mitigate Long-Term 
Unemployment and Its Consequences 
Lauren D. Appelbaum, Editor 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
Appelbaum, Lauren D., ed. 2012. Reconnecting to Work: Policies to Mitigate Long-Term Unemployment 
and Its Consequences. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/
10.17848/9780880994095 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 

Reconnecting to Work 

Reconnecting to Work 
Policies to Mitigate 
Long-Term Unemployment 
and Its Consequences 
Lauren D. Appelbaum 
Editor 
2012 












Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Reconnecting to work : policies to mitigate long-term unemployment and its 
consequences / Lauren D. Appelbaum, editor. 
p. cm. 
Papers presented at a conference held on Apr. 1–2, 2011. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-406-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 
ISBN-10: 0-88099-406-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 
ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-408-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 
ISBN-10: 0-88099-408-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 
1. Labor policy—United States—Congresses. 2. Unemployment—United 
States—Congresses. 3. Full employment policies—United States—Congresses. 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
300 S. Westnedge Avenue 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686 
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design. 
Index prepared by Diane Worden. 
Printed in the United States of America. 




   
  
 
   
  
 




   
  
 
   
  
   
  
 





Foreword: What Happened to Shared Prosperity and Full Employment
and How to Get Them Back: A Seussian Perspective 





2 Job Displacements in Recessions: An Overview of Long-Term
Consequences and Policy Options 
Till von Wachter
17 
3 Labor Market Policy in the Great Recession: Lessons from
Denmark and Germany 
John Schmitt
37 
4 Causality in the Relationship between Mental Health
and Unemployment 
Timothy M. Diette, Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton, and 
William Darity Jr.
63 
5 Work Together to Let Everyone Work: A Study of the
Cooperative Job-Placement Effort in the Netherlands 
Hilbrand Oldenhuis and Louis Polstra
95 
6 Stabilizing Employment: The Role of Short-Time Compensation
Vera Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman
113 
7 Labor Market Measures in the Crisis and the Convergence of
Social Models 











What Happened to Shared Prosperity 
and Full Employment and How to Get 
Them Back: A Seussian Perspective
Richard B. Freeman 
Harvard University and 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
The conference “Reconnecting to Work” was held on April 1–2, 
2011, as the United States suffered its worst job market since the Great 
Depression. Reconnecting to work, indeed! With 9–10 percent unem-
ployment and little sign of substantive job growth in the foreseeable 
future, American workers needed more help to find work than at any 
time since the 1930s. Even if job growth were to miraculously pick up, 
most workers would have trouble keeping their heads above water for 
years to come. For nearly four decades the benefits of economic growth 
have gone almost entirely to a small sliver of wealthy Americans. The 
vast bulk of workers struggled with stagnant real wages and high con-
sumer debt to remain in the middle class. Inequality rose to levels off 
the map for a major advanced country and exceeded levels in most 
third-world countries. Contrary to what many Americans believe, social 
mobility in the United States was below that for most other advanced 
countries.1 
Something or someone had taken shared prosperity and full employ-
ment from the American people. Something or someone was disman-
tling the road to the middle class on which the United States was built, 
and with it the American dream. Who or what could that be? 
The first place where economists seek an answer to changes in eco-
nomic outcomes is in the operation of markets. Viewing the U.S. labor 
market as highly competitive and responsive to market forces, some 
economists explain the stagnation of real wages in terms of (unmea-





the highly skilled over the less skilled. But changes in skill premium 
explain only a small proportion of increased inequality. Most of the 
rise in inequality occurs within observationally equivalent groups— 
among persons with the same age, gender, race, education, math and 
literacy test scores, and so on—rather than across skill groups. And it 
is difficult to understand why in a highly flexible job market firms cut 
employment rapidly in recession but failed to increase employment in 
the ensuing recovery. To fit the observed pattern of change, analysts 
must go beyond the basic flexible market model to consider institutions, 
unions, executive compensation, modes of corporate governance, and 
governmental policies. 
In the spirit of the interdisciplinary Reconnecting to Work confer-
ence, I explored what other social sciences said about the loss of shared 
prosperity and jobs crisis. Sociology focuses on the behavior of the poor 
and the measurement/meaning of class but also offers network analysis 
that quantifies the connections among the elite. Political science docu-
ments the importance of lobbying in determining the rules that govern 
how markets operate and of the revolving door between public service 
and lobbying activities. Social psychology shows how readily authority 
figures and settings can influence people to behave with little regard to 
others even without monetary incentives. But neither economics nor the 
other social sciences gave me the overarching vision or narrative about 
who or what was undoing the U.S. middle class. 
With the time for my presentation at the conference growing short, 
I widened my search. As a youth I read widely in literature, from the 
Greek tragedies to Alice in Wonderland to Charles Bukowski. Did the 
world of literature offer an analogy or a clue to the story? Eureka! Yes, 
there was one narrative that seemed to provide insight into the econom-
ics of lost prosperity and jobs, and it was by the world’s most famous 
and accomplished writer and poet of children’s verse—Dr. Seuss, mas-
ter of the trisyllabic meter. 
Dr. Seuss? Many of the experts at the conference would recall The 
Cat in the Hat (1957a) and wonder what hat I was wearing when Seuss 
popped into my head as offering a framework for understanding the 
country’s economic woes. Hopefully the evidence would convince them 
(and you), as it convinced me, that the answer to who stole American 
prosperity and full employment lies in the classic Seuss tale How the 
Grinch Stole Christmas (1957b) and its successor stories. 
viii 







THE GRINCHES OF WALL STREET
The Grinch is an illustrated book. Rereading your copy, you will 
surely notice, as I did, the uncanny resemblance of the illustrations of 
the snarly heartless cave-dwelling Grinch to the bankers, mortgage 
brokers, and Wall Street–dwelling financiers who sold “liars’ loans” 
to Americans seeking home ownership, sliced and diced mortgages to 
hide the risks to investors seeking safe assets, created credit default 
swaps and exotic derivatives that paid if businesses collapsed or peo-
ple absconded on debts, and sold clients financial products that they 
believed would fail. Those dark brows, sour Grinchy grin, and piercing 
eyes—if the Grinch were a bit pudgier or Bernard Madoff a bit leaner, 
they’d be kissing cousins. 
So who plays the Grinch in the U.S. economy? According to the 
Wall Street occupiers, it is the upper 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion. More accurately, it is the upper 0.1 percent that gained essentially 
all of the economic growth of the past 40 years. In 1970 the top 0.1 per-
cent in income had 2.7 percent of national income. Their income was 27 
times the mean income. In 2007 the top 0.1 percent had 12.3 percent of 
national income.2 Their income was 123 times the mean. But these fig-
ures understate the disparity in income between the top 0.1 percent and 
the average American. The average includes the income of the top 0.1 
percent. Comparing the income of those in the top 0.1 percent with the 
income of those in the bottom 99.9 percent raises the estimated ratio to 
140 times in 2007. Moreover, income distributions are “right-skewed” 
so that a person in the median of the income distribution makes less than 
the average. In 2007 the median income of families was 77.8 percent 
of the mean income in the United States, suggesting that the income of 
the upper 0.1 percent was on the order of 180 times the median income 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2011, Table F-8).  
Who, you may ask, comprises the upper 0.1 percent? Bakija, Cole, 
and Heim (2010, Table 3) find that in 2005, about 64 percent of the 
top 0.1 percent were executives, managers, supervisors, and finan-
cial professionals, or worked in real estate. The 403 or so billionaires 
in the annual Forbes list are there. The top corporate executives and 
Wall Street bankers are there. Following the 1999 repeal of the Glass-






deposits from the riskier investment banks that issue securities, the 
finance sector expanded. Finance absorbed a disproportionate 40 per-
cent of business profits. It hired some of the country’s best and brightest 
to develop new financial instruments, which it peddled as essentially 
risk free, all the while enveloping the real economy with a highly lev-
eraged financial house of cards—an estimated $22 of derivatives for 
every dollar of goods and services produced in 2009 (Matai 2009)! 
While some high-income recipients made their money primarily 
through salaries, for many, million-dollar salaries were chump change, 
dwarfed by earnings from stock options or restricted shares that gave 
them ownership claims on the firm or by bonuses paid as incentive pay. 
When the firm’s share price rises, the owners of the options and shares 
benefit even if the price rise was due to factors outside their control. 
When the stock market crashed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some 
firms gave out new options at the abnormally low market prices, which 
paid off handsomely when the market recovered. In general, when 
share prices fall and drive options “under water,” boards of directors 
give out new options at the low prices to “reincentivize” executives. At 
the top of the income distribution, the IRS reports that the 400 persons 
with the highest adjusted gross income earned 10 percent of all capital 
gains, 4 percent of all interest, and 4 percent of all dividends received 
in the United States in 2007 (Mi2g 2009). Great ways to make a living 
if you can get it. 
The implosion of Wall Street and ensuing recession affected the 
entire economy. The federal government bailed out the banks with 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) monies. The Federal Reserve 
loaned $1.2 trillion dollars to the banks to help them recapitalize. The 
Obama administration’s stimulus package—tax cuts, support of state 
and local governments, and spending initiatives—helped the economy 
recover while adding to the federal deficit. But just as the gains from 
the economic growth had gone disproportionately to a small number, 
the gains from the recovery went disproportionately to a small number. 
Firms gave out options at low share prices when the stock market was 
weak, which allowed executives to clean up in a market that owed its 
recovery to the bailout and stimulus. On the day the Reconnecting to 
Work conference began, USA Today reported that CEO pay had jumped 
27 percent in 2010 under the headline “CEO Pay Soars While Workers’






But while executive pay and corporate profits recovered smartly, 
there was virtually no recovery in the job market. And the recession-
induced deficits in the public sector produced cutbacks in government 
employment and spending with threats of more to come. 
The Resilience of the Grinches 
How the Grinch Stole Christmas ends when the Whos overcome 
their disappointment at the stolen Christmas stockings, presents, and 
cookies, and join hands to celebrate Christmas because Christmas 
meant more to them than material goods bought in a store. This behav-
ior shocked the Grinch to a born-again moment. Seuss reports the event: 
“ . . . in Who-ville they say, That the Grinch’s small heart grew three 
sizes that day.” 
Given the physiological problems of tripling even a small interior 
organ, note that Seuss does not himself claim this is what happened. He 
just reports what folks in Who-ville say. In any case, caught up with 
the Christmas spirit, the Grinch returned the stolen goods to the com-
munity. Then, to the surprise of all, “He himself . . . The Grinch carved 
up the roast beast” for Christmas dinner. 
This is where Seuss and economic reality part. No one, least of 
all an economist, expects Americans to take the loss of prosperity and 
full employment in the Christmas spirit of the Whos, holding hands 
and singing. Unemployment reduces happiness, creates mental distress, 
worsens lifetime career prospects, and reduces family income, leading 
some into poverty.4 Surveys show that the vast majority of Americans 
have a dim view of the direction in which the country is heading: less 
than 25 percent believe that their children will do better economically 
than they do (Bendavid 2011; Rasmussen Reports 2011). 
Similarly, no one, least of all an economist, expected the Wall Street 
Grinches to have a spiritual rebirth and return their bailout-created gains 
to the country. But given the near-death experience of finance, I antici-
pated some change in behavior: apologies for what Wall Street had 
done to the country, thanks to taxpayers for bailing them out, and spe-
cial thanks to the Obama administration for not siccing the FDIC and 
FBI onto them, as Presidents Reagan and Bush had done to the bankers 
who created the 1980s savings and loan crisis, and as New Deal inves-












that even conservative Americans harbored distrust and anger toward 
the bankers, it seemed a good time for them to lay low, take a modest 
million or two in pay, donate to philanthropic causes, and maybe even 
volunteer to help the nation rebuild shared prosperity for all. 
Instead, the Grinches of finance behaved just as the economists’
model of homo oeconimicus predicts people behave when money is 
at stake. Evincing neither remorse nor interest in any interest but their 
own, Wall Street financiers fought to restore the past economic order 
in which they and their compatriots in the upper income brackets gar-
nered all the gains from economic growth. A consumer financial protec-
tion agency to protect citizens in financial transactions? A Tobin tax on 
financial transactions? The Volcker rule? Higher capital requirements 
on banks? A policy to break up the banks too big to fail? Strength-
ened regulatory powers for the Securities Exchange Commission? Tax 
increases on the wealthy? “Nevermore,” quoth the Grinch—or was that 
the Raven? Increased unionization to protect the interests of the middle 
class? Unions? “Forget them.” The middle class? “Charge them debit 
card fees, the dumb marks.” 
After the conference, I worried that How the Grinch Stole Christ-
mas had too rosy an ending to represent the U.S. economy. The Grinch 
looked like a Wall Street operator, but his born-again soft spot would 
have made Gordon Gekko and his cronies cackle. After all, “Greed 
is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the 
essence of the evolutionary spirit.”5 Perhaps I needed a tougher vision 
of the grinches of the world than Dr. Seuss offered. 
Fourteen years after he published the Grinch, Dr. Seuss developed 
that tougher vision in The Lorax (1971). This is the only Seuss book that 
puts economic behavior at the heart of the story. It is a dark, grim tale 
of how the entrepreneurial Once-ler found a way to turn Truffula trees 
into Thneeds, “which everyone, EVERYONE, EVERYONE needs!” 
Crazy with greed, the Once-ler pushed production to the point where 
it destroyed the environment, destroyed every Truffula tree, turned the 
land into a horrific rustbelt of empty factories and buildings fallen apart, 
with “no more work to be done.” Sadly, the book displays only the 
Once-ler’s green hands and beady eyes, so whether the Once-ler looks 
more like Gordon Gekko or Mr. Madoff or—name your favorite or least 
favorite Wall Street banker—I do not know. My guess is that the Once-









I did a Google search to find out more about the Grinch after his 
Christmas epiphany. The slithery sneering creature starred in a 1977 TV
show called Halloween Is Grinch Night. Here Seuss painted a harsher 
character whose sole goal was to terrorize the Whos on Halloween 
by releasing his bag of horrors onto Who-ville. The only thing that 
stopped the Grinch was a brave, bespectacled little Who, who delayed 
the Grinch until past the witching hour. At the show’s end the Grinch 
threatens to come back the next Halloween to do his evil work. In the 
Hollywood remake of the show, I envision Brooksley Born, the head of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under President Clinton, 
playing the brave little Who. Born wanted to regulate the risky deriv-
atives market, a move for which she was viciously attacked by Bob 
Rubin, Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and Arthur Levitt, and forced 
to resign from her job. As for the bag of horrors, we all know what it 
contains: more and more dangerous derivatives, credit default swaps, 
mortgage-backed securities. If the Christmas Grinch is too soft for you, 
think of Once-ler or the Grinch of Halloween. 
THE WAy FORWARD: HORTONOMICS
There is another side to the economics of Dr. Seuss—a positive mes-
sage that economists of every political stripe find particularly appeal-
ing. This is the story of investment in Horton Hatches the Egg (1940). 
Recall, if you will, the situation. Mayzie, a lazy bird, has laid an egg and 
wants someone to replace her atop the nest so she can have a “short” holi-
day. She inveigles Horton to sit on the egg—not an easy task for a huge 
elephant—but he fixes the tree branch to hold him until Mayzie returns. 
Horton sits on the egg through summer, autumn, winter, and spring, and 
all the while, Mayzie does not appear. Seuss reports that she was partying 
in Palm Beach, but I heard that she was actually on the Cayman Islands 
with the corporate Grinches who find the tax haven more profitable than 
building job-creating businesses. If only we had her Tweets to resolve 
the issue. In any case, Horton kept sitting on the egg, repeating the motif 
that we all know so well. “I meant what I said, and I said what I meant . . .








Hunters capture Horton and sell him, the tree, and the egg to a cir-
cus, which sees money-making potential in an elephant hatching an egg 
in a tree. It charges 10 cents a peek. When the egg hatches, Mayzie 
suddenly appears and tries to foreclose the property: “It’s MY egg!” 
she sputters. “You stole it from me. Get off of my nest and out of my 
tree.” But when the egg pops, out comes “something brand new”—an 
elephant-bird with elephant ears, tail, and trunk and wings, who stays 
with Horton. 
Horton Hatches the Egg has two messages for understanding our 
current economic situation. The first is that economic growth requires 
long-term investments—sitting on the egg. Investment in infrastruc-
ture, in R&D, in new plants and equipment, in risky innovations, and, 
in the case of the egg, the investment in human capital. Economic 
growth is harmed by short-term investments based on balloon loans or 
financial manipulations. The second message is that trust is important 
in a well-functioning economy. “I meant what I said, and I said what I 
meant.” Sellers of securities who are faithful to their clients instead of 
betting against them. Management and employees who work coopera-
tively knowing that they will divide the resultant profits. Consumers 
who know that when they pay their debts, the bank will apply their pay-
ments to the debt with the highest interest rate. 
In the tradition of attaching names to economic policies—the New 
Deal, the Fair Deal, Reaganomics, Clintonomics—I propose that poli-
cies to reverse the trend in inequality and restore full employment be 
labeled Hortonomics. I offer one specific policy that would fit the Hor-
ton label. This is to modify the corporate tax code so that firms can-
not deduct as a cost of business huge payments to top executives in 
the form of pay for performance unless the incentive plan covers all 
workers.6 Currently firms cannot deduct health and retirement plans as 
costs of business unless the plans cover all workers, so this modification 
would extend that practice to incentive pay plans. The proposal would 
increase the proportion of American workers covered by incentive pay. 
The workers would benefit from their firms’ economic performance to 
a greater extent than now, which would motivate them to produce more. 
During the Great Recession, firms in most OECD countries adapted 
work-sharing policies that traded lower productivity to save jobs while 
firms in the United States did the opposite, shedding workers so rapidly 








2011). In developing countries also, policies were shifting in favor of 
workers. Brazil and other Latin American countries raised minimum 
wages, used tax monies from the wealthy to fund education and trans-
fer programs for the poor, and experienced both falling inequality and 
increased economic growth. Perhaps most telling, China adopted a pol-
icy of strengthening unions and labor laws to fight inequality. 
But while Hortonomics had traction in other countries, it seemed 
outside U.S. political discourse, which was focused on cutting the fed-
eral deficit, and where many viewed discussion of inequality as raising 
a red banner of class warfare. The Whos in the United States who suf-
fered from stagnant real earnings and unemployment seemed invisible 
in debates over economic policy. In April I could not see what would 
change the situation. 
And Then . . . the American Whos Speak 
They spoke up first in New York City on September 17, 2011, when 
the Occupy Wall Street protestors sat down in Zuccotti Park around 
Wall Street under banners that read “We are the 99 percent.” The protes-
tors targeted economic inequality, corporate greed and corruption, and 
the dominance of Wall Street over the government as the main prob-
lems that troubled them. But they offered no explicit political or policy 
agenda and were suspicious of both Democrats and Republicans. The 
New York event set off similar protests in other U.S. cities and commu-
nities and spread to other parts of the world. 
It is unclear how much staying power the occupiers have or whether 
their protests will influence policy. Unions, environmentalists, and 
many others on the left support them. Many leaders, from the president 
of the United States to the mayor of New York to the head of the Fed-
eral Reserve, expressed sympathy for and recognition of the validity of 
their concerns. Republican politicians have been more critical of the 
occupiers and defensive of Wall Street. At the minimum the occupiers 
have brought the rise in inequality and joblessness to the forefront of 
national discourse. 
The 1954 book Horton Hears a Who! offers Seussian insight into 
what happens when Whos speak up and others hear their voice. The 
book begins “on the fifteenth of May” (in the big scheme of things, 






   
   
 
Freeman 
17). Horton is taking a bath when he hears a small noise from a speck 
of dust in the air. His elephant ears allow him to hear the voices of the 
Whos even though he cannot see them. The smaller-eared denizens of 
the jungle mock Horton for hearing voices until the mayor of Who-ville 
gets every Who “to make noises in greater amounts.” Crying out as a 
group, “Their voices were heard! They rang out loud and clear.” Horton 
and the other animals then join to protect the Whos because “a person’s 
a person, no matter how small.” 
Now that the Whos in this country have spoken and some lead-
ers have begun to listen to their concerns, I am more optimistic than I 
was at the Reconnecting to Work conference that the United States will 
come out of Wall Street’s financial implosion and the Great Recession 
with reforms that will restore full employment and prosperity for all 
citizens. I hope that economics and social science and, more broadly, 
policy analysis, are up to the task of developing efficient programs to 
help attain this goal. 
Notes
1. For data on inequality, see the Gini coefficients from the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the United Nations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries
_by_income_equality (accessed June 5, 2012). For data on social mobility, see 
OECD (2010, Chapter 5). 
2. These data are from Piketty and Saez (2003). The figures for 2008 show a small 
drop in the share of the upper 0.1 percent due to the collapse of the stock market. 
I use 2007 data as likely to be more representative of the situation after the mar-
ket recovered. There are only modest differences in the shares between 2007 and 
2008. 
3. An updated and lengthier analysis is available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/companies/management/story/CEO-pay-2010/45634384/1 (accessed 
June 5, 2012). 
4. See Chapters 2 and 4 in this volume. In Chapter 4 of the 2008 Employment Out-
look, the OECD documents the deleterious effects of unemployment on mental 
health using panel data for several countries. Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) 
show that job displacement of blue-collar males increases mortality by 50 per-
cent to 100 percent. Studies of college graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von 
Wachter, and Heisz 2006) show that a cohort that graduates in a recession suffers 
lower income for the bulk of its working life. Finally, Gallup polls show that 
the proportion of unemployed Americans diagnosed with depression is twice as 
high as the proportion of fully employed persons, and rises with the length of un-
employment. http://www.gallup.com/poll/139604/worry-sadness-stress-increase











5. IMDb’s page for Wall Street, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes (ac-
cessed June 5, 2012). 
6. For the details of this plan see www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/worker
_productivity.html (accessed June 5, 2012). 
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The Great Recession, the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression, was like none other in most of our lifetimes. No other reces-
sion in recent history has had comparable job losses. The second-worst 
recession, in 1981–1982, saw a drop of 2.8 million jobs, or 3.1 per-
cent of payroll employment. By comparison, job losses from the Great 
Recession reached 7.9 million jobs, or 5.7 percent of payroll employ-
ment from December 2007 until jobs started to consistently increase in 
October 2010. As recently as February 2012, an additional 8.1 million 
people found themselves in part-time jobs when they actually wanted to 
be working full time, either because their hours had been cut or because 
there were no full-time positions available. At the recession’s peak, the 
unemployment rate in the country was 10 percent, and over 26 mil-
lion people were either unemployed, working part time for economic 
reasons, wanted a job but stopped looking because of personal reasons 
(e.g., school or family responsibility), or had become too discouraged 
to continue searching for a job (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012a,b,c). 
After nearly two years of recession, the U.S. economy entered a 
period of slow recovery in the third quarter of 2009. However, despite 11 
quarters of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, jobs have just barely 
started to recover. Job growth was not consistent until October 2010, 16 
months after the official end of the recession. Even after this point, job 
growth remained tepid, and the average job growth for the six months 
prior to and including February 2012 was still only about 200,000 jobs 
per month. At this rate, it will take more than eight years—until the end 
of 2020—to recover the jobs lost since the start of the recession and the 
approximately 100,000 jobs that should have been gained each month 








continue to grow at the rate of almost 245,000 jobs per month that the 
country has experienced over the past three months (at the time of this 
writing, December 2011 to February 2012), it will take six years to get 
back to prerecession jobs levels (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011a). 
Furthermore, real GDP, which grew at a rate of 3 percent in 2010, 
slowed in 2011, and grew at an annual rate of 1.7 percent in 2011, 
according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012). In order to make 
a dent in the jobs deficit and to decrease the unemployment rate, the 
economy needs to gain about 300,000 jobs each month, and GDP needs 
to grow at a rate of 5–6 percent annually until the labor market recovers. 
As a result of the anemic job growth experienced since the official end 
of the recession, the unemployment rate in the United States, which has 
fallen from 9.1 percent in August 2011 to 8.3 percent in January 2012 
(and remained as of February 2012), is expected to stay above 8 percent 
for all of 2012 and 2013 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011b; Congres-
sional Budget Office 2012). In February 2012, 12.8 million people still 
remained unemployed, 2.6 million were only marginally attached to the 
labor force, and as noted above, 8.1 million people were working part 
time for economic reasons (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011c).1 
Most notably, long-term unemployment in the United States has 
become a significant problem. As of February 2012, among the offi-
cially unemployed, 5.4 million, or 42.6 percent, had been out of work 
for more than six months, and 29.2 percent had been unemployed for 
a year or more; the average time to find a job had reached more than 
nine months (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011c,d).2 Furthermore, by 
February of 2012, the working-age population of the United States 
had grown by about 9.3 million people from the start of the recession, 
but the labor force had only grown by less than 1 million (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2011b). Since the labor force usually grows with the 
increase in the working-age population, this is a remarkable develop-
ment. Certainly, some jobless people are looking at the poor economic 
climate and choosing not to enter the labor force, deciding instead, for 
example, to return to or stay in school. However, there are doubtless 
many others who—having had no luck in finding a job for six months, 
a year, or two years or more—have simply given up and left the labor 
force. This exodus of working-age people from the labor force suggests 
that the current unemployment rate understates the extent of jobless-




the unemployment rate may remain high for some time to come, even 
as jobs continue to be created. 
Extended periods of high joblessness have detrimental economic and 
financial impacts on workers and the economy that continue long after 
jobs have recovered. Such economic scarring has been demonstrated in 
previous recessions and is bound to be more severe and longer-lasting 
now, as a result of the Great Recession, given the nearly unprecedented 
levels of unemployment, underemployment, and long-term unemploy-
ment facing workers in the United States (Irons 2009). Indeed, a recent 
study of people who lost a job between 2008 and 2009 finds that only 
7 percent had recovered or surpassed their previous financial status and 
maintained their lifestyle. Over one-third (36 percent) of survey respon-
dents were classified as currently being devastated or wrecked. That is, 
they were either in fair or poor financial shape and believed that their 
lifestyle had faced a major change. Twenty-one percent of respondents 
believed that this major change in their lifestyle was permanent (Zukin, 
Van Horn, and Stone 2011). 
Several areas that are negatively affected during recessions, par-
ticularly education, opportunity, and poverty, influence the extent to 
which an economic downturn will have a long-term economic effect. 
Unemployment can lead to decreased educational achievement among 
both children and adults. Children in families with an unemployed or 
underemployed parent may be faced with poor nutrition and the loss 
of a supportive learning environment. These children are less likely to 
excel in school. Young adults as well as returning students are strug-
gling to achieve their educational goals because of reduced family 
incomes due to unemployment and underemployment. Since children 
and their parents have highly correlated levels of educational attain-
ment, the abandonment of educational goals among young adults today 
is likely to have a negative impact on their children’s education levels 
in the future. This loss in educational achievement is likely to continue 
to negatively impact the economy, as wages increase with educational 
success (Hertz et al. 2007; Irons 2009). 
Researchers have found that people entering the workforce during 
an economic downturn fare worse than do workers who enter the work-
force when the economy is healthy. As the unemployment rate rises, the 
impact on wages also increases. One study found a decrease in wages 





rate at the time of entry into the workforce. For workers who have not 
graduated from college, the extent to which unemployment depresses 
wages is even more severe. In addition, these effects are long term, 
lasting as many as 15–20 years (Kahn 2010; von Wachter, Song, and 
Manchester 2007). 
Furthermore, lower wages result in fewer opportunities and 
decreased economic success, not only for the workers themselves, but 
also for their children. Research has found that while we would expect 
job loss to result in reduced family incomes in the present, this decline in 
wages is surprisingly passed down to the next generation. The children 
of male job losers earn 9 percent less than their peers whose fathers did 
not lose a job (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2005). Given the millions 
of people who have lost a job during the recent economic downturn and 
continuing jobs crisis, wages and family incomes are likely to remain 
depressed for decades. 
Not surprisingly, the current poverty rate in the United States is 
higher than it has been in nearly 30 years. At 15.1 percent in 2010, 
the poverty rate was just below its 1982 peak of 15.2 percent. Further-
more, the poverty rate is generally recognized as an outdated measure 
of poverty. In 2010, over one-third of Americans had an income that 
was below 200 percent of the poverty line, which is generally recog-
nized as what it actually takes to get by (Fremstad 2011). Poverty in 
childhood has been correlated with future problems, such as criminal 
activity, poor health, and low earnings. Thus, the increase in poverty in 
the United States following the economic crisis is likely to be a drain on 
the economy into the next generation (Irons 2009). 
These effects of unemployment do not tell the whole story, how-
ever. A substantial number of studies have found that unemployment 
has a negative effect on a large number of outcomes ranging from the 
physical to the social to the psychological. Decades of research have 
demonstrated a relationship between unemployment and poor overall 
health, increases in deaths due to cardiovascular problems, cirrhosis, 
and suicide, decreases in well-being, increases in depression, anxiety, 
and mental hospital admissions, and increases in alcohol abuse, vio-
lence, and arrests. A Rutgers University survey fielded in the summer 
of 2009 found that about two-thirds of unemployed respondents felt 
anxious, helpless, or depressed, and over three-quarters felt stressed. 




of both blue- and white-collar workers found that psychological symp-
toms were greater after four months of unemployment than after one 
month (Blakely, Collings, and Atkinson 2003; Brenner 1967, 1979; Bur-
gard, Brand, and House 2007; Catalano 1991; Catalano et al. 1993a,b; 
Catalano, Novaco, and McConnell 1997, 2002; Dooley, Catalano, and 
Rook 1988; Dooley, Catalano, and Wilson 1994; Dooley, Fielding, and 
Levi 1996; Eliason and Storrie 2009; Hagen 1983; Hamalainen et al. 
2005; Iversen and Sabroe 1988; Kessler, Turner, and House 1988, 1989; 
Kposowa 2001; Liem and Liem 1988; Liem and Rayman 1982; Linn, 
Sandifer, and Stein 1985; Payne, Warr, and Hartley 1984; Rutgers Uni-
versity 2009; Smart 1979; von Wachter 2010; Warr, Jackson, and Banks 
1988). 
One outcome of the psychological trauma caused by living in a 
world of economic uncertainty is the impact it has on the decisions we 
make. For instance, researchers have shown a connection between job 
loss and marital and family dissolution. While marriage can help to 
soften the blow of unemployment, unemployment can lead to marital 
dissatisfaction. When one loses a job, one suffers not only financial 
hardship, but also a loss of identity and social networks. These losses 
may create difficulties in personal relationships. This strain may result 
in decisions to dissolve marriages or postpone getting married. Recent 
anecdotal evidence supports this research. Polls indicate an increase in 
the dissatisfaction among married couples and a decrease in the number 
of marriages in areas particularly hard hit by the recession (Grant and 
Barling 1994; Liem and Liem 1988; McKee-Ryan et al. 2005; Nasser 
and Overberg 2011; Peck 2010; Price, Friedland, and Vinokur 1998; 
Shrieves 2010; Wilcox 2009). 
Unemployment creates insecurity and the disruption of plans, both 
current and future. Unemployment may also lead to limited finances, 
which may constrain personal choices. Furthermore, the time frame 
for reaching goals and milestones, such as buying a home, continuing 
on in education, becoming financially independent from one’s parents, 
or beginning retirement, may be altered by poor economic conditions. 
There is some evidence that disruptive economic events during the life 
course can have consequences reaching well into the future (George 
1993; Moen 1983; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2007). 
Polls indicate a recent increase in college applications, but also 
suggest that people working their way through college have had to 
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leave school. There has been a decline in the United States in both the 
fertility and birth rates since the start of the recession. The number of 
births in the United States fell by 2.6 percent in 2009, at the height 
of job loss, despite an increase in the population. We have witnessed 
an increase of female workers between 30 and 34 years of age since 
the start of the recession. These women may be delaying having chil-
dren and thus staying in the workforce. In a 2009 survey, almost half 
of low- and middle-income women indicated that they planned to delay 
pregnancy or reduce the number of children they plan to have. Almost 
two-thirds of those surveyed said they could not affort to have a baby 
(Guttmacher Institute 2009; Hamilton, Martin, and Ventura 2010;
Norris 2011; Tejada-Vera and Sutton 2010). 
The growth in labor force participation since December 2007 among 
men between the ages of 62 and 64, as well as those above age 65, indi-
cates that people may be delaying retirement and working longer. Fur-
thermore, there was a 7.6 percent increase in the number of people over 
55 with jobs during the three years from the start of the recession in 
December 2007 to December 2010 and an associated rise in the unem-
ployment rate for this group. And, when asked about retirement, nearly 
a quarter of the people participating in the 2010 Retirement Confidence 
Survey indicated that the age at which they plan to retire increased over 
the previous year (Arenson 2008; Foderaro 2009a,b; Employee Benefit 
Research Institute 2010; Norris 2011; Public Agenda 2009; Scheiber 
2009; Sok 2010). 
The decisions made not only by the unemployed but also by 
employed workers facing a difficult job market affect the workers 
themselves, as well as their families and communities. They could have 
serious implications for the future health of the U.S. economy, even 
decades beyond the end of the recession. Given the multitude of nega-
tive outcomes of job loss, the United States must find a way to recover 
from the current jobs crisis. It is important to understand both the eco-
nomic and psychological outcomes of this crisis in order to have a more 
robust response that goes beyond economic stimulus and financial mar-
kets reform to address the lingering social and psychological impacts of 
prolonged weakness in the labor market. 
In the context of the Great Recession and its aftermath, in April 
2011 the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at the Uni-





ing to Work. Researchers, advocates, and practitioners from across the 
United States, Canada, and Europe came to Los Angeles to participate 
in the conference. The goal of the conference was to enable a better 
understanding of the consequences of long-term unemployment and the 
policies that are needed to address it. Speakers presented research that 
examined the psychological and economic consequences of experienc-
ing a prolonged spell of joblessness. Discussion of policies to increase 
job creation and get the long-term unemployed back into jobs engaged 
both researchers and practitioners, and drew lively responses from the 
audience. 
Presentations focused on what it means to be out of work for 
long periods, and the consequences, both economic and psychologi-
cal, of this experience. One of the more unusual presentations exam-
ined responses of employers to the recession and high unemployment. 
Speakers discussed policy options for adjusting to declines in demand, 
including reducing hours of work rather than laying off workers. Speak-
ers from Europe and the United States addressed these issues both from 
a national and international comparative perspective. 
Several major themes arose from the conference presentations and 
are represented in the chapters in this volume. One recurring theme 
is that losses experienced as a result of unemployment will be felt for 
years. Economic losses persist for up to two decades, with measurable 
negative effects on the health of unemployed individuals and their fami-
lies. It is not only physical health that is impaired by long spells of 
unemployment—long-term unemployment causes psychological dis-
tress that is not easily overcome. On the policy front, many speakers 
identified short-time compensation, in which workers are not laid off 
in a downturn but instead their hours are reduced and they draw partial 
unemployment benefits for the lost hours, as a policy that has proven 
successful in keeping unemployment from rising. Countries that have 
used this approach for dealing with declines in demand have experi-
enced smaller increases in unemployment in relation to the decline 
in GDP than occurred in countries where this policy was not widely 
utilized. 
World-renowned economist Richard Freeman gave the keynote 
address at the Reconnecting to Work conference. His address focused 
on Wall Street’s role in the jobs crisis and the policies needed to return 







address forms the foreword to this volume. With this provocative pre-
sentation, Freeman sets the stage for the substantive chapters of this 
book. Drawing on the whimsical writings of Dr. Seuss, Freeman makes 
serious points about the nature of the jobs crisis in the United States and 
focuses attention on what must change in order to resolve the problems 
of extreme inequality and high and persistent joblessness. 
Because policymakers failed early on to recognize the severity of 
the economic problems facing the country and to adopt macroeconomic 
policies adequate to address them, the United States has experienced a 
period of persistent and long-term unemployment. As noted by Till von 
Wachter in Chapter 2 of this book, losing a job has economic repercus-
sions for workers that take 15–20 years to overcome. Von Wachter says 
that although there is variation in degree, these economic losses are 
felt by all unemployed workers regardless of demographic factors or 
industry. Furthermore, poor economic outcomes can lead to poor health 
outcomes, which can extend to workers’ families. Von Wachter’s chap-
ter explores the negative impact of unemployment and policy options 
for relieving the economic costs of job loss. 
In Chapter 3, John Schmitt addresses the question of whether steep 
declines in GDP inevitably lead to sharp increases in unemployment. 
He examines the role that various labor market institutions play in mut-
ing or transmitting demand shocks to jobs. He does this by comparing 
national labor market institutions in Denmark, which is noted for the 
flexibility of its labor market and its use of retraining and job search 
assistance to match unemployed workers with jobs, with those in Ger-
many, which include a range of measures that facilitate adjustment 
by firms to demand shocks via changes in hours of work rather than 
changes in number of employees. Schmitt looks to the example of Ger-
many as the road not taken and argues that the nature of labor market 
institutions may explain the varying experiences of different countries 
during the downturn. In particular, Schmitt argues that Denmark, which 
had the most successful labor market of the 2000s, lacked the ability 
to adequately respond to periods of slack demand. The German labor 
market on the other hand, which allowed for a great deal of flexibility 
in adjusting hours worked, was able to prevent a steep decrease in GDP
from resulting in skyrocketing unemployment. Quite to the contrary, 
Germany’s unemployment rate decreased during the economic crisis, 





Thus far, the United States has not followed the German example, 
and the sharp decline in GDP during the economic crisis led to a dou-
bling of the unemployment rate from 5 percent in December 2007 to 
10 percent in October of 2009. While dropping fairly consistently since 
October 2010, unemployment remains at 8.3 percent (at the time of this 
writing), despite more than two and a half years of economic recovery. 
In Chapter 4, Timothy M. Diette, Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick 
Hamilton, and William Darity Jr. examine the psychological footprint 
of unemployment and demonstrate a causal link between unemploy-
ment and emotional well-being. Using a new method for identifying 
this causal link, these authors are able to estimate the impact of unem-
ployment on emotional health. Diette and colleagues also explore the 
way in which particular social characteristics interact with the detri-
mental effects of experiencing a bout of unemployment. Their research 
points to differing impacts of long- and short-term unemployment. 
Understanding the relationship between psychological well-being and 
unemployment is critical, given the unprecedented length of time it cur-
rently takes the average unemployed person to find a job. 
In view of the failure of job growth to recover in the United States, 
different approaches to labor market policies that may increase employ-
ment must be explored. The next three chapters of this volume look 
at varying options for encouraging firms to step up hiring and/or to 
reduce layoffs, either of which will result in net increases in jobs in the 
economy. 
In Chapter 5, Hilbrand Oldenhuis and Louis Polstra argue that get-
ting employers to cooperate with social service agencies is essential 
to improving the jobs outlook. They determine that different psycho-
logical factors are important in predicting whether the people making 
hiring decisions at small, medium, and large firms will cooperate with 
social service agencies. The authors argue that these factors must be 
taken into consideration when attempting to elicit cooperation between 
firms and social service agencies. Oldenhuis and Polstra conclude that 
getting firms to cooperate is important for reducing the unemployment 
rate now and for preventing long-term unemployment as time goes on. 
With the German example in mind, two of the chapters examine 
the implementation of short-time compensation programs, such as work 
sharing—the shortening of workers’ hours in order to create work and 






work sharing, employers can save money and resources by reducing the 
hours of their current employees while avoiding the costs of hiring and 
training a new workforce later. Employees benefit by keeping their jobs 
and maintaining their skills while receiving a proportionate amount of 
their unemployment benefit for the time not worked, and the govern-
ment spends little or no more than it currently does for unemployment 
benefits. 
Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume demonstrate the importance of 
labor market institutions and the value of work sharing as a solution to 
the current jobs crisis. Vera Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman in Chapter 
6 discuss the features of short-time compensation and examine its use 
in the United States thus far. They then compare the programs in the 
United States with short-time compensation programs in Canada, Ger-
many, and Belgium. Brusentsev and Vroman conclude that the program 
needs to be expanded in the United States in order to have a meaningful 
impact, and they discuss a legislative proposal that could do just that. 
In Chapter 7, Michele Tiraboschi and Silvia Spattini examine how 
different EU member states have responded to the economic crisis and 
the impact of different policy choices on the unemployment rate in 
these countries. The authors conclude that while there is no one best 
solution to reducing job loss during a recession, a short-time work 
arrangement is a necessary element for preventing job loss and holding 
down increases in unemployment. Finally, these authors note that there 
has been a convergence of systems; short-time work arrangements as 
well as active labor market policies (such as training) that are intended 
to facilitate reintegration of the unemployed into employment are being 
utilized in European countries to respond to the crisis. 
Recent slow growth is not enough to lead to a significant increase in 
jobs and reduction in unemployment. The Congressional Budget Office 
(2012) considers the current natural rate of unemployment to be about 
6 percent and estimates that it will take about five years for the unem-
ployment rate to reach the natural rate of unemployment, dropping to 
an average of 5.7 percent in 2017. Thus, despite 11 quarters of GDP
growth, the recovery is both tenuous and jobless. 
While political leaders in Washington are unable to agree on how 
to stimulate the economy and create jobs, the authors in this volume 
present a fresh approach to understanding the nature and causes of the 







persistent unemployment, and the policy approaches that can begin to 
make a difference, even in the current fraught political environment. 
Notes 
1. People who are marginally attached to the labor force are out of work and have 
stopped looking for work either because they are too discouraged or for personal 
reasons. However, they are available for work and would take a job if offered one. 
2. While the percentage of the unemployed who have remained out of work for more 
than six months is seasonally adjusted, the percentage of the unemployed who 
have remained out of work for a year or more is not seasonally adjusted.
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As the U.S. economy continues to recover from the Great Recession, 
an important unknown is the fate of the millions of workers affected by 
layoffs and lengthening spells of unemployment. This chapter focuses 
on the short- and long-term consequences of layoffs and unemploy-
ment for affected workers, and on potential policy options to ease the 
burden of adjustment on workers and their families. 
Judging from experience in past recessions, the consequences of 
layoffs for job losers are severe and persistent across several dimen-
sions. The average mature worker losing a stable job with a good 
employer will see earnings reductions of 20 percent lasting over 15–20 
years. While these earnings losses vary somewhat among demographic 
groups or industries, no group in the labor market is exempt from sig-
nificant and long-lasting costs of job loss (von Wachter, Song, and 
Manchester 2011a). 
A job loss is also typically followed by an extended period of insta-
bility of employment and earnings. During this period, job losers can 
experience declines in health. In severe downturns, these health declines 
can lead to a significant reduction in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years 
(Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). The consequences of job loss are also 
felt by workers’ children—who can suffer even into adulthood—and 
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Government programs can alleviate part of the short-term earnings 
loss associated with job loss and unemployment. As a typical measure, 
extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) 
• ease the burden of adjustment for laid-off workers, 
• are likely to prevent entry into more costly government programs 
such as disability insurance, 
• provide a degree of demand stabilization, and 
• are unlikely—at least in recessions—to be associated with sig-
nificant reductions in employment in the short or the long run. 
However, policy is unlikely to be able to prevent the large and last-
ing reductions in earnings that eventually follow a typical job loss. 
The majority of long-term losses are due to factors that are not eas-
ily manipulated by government policy, such as losses in the value of 
certain skills as industries decline, the loss of long-term career jobs, or 
slow wage-adjustment in the labor market. Some policies, though, have 
been shown to be able to reduce unemployment, such as targeted efforts 
to help workers in their job search, or programs reducing the costs of 
long-term adjustment, such as the costs of retraining. 
Given the difficulties of helping job losers and unemployed workers 
recover from long-term earnings losses after the fact, it may be worth-
while to explore available options to prevent large-scale layoffs in the 
future. Such options include programs of work sharing to subsidize 
employment before workers are laid off and become unemployed, to 
encourage the introduction of flexible work-time arrangements, or to 
encourage the provision of credit to economically viable firms affected 
by distress in financial markets. 
For example, the cost of UI benefits for a typical worker is a small 
fraction of the total earnings lost due to a layoff over the remainder 
of the individual’s working life. If the same benefits were paid during 
employment to avoid job loss, the cost of recessions would be substan-
tially reduced. This would be beneficial even if the worker were to be 
let go eventually, since earnings losses tend to be significantly smaller 
for layoffs that do not occur in a large recession. 
Overall, job loss and unemployment during severe recessions can 
impose substantial and lasting costs on affected workers in terms of 





Job Displacements in Recessions 19 
of these costs can in part be alleviated at a comparatively small cost, 
such as by extensions in UI. Less is known about how to help reduce 
the substantial long-term costs. While cost-effective policies may be 
available to help reemploy the long-term unemployed, the potential of 
policy interventions to significantly aid recovery of long-term earnings 
declines appears bleaker. Given these large and long-term costs, pre-
ventive measures to avoid massive layoffs are a policy option worth 
considering. 
THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM CONSEqUENCES OF
LAyOFF AND UNEMPLOyMENT 
An increasing literature has documented that job losses during 
recessions have severe and lasting consequences for earnings. For 
example, workers displaced in the recession of the early 1980s—which, 
until 2008, was the strongest U.S. recession since World War II—on 
average had earnings reductions of 30 percent or more in the first year 
after layoff. These losses declined somewhat over time, but even 15–20 
years after job loss, the earnings reduction was still 20 percent (Jacob-
son, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 
2011a). Such lasting earnings reductions occurred for job losers in all 
age ranges, in all industries, for men and women, and throughout the 
earnings distribution. This phenomenon is not limited to the early 1980s 
recession or to particular regions of the country, and it does not depend 
on the particular way of measuring the cost of displacement.1 Older 
workers suffer larger losses in earnings, but these losses extend over 
shorter periods of time, since remaining lives are shorter and job loss 
hastens retirement (Chan and Stevens 2001). Workers in the middle of 
the education distribution, such as workers with some college or only 
a high school degree, appear to lose more than very low- or very high-
skilled individuals (von Wachter and Handwerker 2009). 
These long-lasting reductions in earnings occur alongside, and may 
be partly augmented by, increases in job instability, recurring transitions 
to nonemployment, and repeated switches of industry or occupation 
(Stevens 1997; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Some of 
this increased mobility between jobs may be a sign of beneficial adjust-
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ment, but on average those workers who immediately find a stable job 
in their predisplacement industry do significantly better. The increase in 
job instability lasts up to 10 years after layoff. During the same period, 
these workers experience continuing increases in earnings instability. 
Thus, there is no sign that laid-off workers trade lower earnings for 
more stable employment. While heightened regional mobility appears 
beneficial in the short run, as mobile workers may eschew a particularly 
depressed local labor market, movers do not have lower long-term earn-
ings losses. 
There is also increasing evidence that laid-off workers suffer short- 
and long-term declines in health. In the short term, layoffs and unem-
ployment are associated with an increasing incidence of stress-related 
health problems, such as strokes or heart attacks (Burgard, Brand, and 
House 2007). These problems can lead to a large spike in mortality 
right after job loss. For example, mature men who lost their stable jobs 
in Pennsylvania during the early 1980s experienced an increase in the 
mortality rate right after job loss of up to 100 percent. This initial rise in 
mortality declines over time, but mortality remains significantly higher 
for job losers than for comparable workers who did not lose their jobs. 
If sustained until the end of their lives, such increases lead to reductions 
in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). 
Several studies also point to short- and long-term effects of layoffs 
on the children and families of job losers and unemployed workers. For 
example, in the short run, parental job loss reduces schooling achieve-
ment of children (Stevens and Schaller 2009). In the long run, it appears 
that a lasting reduction in the earnings of fathers also reduces the earn-
ings prospects of their sons (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008). 
There is also evidence that layoff heightens the incidence of divorce, 
reduces home ownership, and increases the rate of application to and 
the receipt of disability insurance programs (Charles and Stephens
2004; Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2009; Rupp and Stapleton 1995; von 
Wachter and Handwerker 2009). 
All of these costs are likely to be larger for workers who are unem-
ployed for longer periods of time. It is well documented that earnings 
losses for unemployed workers increase significantly with time spent 
outside employment (Congressional Budget Office 2007; Machin and 
Manning 1999). It is difficult to establish whether this is because the 
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facing the strongest challenges in the labor market take longer to find a 
new job. In one of a few studies establishing causality, Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Bender (2012b) show that nonemployment indeed leads 
to lower reemployment wages, at least in Germany. Independently of 
the source, longer unemployment spells are likely to put a significant 
additional strain on workers’ financial situations and the overall well-
being of both themselves and their families. These workers are also 
particularly dependent on benefits from UI. The poverty rate among the 
long-term unemployed is high, especially for those exhausting unem-
ployment benefits (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Tables 6 and 9). 
Finally, even though they were not laid off or are not officially 
counted as unemployed, the long-term earnings and career prospects of 
young workers entering the labor market during a recession also suffer. 
For example, individuals graduating from college during a large reces-
sion are likely to see reduced earnings for 10–15 years compared to 
more fortunate graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and 
Heisz 2012; Oyer 2008). As is the case for job losers, those labor mar-
ket entrants in the middle of the education distribution do worse, while 
those with lower or higher education tend to do better (Kondo 2008; 
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). The pattern of recovery of
unlucky college graduates is telling: a recession reduces the quality
of the first employer. After about five years, workers find an employer 
of better quality, but their earnings still have to recover within the firm 
relative to more fortunate graduates who obtained their jobs in better 
economic times. Thus, the initial setback in the career can take 10–15 
years to dissipate, even for this very mobile demographic group. 
THE REASONS FOR LONG-TERM EARNINGS LOSSES
AFTER LAyOFF AND UNEMPLOyMENT 
There are several potential sources of lasting reductions in earnings 
after a layoff. An often cited explanation attributes the losses in earnings 
to a loss in the use of certain skills, as some industries or occupations 
shift their operations elsewhere or permanently reduce their employ-
ment levels. If some of workers’ earnings derived from payment for ser-
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job loss workers lose wages associated with these skills (Neal 1995; 
Parent 2000; Poletaev and Robinson 2008). Such a loss can lead to 
long-term earnings declines if workers do not reinvest in a new equiva-
lent set of skills. Particularly for middle-aged or older workers, it might 
not be worth spending their time and money in costly retraining as they 
face uncertain reemployment over a shorter remaining working life. 
Another explanation is that workers in stable jobs, especially work-
ers aged 30 or older, are likely to have found an occupation and an 
employer suitable for their interests and qualifications. The process of 
searching for such a job can take time, involving both changes of occu-
pations and employers in the beginning of their careers, as well as job 
search and promotions within a firm (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
1994; Neal 1999; Topel and Ward 1992). On average, this phase of 
workers’ careers can last 10 years. Part of the gain from this prolonged 
search and matching process is lost at job loss. By its nature, finding 
such a suitable job again is likely to take a long time. If job offers start 
arriving only as the economy picks up, the adjustment process can last 
well beyond recovery in the aggregate labor market. 
Increasing evidence also suggests that the first wage on a worker’s 
new job is likely to influence her pay for a long time (Beaudry and 
DiNardo 1991; Schmieder and von Wachter 2010). This persistence 
can arise from (explicit or implicit) wage contracts between workers 
and firms. Since many unemployed workers end up finding the first job 
when wages are still depressed due to the recession, persistence implies 
that they may live with lower earnings for quite some time. As a result, 
workers laid off in recessions suffer substantially larger earnings losses 
than workers laid off in booms (Davis and von Wachter 2012). Although 
workers can improve their pay by obtaining outside job offers, chang-
ing jobs, or relocating, many face obstacles to such adjustment, often 
due to family commitments. However, the rate of mobility is likely to 
be too low even given those factors, possibly because individuals do not 
realize the need to keep improving their economic situations 5–10 years 
after a job loss or an unemployment spell.
Some workers may also experience reductions in earnings because 
they held jobs in industries or at firms that paid exceptionally high 
wages. Yet, it does not appear that workers in such jobs are more likely 
to be laid off. In fact, during large recessions job losers are less likely to 
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be selected from high-wage jobs, partly because economic difficulties 
are widespread and do not just affect single firms or sectors. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that job losses arise because firms systematically let go 
those workers who are overpaid or who are least productive.2 
POLICy OPTIONS TO EASE THE BURDEN OF ADJUSTMENT
OF LAID-OFF AND UNEMPLOyED WORkERS 
Policies Aimed at Reducing the Burden of Short-Term 
Earnings Losses 
Government programs can help to ease the burden of the short-term 
cost of job loss and unemployment. The most common approach to do 
so has been to increase the duration over which eligible workers can 
receive unemployment benefits. In the 2008 recession, the maximum 
duration of UI benefits was 99 weeks, about four times the regular dura-
tion of 26 weeks. Significant extensions in the duration of UI also took 
place in the 1982 and 1990 recessions (Congressional Budget Office 
2004). 
Extensions of UI benefits have several beneficial aspects for recipi-
ents and for the economy as a whole. Extended benefits allow workers 
to buffer the effect of the earnings loss on consumption, albeit con-
sumption still falls for the average UI recipient (Browning and Cross-
ley 2001; Congressional Budget Office 2007; Gruber 1997). In addi-
tion, extended benefits allow workers to search longer for a suitable 
job, and provide insurance against the stress of not being able to find 
a job because of continued slack in the labor market. Extensions in UI 
benefits also prevent some workers from applying to other government 
programs not intended to smooth short-term economic shocks, such as 
Social Security Disability Insurance or Old Age and Survivors Insur-
ance. In particular, benefits provided under disability insurance can be 
very costly, especially if provided to younger or middle-aged workers 
with low-mortality impairment (Autor and Duggan 2006; von Wachter, 
Song, and Manchester 2011b). While increases in unemployment rates 
typically lead to a significant rise in application and award rates, exten-
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UI benefits can provide a degree of demand stabilization through the 
multiplier effect (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Table 1). 
On the downside, several studies have suggested that UI may impose 
a cost by reducing recipients’ willingness to work (Congressional Bud-
get Office 2008).3 In addition, prolonged spells of unemployment may 
lead workers’ skills to atrophy or otherwise reduce their employabil-
ity. Yet, it is likely that in severe recessions the benefit of extended UI 
outweighs the costs. First, the value of income replacement to workers 
should be particularly high. Second, longer UI durations are unlikely to 
have a strong effect on employment, since strategic considerations are 
likely to be weaker when the number of jobs is scarce (see, for example, 
Congressional Budget Office [2008]). Moreover, recent research sug-
gests that a sizable part of the decline in employment may not be due to 
the reduction in the willingness of UI recipients to work, but rather to 
the fact that some individuals have limited access to credit. If this is the 
case, not all of the employment effects of UI represent a distortion, but 
it may be a sign that UI helps to alleviate credit constraints that prevent 
individuals from self-insuring against unemployment shocks.4 
In the only study of its kind, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 
(2012a) analyze large extensions in the durations of UI in Germany and 
show that these led to only moderate reductions in employment, without 
a noticeable difference in this effect in large recessions. Based on a very 
large sample of unemployed workers spanning over 25 years and utiliz-
ing a very credible research design, these findings lie at the lower range 
of typical U.S. estimates (Meyer 2002, Table 5). For a large increase in 
UI duration from 26 to 99 weeks, the estimates from Germany suggest 
that extended UI would lead to a moderate increase in the rate of unem-
ployment. Yet, for several reasons the current effect in the United States 
would likely be smaller. The increases in UI durations were stepwise, 
and extension was not always certain. Only 50 percent of all eligible 
unemployed workers have taken up UI benefits in this recession, further 
reducing the potential impact of UI extensions on employment.5 Finally, 
the effects on aggregate employment are based on the assumption of full 
employment; under a slack labor market, the effect of individual search 
decisions on aggregate employment is likely to be smaller.6 
This research also suggests that contrary to what is often believed, 
extensions in UI benefits appear to neither help nor strongly hurt the 
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small negative effects on the wage at the first job after unemployment. 
Yet, neither the wage nor the employment rate five years after entry 
into unemployment is affected by longer UI durations (Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Bender 2012b). Thus, it appears that extended UI benefits 
have an effect on workers’ disposable income, consumption, and short-
term employment choice, but they may have neither strong adverse nor 
beneficial effects on long-term employment prospects. 
Several other measures to ease the short-term burden of adjustment 
have been tried in the current and in past downturns, and have been 
featured in policy proposals in the 2008 recession. These include wage 
subsidies paid to employers and tax breaks for firms to raise job cre-
ation, temporary assistance to obtain further training, and some form 
of public employment. The best available evidence suggests that these 
measures are somewhat successful in reducing unemployment and 
alleviating earnings losses of job losers.7 These measures do not share 
the advantage of extended UI, which builds on an existing infrastruc-
ture of a successfully functioning program and immediately affects UI 
recipients and the economy (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Table 
1). However, with the exception of training, the measures share with 
extended UI the mainly short-term focus, with less known long-term 
benefits for laid-off and unemployed workers. 
Policies Aimed at Reducing Long-Term Unemployment and 
Lasting Earnings Losses 
The reach of the large losses in earnings, increases in job instabil-
ity, and reductions in health goes beyond the duration of extended UI 
benefits. In fact, since the losses persist well beyond 5 or 10 years, the 
majority of the lifetime loss in earnings occurs after eligibility for UI 
benefits has expired. Yet, few policy options are available to alleviate 
the long-run costs of job loss and unemployment. 
For example, there is no current evidence that the longer duration 
of UI benefits improves the long-term earnings or employment trajecto-
ries of the unemployed (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2012b). 
Similarly, the evidence of efforts to successfully train laid-off work-
ers in new skills is mixed, and there is little evidence available on the 
long-term effects of other programs.8 By the nature of the mechanisms 
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any policy will completely close or significantly reduce the long-term 
earnings gap—short of altering the market’s mechanisms of wage set-
ting, the trade-offs governing workers’ investment in their skills, or the 
multiple factors affecting the decision to relocate. Yet, there are some 
options available to help those with long unemployment spells find jobs 
and try to improve the long-term earnings prospects of job losers. 
In particular, it is likely that a lack in mobility between jobs, occu-
pations, or regions will contribute to the persistence of reductions in 
earnings at job loss, perhaps because workers are not aware of the time 
it would take to dissipate their earnings losses. As explained above, the 
individual’s recovery process is likely to last well beyond the recov-
ery of the aggregate labor market. Job losers might not be aware of 
the long-term efforts required to rebuild a career, and active counseling 
may help in bringing expectations in line with the reality workers will 
be facing in the labor market. Evaluations of job search assistance have 
found that counseling reduces UI rolls and is cost-effective.9 
Another reason why workers do not move or change occupations 
might be because they are not aware that the job prospects in their lines 
of work and in their local labor markets may have declined perma-
nently. This may lead individuals to wrongly assess the prospects of 
finding a job in their old industries or occupations in their local labor 
markets, and wait too long to switch careers, change employers, or 
move to another region. Information on how job prospects in the work-
ers’ professions and related occupations are evolving both locally and 
nationally might be a useful tool to help unemployed workers and their 
families make better choices. Such information is routinely available 
from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and could, 
for example, be included with workers’ UI benefit checks. 
Part of the effort to rebuild a career might involve retraining or relo-
cating. One way to raise mobility is to offer workers support in cover-
ing expenses related to retraining or moving. Evaluations of subsidies 
to attend community college have found that they, on average, raise 
earnings of displaced workers, particularly if covered subjects are of a 
more technical nature. However, such programs seem to be beneficial 
and cost-effective for selected populations but may not be a solution for 
the broader population of participants (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 
2005). Less is known about the potential benefits of relocating unem-
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plays an important role in equilibrating local labor markets (Blanchard 
and Katz 1992). On the other hand, regional mobility does not appear 
to significantly lower earnings losses of displaced workers, perhaps 
because most large recessions afflict most regions of the country (von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Yet, over the longer run, gov-
ernment programs helping unemployed workers to relocate, for exam-
ple, by reducing their mortgage debt, are likely to help workers recover 
some of their lost earnings. 
An alternative set of policies includes efforts to directly stimu-
late employment growth at the local level. These could be targeted at 
improving the economic situation in regions particularly hard hit by 
the recent downturn. Yet, in general, an upturn in the labor market 
improves the lot of some workers, but does not raise the earnings tra-
jectory of job losers or those formerly unemployed (Jacobson, Lalonde, 
and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). There 
is no reason per se why localized policies should have a different effect 
on the employment of the long-term unemployed or the earnings of 
reemployed laid-off workers than a regular upturn in the labor market. 
One reason why workers experiencing long-term unemployment 
spells are not affected by an improvement in labor market conditions 
is that they have become detached from the labor market. In this case, 
low-cost policies, such as informing workers about job opportunities 
or the employment outlook in their occupation, may not deliver the 
desired effect of increasing workers’ mobility and raising their chances 
of finding a job. In this case, a more active approach may be needed 
to reintegrate long-term unemployed workers into the labor market. 
For example, it may be cost-efficient to temporarily subsidize workers’
wages upon reemployment for a certain period if this leads to a perma-
nent increase in labor force participation and reduces applications to 
programs geared for the disabled or the poor.10 
Finally, given increasing evidence that children’s long-term eco-
nomic success might be influenced by the layoff of a parent, it is worth 
considering ways to directly assist families with children. One possibil-
ity that builds on existing programs is to provide additional financial aid 
to cover college tuition and living expenses. While work on the cross-
generational effects of displacement is still developing, many families 
that experienced a layoff with children in college or nearing college 
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it may be worth exploring measures to help cover part of the costs of 
higher education or training for the children of job losers. 
Policy Initiatives to Avoid Mass Layoffs in Future Recessions 
It is likely that cost-effective government policies can help the long-
term unemployed find renewed employment. Yet, few measures prom-
ise to substantially reduce the long-term earnings losses that can afflict 
laid-off or unemployed workers. While Congress considers financial 
reform to safeguard against another financial crisis, it may be worth 
considering reforms that help prevent costly earnings losses during a 
future recession, such as work sharing. For jobs lost in declining firms 
or industries, this may mean that inevitable job destruction would be 
spread over time. Thus, layoffs would likely occur in a better economic 
environment and therefore lead to significantly smaller losses in earn-
ings. For jobs lost in economically viable sectors or at viable firms, 
work sharing could avoid costly breakup of productive employment 
relationships that would have likely continued in the absence of an eco-
nomic crisis. 
Two mechanisms to achieve such a temporary buffering of employ-
ment at firms in economic difficulties could be work-sharing arrange-
ments supported by the government, or private arrangements such as 
work-time accounts. Work sharing has effects that are similar to those 
of current measures to increase job creation through tax breaks or wage 
subsidies, except that incentives to generate employment are given 
prior to job displacement. In particular, instead of firing, say, 30 per-
cent of its workers, an employer would reduce hours worked by all 
of its workers by 30 percent. Government subsidies comprise part of 
workers’ reduced earnings. They could be financed partially by the UI 
system, in which case workers essentially draw part of the benefits they 
would have received if they had become unemployed. 
Work-sharing policies have been currently adopted by 21 U.S. 
states. Yet, these have a limited public commitment to replace earnings, 
so the take-up is relatively low. Even though a large amount of layoffs 
have already taken place, if expanded, such programs could increase 
aggregate employment by reducing continuing layoffs at those firms 
that keep shedding workers.11 Work sharing was also available to firms 
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helped avert a significant number of layoffs, despite a drop in GDP
growth that was larger than the decline in the United States.12 Clearly, it 
is important to pay attention to the details of such an arrangement. From 
the point of view of UI, being unemployed is a clearly defined state. For 
administering work sharing, it may be difficult to screen eligible firms. 
Yet, the successful implementation by many states suggests that these 
difficulties can be surmounted on a practical level. 
The evaluation of work sharing is still at an early stage. However, it 
comes with lower financial involvement and less direct steering of eco-
nomic activities than more targeted interventions, and is likely to extend 
the benefits of government support to a much broader group of workers. 
A related strategy to help avert layoffs of productive workers would 
be to create programs geared to maintain access to short-term credit to 
firms in financial distress that are otherwise economically viable. This 
approach would be most sensible in times of a sudden reduction in pri-
vate credit, such as what occurred after the financial crisis in 2008. 
A second approach would be to encourage workers and firms to 
find private solutions to reduce the risk of layoffs, such as work-time 
accounts based on an agreement between workers and firms to smooth 
hours over the business cycle. Thus, effectively the firm saves part of 
the overtime pay on behalf of workers during good economic times, 
and draws down balances when economic conditions worsen instead of 
firing the worker. In addition to work sharing, such work-time accounts 
were a major factor in keeping layoffs to a minimum in Germany dur-
ing the current recession. The use of these accounts was particularly 
prevalent in sectors that exhibited stable growth prior to the crisis and 
were experiencing shortages in skilled labor (Möller 2010). Such an 
arrangement is based on long-term relationships between workers and 
firms that involve some degree of firm- or sector-specific skills. While 
the paradigm in the United States is one of high labor turnover, many 
employment relationships are long-lasting, and employers invest in 
searching for and training workers. Thus, in light of the large costs of 
job displacement, such arrangements may be beneficial to both workers 
and firms.13 
Clearly, layoffs cannot be prevented altogether and are to some 
extent a natural feature of a market economy. However, in special cir-
cumstances, such as the financial crisis of 2008 or high interest rates 
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to costly layoffs as productive employment relationships are severed. 
Similarly, layoffs in declining industries might be accelerated, leading 
to large-scale layoffs that exceed the capacity of the labor market to 
reallocate these workers. For such cases, mechanisms that allow firms 
to avoid large-scale layoffs could prevent large and lasting conse-
quences affecting a high number of workers. The potential benefit of 
such safeguards is underscored by the difficulty of alleviating the long-
term consequences of workers affected by layoffs and unemployment. 
CONCLUSION
An increasing number of studies indicate that job loss and unem-
ployment during recessions can impose large and lasting costs on 
affected workers and their families. The short-term burden of these 
costs can be alleviated relatively cost-effectively, such as by extending 
UI. Less is known about how to help workers adjust to the significant 
long-term costs. While cost-effective policies exist to reintegrate the 
long-term unemployed into the labor market, the potential for policy 
interventions to reduce long-term earnings losses appears less promis-
ing. Given the large long-term costs of layoffs and unemployment, pre-
ventive measures to avoid large-scale layoffs in future recessions are 
worth exploring further. 
Notes 
This chapter is based on a testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of U.S. 
Congress on April 29, 2010, on “Long-Term Unemployment: Causes, Consequences 
and Solutions,” as well as a presentation at the Reconnecting to Work conference at the 
University of California–Los Angeles. 
1. Davis and von Wachter (2012) contrast the effects of job loss in booms and reces-
sions. Farber (2005) provides estimates of the short-term costs of job loss for the 
United States over the past two decades. Couch and Placzek (2010), Kodrzycki 
(2007), Schoeni and Dardia (2003), and von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth 
(2008) show medium-run estimates for California, Connecticut, and Massachu-
setts in the early 1990s. 
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firm characteristics; the effect of layoffs is not larger when firms displace fewer 
workers, such as during smaller layoffs or good economic times. 
3. For a more technical overview, see Meyer (2002). 
4. This point is made by Chetty (2008), who estimates that over half of employment 
effects of UI may be due to such an income effect. 
5. The take-up rate of UI fluctuates between 40 and 50 percent for all unemployed 
and between 70 and 80 percent among job losers (Congressional Budget Office 
2004). A similar back of the envelope calculation and caveat is made by Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Şahin (2010, Section 3.2). 
6. Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) discuss the role of aggregate factors in deter-
mining the employment effects of UI extensions; Rothstein (2011) provides esti-
mates suggesting small to moderate employment effects of UI extensions in the 
United States during the Great Recession of 2008. 
7. For example, for an assessment of the effect of wage subsidies, see Perloff and 
Wachter (1979) and Congressional Budget Office (2010). For an assessment of the 
effect of training programs for displaced workers see U.S. Department of Labor 
(1995, Section 5). For a meta-analysis of the effect of various labor market poli-
cies, see Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010). 
8. While the average returns from training are positive, relatively few displaced 
workers take up training (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 2005). 
9. U.S. Department of Labor (1995, Section 5). For a survey of recent evidence see 
Jacobson (2009). 
10. This has been recently advocated under the name of wage insurance, for example, 
by Kling (2006); Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993); and Litan and Kletzer 
(2001). Evidence on related reemployment bonus experiments suggests that short-
term subsidies raise employment, but may only be cost-effective if targeted to 
workers most likely to exhaust their benefits (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 
2005; U.S. Department of Labor 1995). 
11. This argument is spelled out in Hassett’s (2010) testimony to the House Commit-
tee on Financial Services. 
12. Burda and Hunt (2011) and Möller (2010) assess the role of work sharing and 
work-time accounts in averting layoffs in Germany. 
13. A small theoretical literature discusses why such contracts are not prevalent in the 
United States (Grossman and Hart 1983; Ramey and Watson 1997). 
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Labor Market Policy 
in the Great Recession 
Lessons from Denmark and Germany 
John Schmitt 
Center for Economic and Policy Research 
The Great Recession started in the United States, but it quickly 
spread to the rest of the world. Although some countries fared even 
worse than the United States, many have weathered the crisis better. 
This chapter reviews the experience of 21 rich countries that are all 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD)—a group of economies that offer a standard of living 
roughly comparable to that of the United States—in search of possible 
lessons for the United States. 
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage point change between 2007 and 
2009 in the unemployment rate across these 21 rich countries. Since 
national definitions of the unemployment rate vary somewhat, the fig-
ure uses “harmonized” unemployment rates prepared by the OECD. It 
covers a period that starts in 2007—the year just before the downturn 
hit most economies—and ends in 2009—the year that the economy 
reached its trough in most countries.1 The United States had the third-
highest increase in unemployment (4.7 percentage points), after Spain 
(9.7 percentage points) and Ireland (7.2 percentage points). In the other 
OECD economies, the increase in unemployment was less than 2.5 per-
centage points. Strikingly, the unemployment rate actually fell in Ger-
many (−1.2 percentage points). 
Economic theory suggests three possible reasons for the differ-
ent unemployment experience. The first is that the size of the negative 
demand shock might have varied across these economies. It could be, 
for example, that Spain suffered a larger negative demand shock than 
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most of the rest of the OECD. Since we can’t directly observe demand 
shocks, we can never be completely sure. But all of the evidence—pri-
marily the change in GDP—suggests that the demand shocks were large 
and negative across all of these economies. The shock to Germany, 
for example, was likely larger than the one that hit the United States: 
between 2007 and 2009, German GDP fell 3.8 percent, compared to a 
2.6 percent decline in the United States.2 
A second possible explanation for the different unemployment 
experiences is different macroeconomic policy responses. Even if 
all countries experienced exactly the same negative demand shock,
countercyclical macroeconomic policy—expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy—could have reduced the observed decline in GDP more 
in some countries than in others. Macroeconomic policy responses 
did vary widely across the OECD, but most analyses suggest that the 
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lowered interest rates farther and faster in the United States than, for 
example, the European Central Bank did in Europe.4 The United States 
also implemented the largest explicit fiscal stimulus package (as a share 
of GDP) among the major OECD countries. Other countries passed 
smaller stimulus packages, and automatic stabilizers were more impor-
tant parts of the fiscal response elsewhere, but, even taking all these 
measures into account, the fiscal response was likely faster and larger 
in the United States. 
A final possible explanation for the different international unem-
ployment experience in the downturn is the structure of labor markets. 
National labor market institutions likely vary in the way that they trans-
late a given decline in GDP into unemployment. The preceding dis-
cussion suggests that the United States experienced a negative demand 
shock somewhere in the middle of the OECD experience and responded 
in a way that partly mitigated the negative impact of that shock. If so, 
the large rise in U.S. unemployment suggests that U.S. labor market 
institutions offered a particularly harsh trade-off between falling GDP
and unemployment. By contrast, Germany appears to have experienced 
a larger negative demand shock and responded to that shock with less 
aggressive monetary and fiscal policy than the United States, yet unem-
ployment declined in Germany between 2007 and 2009. The German 
labor market institutions appear to have handled the demand shock 
extremely well. 
This chapter will focus on this third possible reason for interna-
tional differences in the labor market response to the Great Recession: 
national labor market institutions. The following section presents a brief 
framework for thinking about how labor market institutions and poli-
cies mediate the relationship between GDP and employment. The next 
section reviews the experience of two national economies: Denmark, 
which operated what was arguably the most successful labor market of 
the 2000s, and Germany, which has had remarkable success in resisting 
the international rise in unemployment since 2007. The final section 









LABOR MARkETS AND MACROECONOMIC SHOCkS 
Once a negative demand shock has hit and macroeconomic policy 
has been deployed in response, the path of employment and unemploy-
ment depends largely on the labor market. For the 21 rich OECD coun-
tries, Figure 3.2 graphs the change between 2007 and 2009 in the unem-
ployment rate against the corresponding change in real GDP. Over this 
two-year period, real GDP fell in every country except Austria. 
Figure 3.2 includes a regression line that traces the average relation-
ship between unemployment and GDP across the countries. Most of the 
countries in the sample (including Denmark) are clustered close to the 
average experience. These data suggest that the national labor market 
institutions in place in these countries converted a 1 percentage point 
decline in GDP into about a 0.4 percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment. Several of the countries, however, lie well off the line, indicat-
ing that they differ substantially from the OECD average. Germany, 
for example, falls well below the regression line. Any given decline in 
German GDP had far less impact on the unemployment rate than at the 
OECD average. The United States, Spain, and Ireland, meanwhile, all 
lie well above the regression line, suggesting that GDP declines in these 
countries are much more costly in terms of unemployment than was the 
case for the OECD in general. 
In broad terms, labor markets can adjust to macroeconomic demand 
shocks in some combination of two ways (with an important caveat, 
which will follow). Either employment can fall—fewer workers work-
ing the same number of hours as before (at the same hourly wage) meet 
the new lower output demanded—or average hours per worker can 
fall—the same number of workers spend fewer hours per week to pro-
duce the new output level.5 
Imagine that a particular decline in aggregate demand requires that 
employers reduce their total wage bill by 10 percent. The wage bill (B) 
is equal to the total number of employees (E), times the average number 
of hours they work (H/E), times the average hourly wage (W): 
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Employers could cut the wage bill by reducing employment by 10 
percent (E), or by reducing the average hours per worker (H/E) by 10 
percent (or, of course, by some combination of the two). As the dis-
cussion below suggests, labor market institutions play a crucial role in 
determining exactly where the adjustment falls. In Denmark, the United 
States, and most other countries in the OECD, much of the adjustment 
has fallen on employment (E), resulting in substantial increases in 
unemployment. In Germany, essentially all of adjustment has occurred 
through changes in average hours (H/E), resulting in a counterintuitive 
decline in unemployment there. 
One caveat applies, however. These adjustment mechanisms are 
incomplete on their own. One of the central insights of Keynes’s Gen-
eral Theory (1936) was that cuts in workers’ incomes, whatever form 
they take, cannot restore full employment in the face of a shortfall in 






workers’ take-home pay in order to bring their individual wage bills into 
line with the lower level of aggregate demand has the effect of further 
lowering aggregate demand. Labor market adjustments take place, but 
in the middle of an aggregate demand slump, they cannot restore full 
employment without offsetting expansionary macroeconomic policy or 
some new, positive aggregate demand shock. This new, positive demand 
shock could take many forms, some of which are more desirable than 
others. The short U.S. recession of 2001, for example, ended primar-
ily because of demand fueled by the housing bubble. Economists have 
long argued, however, that wage-led growth offers a more sustainable 
avenue for reviving and maintaining aggregate demand (see Berg and 
Ostry [2011], Coats [2011], Kalecki [1991], and Palley [2011]). 
THE GREAT RECESSION IN DENMARk AND GERMANy 
Labor market institutions have been at the center of the discussion of 
labor market performance since at least the 1980s, when unemployment 
rose sharply and remained stubbornly high in most of the major OECD 
economies. A standard view, encapsulated in the OECD’s 1994 Jobs 
Study, maintains that labor market institutions are the primary deter-
minant of labor market performance. In this framework, labor market 
institutions should first and foremost seek to maximize “flexibility”; 
other economic and social goals of labor market institutions—includ-
ing economic security and equity—are distinctly secondary. This view 
generally leaves aside the role that macroeconomic policy plays in the 
smooth functioning of the labor market. To the extent that this approach 
does acknowledge the importance of macroeconomics, it is usually to 
argue that institutions such as unions, UI, and employment protection 
legislation restrict the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy by intro-
ducing “rigidities” that channel expansionary policies toward inflation, 
not job creation.6 
In the mid-2000s, this standard view was updated and amended in 
the face of substantial evidence that countries with what qualified as 
“rigid” labor markets by many of the usual indicators (high union cov-
erage rates, generous unemployment benefits, and strong employment 
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brought explicit recognition to two key ideas. The first was that the 
previous understanding of flexibility was too narrow. Unemployment 
insurance, for example, might reduce incentives for the unemployed to 
accept jobs, but these same benefits might improve the quality of even-
tual job matches by giving workers more time to search. A second key 
idea was that the interaction of labor market institutions matters more 
than the specific institutions separately. In some contexts, high unem-
ployment benefits might raise the unemployment rate. In others, the 
existence of generous unemployment benefits might persuade work-
ers and unions to accept lower levels of legal employment protection, 
resulting in a more, not less, dynamic labor market. 
The rest of this section reviews the recent experience of two coun-
tries with very different experiences before and after the Great Reces-
sion. Denmark had what was arguably the OECD’s best performing 
labor markets before the Great Recession, but has suffered since 2008. 
German labor markets, meanwhile, were generally struggling shortly 
after unification until the end of 2007, when suddenly Germany began 
to outperform every major economy in the OECD. 
DENMARk 
The experience of the Danish economy from the mid-1990s through 
the Great Recession did a great deal to change the consensus view on 
the need for labor market “flexibility” at all costs (see, for example, 
OECD [2004, 2006] and European Commission [2006]). In 2007, just 
before the downturn, the Danish unemployment rate was 4.0 percent 
(compared to 4.6 percent in the United States), and the employment-
to-population rate was 77.1 percent (compared to 71.8 percent in the 
United States).8 Low-wage work was rare, and income inequality was 
near the lowest levels in the OECD (see Mason and Salverda [2010]; 
OECD [2011, Figure 1]; and Westergaard-Nielsen [2008]). Yet, by 
OECD standards, Denmark had high taxes, high unionization rates, 
generous unemployment benefits, and a costly system of education, 
training, assistance, and incentives for unemployed workers. 
The Danish model—often described as being built around flexicu-










ity for employers with equally high levels of security for workers. The 
flexibility came primarily in the form of low levels of legal employment 
protections combined with a willingness of Danish unions to accept lay-
offs. The security came in the form of high wages, strong unions, and 
generous UI and other benefits.9 A defining Danish labor market institu-
tion has been its collection of active labor market policies (ALMPs). 
These policies, targeted at unemployed workers, include education 
and training, extensive assistance in job search, financial incentives, 
subsidized employment, and, in some cases, even direct public-sector 
employment. Active labor market policies increase flexibility by mov-
ing the unemployed through the generous unemployment benefits sys-
tem and enhance security by improving skills and providing temporary, 
subsidized employment opportunities for workers who otherwise might 
spend long periods unemployed. 
From about the middle of the 1990s through the onset of the Great 
Recession, the system produced enviable results. The unemployment 
rate fell rapidly, from over 10 percent in 1993 to less than 5 percent 
by 2000, a range where it remained until 2008. Most accounts explain 
these results by emphasizing the way that the flexicurity institutions 
supported a dynamic labor market that was capable of rapidly reallocat-
ing workers from firms and sectors in the economy where demand was 
falling to firms and sectors where demand was on the rise (see OECD 
[2004, 2006] and European Commission [2006]). Politically, the sys-
tem worked because workers and their unions felt secure enough about 
their incomes to agree to only limited legal and negotiated job security. 
Employers accepted the higher taxes and an important economic role 
for unions because these were the political conditions that made the 
greater numerical flexibility possible. 
Figures 3.3–3.7 put the salient features of the Danish system into 
international perspective. As Figure 3.3 shows, Denmark has an excep-
tionally large commitment to ALMPs. The share of national GDP spent 
on ALMPs (per percentage point of unemployment) was the highest in 
the OECD.10 Using this standard measure, in 2007, before unemploy-
ment in Denmark increased, the country spent 0.26 percent of GDP
per percentage point of unemployment—about 12 times more than the 
United States (0.02 percent of GDP per point of unemployment) and 
about 5 times more than Germany (0.05). 
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One of the standard justifications for the large scale of Danish 
ALMPs is that they are necessary to ensure that the unemployed don’t 
get stuck in the country’s generous, union-administered, unemployment 
benefit system. The OECD data in Figure 3.4 support the view that 
unemployment benefits in Denmark are fairly generous by international 
standards. An average worker receives about 70 percent of the average 
wage during their initial period of unemployment, slightly less gen-
erous than Germany (74 percent), but more generous than the United 
States (58 percent).11 
Denmark is also heavily unionized. As Figure 3.5 shows, over 80 
percent of Danish workers are covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, more than in Germany (63 percent), and far above the level in the 
United States (13 percent). 
At the same time, Denmark provides a relatively low level of legal 
employment protection. Figure 3.6 presents an index of the strength of 
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employment protection legislation (EPL) based on the OECD’s assess-
ment of legal and bargained conditions on severance pay, advance noti-
fication of dismissal, legal procedures related to unfair dismissal, and 
related issues. The index runs from zero (essentially no legal employ-
ment protections) to six (a very high level of legal employment protec-
tion). On this scale, Denmark (1.6) lies closer to the English-speaking 
economies (Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United King-
dom, and the United States) than it does to Germany (3.0), Sweden 
(2.9), and France (2.5), where employment protections are stronger. 
This combination of institutions performed well between the mid-
dle of the 1990s and the onset of the Great Recession. These same insti-
tutions, however, have not fared so well in the current downturn. Figure 
3.7 compares the increase between 2007 and 2010 in the unemployment 




Labor Market Policy in the Great Recession 47 







































0 25 50 75 100 
Percent of workforce 
SOURCE: Visser, ITCWSS data, http://www.uva-aias.net/208. 
country with the largest increase in unemployment over the period). 
Between 2007 and 2010, the Danish unemployment rate almost dou-
bled from 4.0 to 7.8 percent, more closely tracking the experience of 
Spain and the United States than of Germany. 
Figure 3.8 sketches the labor market adjustment path in Denmark 
between 2007 and 2009. Total employment and total hours worked 
increased about 2 percent between 2007 and 2008—the crisis hit Den-
mark later than most of the rest of the OECD. Between 2008 and 2009, 
however, total employment and total hours both fell sharply. Total hours 
fell to about 2 percent below their 2007 level, with almost all of this 
reduction in total hours stemming from a decline in the total number of 
workers. The Danish economy did not adjust to the labor-demand shock 
by lowering the average number of hours worked by the existing work-
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relatively small cuts in the average hours worked. In the framework 
discussed earlier, almost all of the adjustment fell on employment cuts 
and very little on average hours reductions. 
Why did the Danish system suddenly lose its luster? One explana-
tion is that the same institutions that created a dynamic labor market 
in good macroeconomic times acted to accelerate job loss during the 
downturn. Low dismissal costs produced dynamism when there was 
sufficient macroeconomic demand to produce full employment. How-
ever, low dismissal costs encouraged employers to reduce employment 
(rather than hours) when aggregate demand fell. Meanwhile, the coun-
try’s superb system of ALMPs was poorly equipped to deal with aggre-
gate demand slumps. The majority of ALMPs seek to “activate” unem-
ployed workers through training or by connecting them with available 
jobs. Even the best ALMPs, however, cannot connect workers to jobs 
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The Danish model worked well when aggregate demand was high 
enough to ensure full employment. When the economy was operating 
near full employment, the main economic bottlenecks were on the sup-
ply side of the labor market (labor quality, the distribution of skills, and 
location of workers relative to jobs). When the bottlenecks were on the 
demand side, however, greater numerical flexibility did little to gener-
ate employment and helped to drive unemployment up. A real danger 
for Denmark going forward is that the cyclical flaws in the model will 
be used to dismantle rather than reform these institutions. The German 
case suggests that a combination of numerical flexibility—in hours— 
combined with moderate legal and bargained dismissal costs can pro-
duce far better outcomes in downturns. This experience should inform 
efforts to improve the ability of Danish institutions to respond to future 
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GERMANy 
Before the Great Recession, Germany was not the ideal model of 
labor market performance. Unemployment was high, job creation was 
weak, and wage inequality was on the rise, primarily because of the 
sharp rise in low-wage and precarious employment that began in the 
mid to late 1990s.12 German companies were profitable and the country 
was a successful exporter, but the labor market was generally not deliv-
ering. The German labor market’s performance since the Great Reces-
sion, however, has been remarkable. In 2007, before the downturn, the 
German unemployment rate was 8.7 percent (using the OECD’s inter-
nationally comparable measure, which differs slightly from the official 
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of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate in Germany had fallen 
to 7.5 percent. 
The German unemployment rate dropped because labor market 
adjustment fell entirely on hours, not employment (or wages). Figure 
3.9 shows the change in hours and employment between 2007 and 2009. 
The contrast with Denmark is striking. The Great Recession affected 
both countries later than in the United States, but once the downturn hit, 
total hours fell in Germany—to about 98 percent of 2007 levels—even 
as total employment remained constant. Effectively, reductions in the 
average hours worked absorbed all of the decline in labor demand in 
Germany. By contrast, in Denmark the reduction in labor demand fell 
strongly on total employment, with only small reductions in average 
hours worked per employee. 
How did Germany manage this? A key element was the German 
system of short-time work (STW) programs, which provide part-time 
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unemployment benefits to workers who have had their hours reduced in 
response to declines in demand for their employers’ products and ser-
vices.13 In a traditional UI program, if an employer needs to cut employ-
ment by 20 percent in the wake of a demand shock, the employer will 
lay off 20 percent of workers who, assuming that they individually meet 
eligibility requirements, will receive UI benefits. In a STW system, the 
same employer could instead cut average hours for all employees by 
20 percent, and each employee (again, assuming individual eligibil-
ity requirements are met) would receive 20 percent of the full-time UI 
benefit. Germany had a long-standing STW system in place before the 
downturn, and participation increased rapidly by the end of 2008 (Inter-
national Labor Organization [ILO] 2011, Figure 3.5). By 2009, Ger-
many had one of the highest shares of its workforce enrolled in STW
programs (see Figure 3.10). 
Short-time work, however, was only part of the hours adjustment in 
Germany. According to an analysis by Fuchs et al. (2010) of the change 
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in the average hours worked between 2008 and 2009, STW accounted 
for about 25 percent of the decline in average hours (see Table 3.1).14 
Employer-initiated reductions in working time—usually implemented 
through collective-bargaining agreements—were even more important 
than STW, accounting for about 40 percent of the decrease in hours. 
Another 20 percent of the decline in hours was due to the debiting of 
workers’ working-time accounts. About two-thirds of German compa-
nies have working-time accounts in place, where employees who work 
more than the normally scheduled number of hours (or work weekends, 
evenings, and holidays, or under other circumstances) can “bank” these 
hours against future hours of work.15 In the recession, many employ-
ers—with the agreement of workers and their unions—cut hours worked 
and paid workers out of the hours accumulated in these working-time 
accounts, rather than laying them off. Reductions in overtime accounted 
for an additional 20 percent of the decline in average hours worked. 
A review of the German experience suggests that several institu-
tional features pushed employers to reduce hours rather than work-
ers. Relatively high levels of legal employment protection (see Fig-
ure 3.6) made it more expensive for firms to lay workers off than to 
reduce hours. Relatively high levels of collective-bargaining coverage 
(see Figure 3.5), combined with a union focus on job security, further 
raised the relative cost of layoffs. The widespread presence of collec-
tive bargaining facilitated hours flexibility by implementing negotiated 
working-time banks and allowing for negotiated reductions in overtime 
and the usual workweek. Together, this institutional structure gave sub-
stantial incentives to firms to prefer hours reductions to employment 
cuts, and gave workers incentives to do the same. 
Germany faces its own set of institutional challenges. Critics of the 
German response to the Great Recession have argued that the strong 
Table 3.1  Average Hours Reductions in Germany, 2008–2009 (%)
Proportion of average hours reduction due to: 
Increased short-time work 25 
Employer-initiated reductions in working time 40 
Debiting working-time accounts 20 
Reduced overtime 20 
NOTE: Factors are approximate and therefore do not sum to 100. 








emphasis on “labor hoarding” at the firm level may mean that the econ-
omy is not efficiently reallocating labor from firms and sectors that are 
lagging to those that are growing. This argument, however, assumes 
that the problem facing German firms in the downturn is their indi-
vidual or industry performance, rather than an across-the-board col-
lapse in demand. In some respects, though, this concern presents the 
mirror image of the problem facing Denmark. The German system, as 
implemented since 2008, has done an excellent job coping with a deep 
recession, but a reliance on hours adjustments alone could conceivably 
create efficiency problems when the economy is operating closer to 
full employment. If an individual firm is facing a long-term decline in 
demand for its output, for example, it is not likely to be socially efficient 
—beyond a transition period—to adjust to that firm-specific decline in 
demand by keeping workers tied to the declining firm. But, this kind 
of reasoning suggests modifying the functioning of the STW system 
in good times, so as to ensure that STW does not impede the efficient 
reallocation of workers across firms and sectors when the economy is 
operating near full capacity. In fact, the German STW system already 
appears to incorporate this kind of flexibility across the business cycle. 
Before the downturn, participation in STW was limited to six months, 
but as the economy deteriorated, the maximum duration of STW was 
expanded successively to 12, 18, and then 24 months (ILO 2011). 
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The recent experiences of Denmark and Germany provide impor-
tant insight into the interplay between labor market institutions and 
business cycles. Danish institutions—built around numerically flexible 
employment levels and strong income security for workers—appear to 
perform well when the economy is at or near full employment. In good 
times, the country’s expensive ALMPs work to connect unemployed 
workers to available jobs. In a severe downturn in which the over-
whelming cause of unemployment is a lack of aggregate demand, how-
ever, institutions that encourage adjustment through employment are a 
liability, and policies that seek to “activate” workers are not particularly 
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ers connected to their current employers, may have drawbacks when 
the economy is operating near full employment because they may dis-
courage the efficient reallocation of workers from firms and industries 
where demand is falling to firms and industries where demand is on the 
rise. These same institutions, however, appear to have been well-suited 
for coping with the Great Recession because they encouraged firms to 
cut hours rather than workers, sharing the burden of the downturn more 
widely and helping firms keep their workforces in place and ready for 
the subsequent upturn. 
In the United States, the hours and employment response to the 
Great Recession looked more like it did in Denmark than Germany. 
The recession hit U.S. labor markets slowly at first, but between 2008 
and 2009, employment and hours both fell sharply (see Figure 3.11). By 
2009, employment was about 4 percent lower than it had been in 2007, 
and total hours were down almost 6 percent. The larger drop in hours 
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than in employment implies that some of the labor market adjustment in 
the United States fell on the average number of hours worked. Employ-
ment losses, however, still accounted for the large majority of the 
adjustment. A simple decomposition suggests that the mix of declines 
in employment and in average hours worked was similar in the United 
States and Denmark. In both countries, about 30 percent of the decline 
in total hours was the result of a decline in average hours per employee, 
and about 70 percent was the result of lower levels of employment.16 
The hours decline in the United States largely reflected a rise in 
part-time work for economic reasons, reductions in overtime, and 
reductions in the average hours of full-time employees. Overall, U.S. 
labor market institutions did little to encourage firms to reduce average 
hours rather than employment levels. On the one hand, firing costs are 
low: the United States has the lowest level of employment protection 
(see Figure 3.6) and the lowest level of collective bargaining cover-
age (see Figure 3.5) in the OECD. On the other hand, the structure of 
employer-provided benefits, particularly health insurance, make hours 
cuts a less cost-effective tool for lowering total compensation. While 17 
states operated short-time unemployment compensation programs dur-
ing the Great Recession, take-up rates were too low to have a measure-
able impact on national average hours worked. At their peak, participa-
tion rates in STW programs, for example, never exceed a few tenths of 
a percent of the total U.S. workforce (see Figure 3.10).17 
Are there any direct lessons that the United States can learn from 
the experience of Denmark and Germany? The political debate around 
“structural unemployment”—the idea that unemployment has remained 
high because workers lack the skills in demand in the postrecession 
economy—has rekindled an interest in education and training as a 
means to rescue the labor market in the short term.18 Yet, on a per-
unemployed-worker basis, Denmark spends more than 12 times what 
the United States does to train and “activate” unemployed workers, with 
only moderately better outcomes since the beginning of the downturn. 
In general, supply-side ALMP strategies seem poorly suited to reces-
sions caused by deficient demand. At least with respect to performance 
in an aggregate demand slump, the Danish system appears to emulate a 
lot of the least desirable features of the U.S. system, including low fir-
ing costs that encourage firms to adjust to downturns by cutting workers 
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The German response to the downturn, in contrast, suggests that 
labor market institutions that encourage hours reductions rather than 
layoffs can spread the pain of adjustment more equitably, as well as act 
to preserve good matches between workers and firms. German insti-
tutions raise the cost of firing workers—through employment protec-
tion legislation and collective bargaining agreements—and encourage 
reductions in average hours—through STW arrangements, withdrawals 
from collectively bargained working-time accounts, and collectively 
bargained reductions in the usual workweek and overtime. 
Translating these lessons to the U.S. context, however, is a chal-
lenge. Firing costs are low in the United States, and the two main ave-
nues for raising firing costs—employment protection legislation or a 
rapid expansion in collective bargaining—appear unlikely in the fore-
seeable future. Individual states could expand the use of STW programs 
within their UI systems, but the scale of expansion necessary would be 
substantial and would require addressing a host of concrete barriers that 
keep take-up rates low (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). 
A federal program to subsidize temporary reductions in work 
hours—by giving tax credits to employers who implement or expand 
paid sick days, paid family leave, paid vacations, four-day workweeks, 
or other practices that reduce hours—instead of, or in addition to, 
expanding state-level UI programs might also help.19 One advantage 
of a temporary federal tax break for these practices is that such a sys-
tem directly targets the high cost of cutting hours relative to cutting 
workers, which has limited the take-up rate for STW programs in the 
United States. Even in Germany, which has higher firing costs and a 
long-standing STW system, STW accounted for only about one-fourth 
of the decline in average hours. 
In labor markets, at least, the Great Recession continues. Given 
the political discussion around debt and deficits, any further macro-
economic policy response to the ongoing problems in the labor market 
seems unlikely. That leaves the United States little choice but to learn 
what it can from the labor market experiences of other countries that 
are also facing the worst downturn since the Great Depression. Unfor-
tunately, U.S. labor market institutions have fared much worse than the 
OECD average since 2007, turning any given decline in GDP into far 
more unemployment than almost every major economy in the OECD. 
To the extent that U.S. policymakers have decided on any course of 
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action, it appears to be, in President Obama’s words, to “win the future” 
by investing in education and training. The experience of Denmark, 
which won the future in the 1990s and 2000s, however, gives cause for 
caution. Education, training, and other measures to connect workers to 
jobs only work when there are jobs to be had. For the immediate future, 
the experience of Germany looks to offer a better way forward. German 
labor market institutions gave employers incentives to spread the pain 
across the full workforce, with the remarkable result that the unemploy-
ment rate there actually fell over the course of the Great Recession. 
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1. The National Bureau of Economic Research marks the beginning of the recession 
in the United States at December 2007, with the trough in June 2009. The down-
turn generally hit the rest of the world later, in 2008. For a summary of the timing 
of the recession in European economies, see Cameron (2010, Table 2). 
2. The German economy was particularly vulnerable to the Great Recession because 
world trade collapsed in the downturn and exports are such an important part of 
the German economy. The main source of the shock in the United States was the 
collapse in the residential housing market. Construction and real-estate-related 
employment plummeted, but the main blow came through the (still not quite com-
plete) deflation of the housing bubble, which greatly reduced household net worth 
and induced a severe contraction in spending. See, for example, Baker (2009a) 
and Bivens (2011). 
3. See, for example, OECD (2009) and ILO (2009). For a dissenting view on com-
parative fiscal policy, see Aizenman and Pasricha (2011), but note that their defi-
nition of fiscal stimulus is narrow, excluding tax cuts and increases in unemploy-
ment benefits, for example. 
4. For an illustration of key interest rates across a sample of the major OECD econo-
mies, see ILO (2011, Figure 2.2). 
5. A third possibility is that total employment and average hours remain constant, 
but the hourly wage falls. Assuming that average productivity remains constant, 
however, the wage cut alone doesn’t lower output to match the new lower level of 
demand facing the firm. 
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many others, Howell (2005), Schmitt and Wadsworth (2005), and Baccaro and Rei 
(2007). 
7. For a succinct summary of the amended thinking, see OECD (2006, Chapter 3). 
8. Rate is for population ages 15–64; see OECD (2010, Table B). 
9. The Danish UI system is administered by the country’s unions, not the government. 
10. Expenditures (as a share of GDP) per percentage point of unemployment is a stan-
dard measure of the generosity of national ALMP programs. Using only expendi-
tures (as a share of GDP) would exaggerate the generosity of ALMP programs in 
the case of countries with high levels of unemployment. In the case of Denmark, 
dividing the total expenditures (as a share of GDP) by the unemployment rate 
emphasizes that the Danish system is exceptionally generous—per unemployed 
worker. 
11. The figure shows the OECD’s estimate of the (unweighted) average net replace-
ment rate during the “initial phase of unemployment” for a worker at average 
earnings across six family types. These results are conditional on receipt of ben-
efits, that is, the generosity estimate does not factor in the share of the unemployed 
who are eligible for and take up unemployment benefits. In the current downturn, 
take-up rates in the United States have been as high as three-fourths; in normal 
times, including earlier recessions, the take-up rate in the United States is typically 
between one-third and one-half. 
12. For a discussion of German and related European economic policy and perfor-
mance since reunification, see Bosch and Weinkopf (2008), Carlin and Soskice 
(2009), Leschke and Watt (2010), Möller (2010), and Schettkat and Sun (2009). 
13. For discussions of STW in Germany and elsewhere in the OECD, see Cahuc and 
Carcillo (2011), Hijzen and Venn (2011), ILO (2011), and Vroman and Brusentsev 
(2009). 
14. The original analysis is in Fuchs et al. (2010). I rely here on the ILO’s (2011) 
presentation of its findings. 
15. For a helpful discussion in English of the German system, see Fagan, Hegewisch, 
and Pillinger (2006). 
16. Between 2007 and 2009, total hours fell 5.8 percent and total employment fell 4.2 
percent. The 4.2 percent decline in employment represents about 72 percent of the 
5.8 percent decline in total hours, with about 28 percent accounted for by a decline 
in the average hours worked by the remaining workers. In Denmark, total hours 
fell 1.9 percent and total employment fell 1.3 percent, implying that employment 
declines accounted for about 68 percent and average-hours declines about 32 per-
cent of the decline in total hours. 
17. See Hijzen and Venn (2011, Figure 4). For a discussion of the limitations of exist-
ing U.S. short-time compensation programs, see Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) 
and Hijzen and Venn (2011). 
18. For evidence against a large, permanent rise in the “natural” unemployment rate, 
see Daly, Hobijn, and Valletta (2011); Mishel (2011); Mishel, Shierholz, and 
Edwards (2010); Schmitt and Warner (2011); and Weidner and Williams (2011). 
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Unemployment is costly to society and individuals. Fifty years ago 
economist Arthur Okun (1962) demonstrated that for the United States 
in the postwar period, a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate 
is associated with a 3 percent decline in gross national product. Sub-
sequent work (Moosa 1997) revealed that this rule of thumb, known 
as Okun’s Law, closely characterizes most developed economies. At 
the individual level, unemployed persons who are laid off experience 
financial losses in the form of a drop in income, even if they are covered 
by UI. Moreover, when reemployed, their wages typically fall short of 
their previous level for a number of reasons, one of which is that work-
ers’ skills are not fully portable across firms, occupations, and indus-
tries (Goldsmith and Veum 2002). 
Social scientists also assert that unemployment lasting more than 
a few weeks is damaging to mental health. For instance, two meta-
analytic studies (McKee-Ryan et al. 2005; Paul and Moser 2009) report 
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being after controlling for a wide range of factors expected to influence 
emotional health. However, a largely unresolved issue is whether the 
poor mental health status associated with the unemployed is caused by 
their involuntary joblessness. The purpose of this chapter is to move 
toward resolution of that question. First, we offer a new method for 
identifying whether there is a causal link between exposure to unem-
ployment and emotional well-being. Second, by using this identifi-
cation strategy, and by drawing upon data from two large nationally 
representative data sources—the National Comorbidity Survey Rep-
lication (NCS-R) and the National Latino and Asian American Study 
(NLAAS)—we estimate the impact of both short-term and long-term 
unemployment on a broad measure of emotional health. 
UNEMPLOyMENT, PSyCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, 
AND CAUSALITy
Social psychologists have proposed a number of pathways whereby 
involuntary joblessness potentially diminishes emotional well-being. 
Jahoda (1982) contends that unemployment is psychologically destruc-
tive primarily because it deprives an individual of the latent by-
products of work, including a structured day, shared experiences, sta-
tus, and opportunities for creativity and mastery.1 Erikson (1959), in 
his life-span development theory, asserts that healthy emotional well-
being as an adult is contingent upon the realization of occupational suc-
cess for those intent on being breadwinners; therefore, unemployment 
is harmful to mental health. Attribution theory (Heider 1958; Weiner 
1974) suggests that individuals seek an explanation for developments 
in their lives. Those who blame themselves for undesirable happen-
ings such as involuntary joblessness are likely to experience feelings of 
“helplessness” (Seligman 1975), which damages mood (i.e., depression, 
anxiety) and self-perception.2 Thus, for these persons, unemployment is 
expected to foster psychological distress. Anumber of psychologists and 
epidemiologists have asserted that the deleterious effects of unemploy-
ment increase as unemployment duration advances (Jackson and Warr 
1984). They support the idea that stress accumulates, so there is reason 
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tionally damaging than prior weeks (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld 1938;
Harrison 1976). This suggests that long-term unemployment is more 
harmful to psychological well-being than short-term unemployment. 
There is an extensive empirical literature dating to the Great 
Depression that documents a negative association between unemploy-
ment and psychological health.3 Ethnographic studies conducted by 
Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel (1933) and Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld 
(1938) found that the unemployed exhibited both poor emotional well-
being and an inferior view of themselves. Subsequently psychologists 
have developed inventories of questions designed to measure various 
dimensions of psychological health, including depression (Beck et 
al. 1961); anxiety (Spielberger et al. 1983); mastery or self-efficacy 
(Pearlin et al. 1981; Rotter 1966); self-esteem (Rosenberg 1965); and 
general psychiatric status (Goldberg and Blackwell 1970). Using these 
measures, numerous researchers conducting quantitative studies using 
cross-sectional survey data report that unemployed groups have lower 
levels of psychological well-being than employed groups. Unemployed 
persons have been found to exhibit higher levels of depression (Fryer 
and Payne 1986) and anxiety (Kessler, Turner, and House 1989), as 
well as lower levels of self-esteem (Feather 1982; Goldsmith, Veum, 
and Darity 1997) and self-efficacy (Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity 1995) 
compared to the employed.4 However, because unemployment can be 
the consequence of poor mental health, it is not appropriate to interpret 
these results as conclusive evidence that unemployment causes deterio-
ration in emotional well-being. 
A common strategy to address the issue of reverse causality is to 
use longitudinal or panel data and examine whether changes in men-
tal health coincide with changes in workforce status. The fundamental 
idea is that if involuntary joblessness leads to psychological distress, 
then persons moving from an employed to an unemployed state will 
exhibit a decline in mental health, and those switching over time from 
an unemployed to a working state will experience an improvement in 
psychological well-being. Numerous researchers report evidence con-
sistent with this perspective. Their findings, although compelling, are 
not definitive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that unemployment 
causes deterioration in mental health.5 The problem is that it is still 
possible that an individual’s emotional well-being changed, for some 
reason, prior to the alteration in workforce status. We attempt to shed 
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further light on the question of causality by examining whether psycho-
logically resilient persons (i.e., individuals who have always exhibited 
sound emotional well-being) exposed to unemployment in the past year 
are more likely to experience their first spell of poor emotional well-
being than persons employed throughout the past year. 
DATA AND A STRATEGy FOR DETERMINING IF
UNEMPLOyMENT CAUSES POOR MENTAL HEALTH
Data and Methodology 
The NCS-R and the NLAAS were designed to collect informa-
tion on potential determinants of mental disorders in the United States 
through face-to-face interviews with respondents conducted in the pri-
vacy of their homes. The NCS-R was carried out on a nationally rep-
resentative group of 9,282 racially and ethnically diverse respondents 
between February 2001 and April 2003. The NLAAS contains infor-
mation on a nationally representative group of 4,649 Latino or Asian 
respondents collected between May 2002 and November 2003. These 
data sets, which we merge together, are ideal to use in our investigation 
of whether a causal link exists between unemployment and emotional 
health because of the way that the survey collects respondent informa-
tion on emotional well-being. 
The NCS-R and the NLAAS respondents provided retrospective 
information on whether they were sad, empty, discouraged, depressed, 
or disinterested most of the day nearly every day for at least two weeks 
or every month in the past year, which we use to construct a broad 
measure of psychological distress.6 An unusual and desirable feature of 
the survey is that respondents who had suffered psychological distress 
were asked to provide the year during which they first suffered a bout 
of poor emotional health. We take advantage of this unique aspect of 
the NCS-R and the NLAAS to develop a new strategy for assessing the 
link between unemployment and psychological health. Using informa-
tion on the year of first onset of poor psychological health, we stratify 
our data into two separate subsamples or data sets. We construct a data 
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who have either never experienced a significant bout of poor emotional 
well-being or had their first spell in the past year—and a second data set 
of psychologically vulnerable persons (vulnerable)—those who have 
experienced psychological distress in prior years. 
The resilient subsample allows us to focus on those individuals 
without previous bouts of poor mental health. We suspect that persons 
who report never experiencing sustained psychological distress over 
the course of their life cycle and who are in the workforce will con-
tinue to be emotionally healthy. The resilient subsample allows us to 
analyze those least likely to have a bout of poor mental health leading 
to unemployment. Therefore, the findings of this subsample represent a 
significant step forward in resolving the problem of identifying a causal 
relationship between unemployment and poor mental health. However, 
there are conditions where the resilient subsample could still suffer 
from reverse causality. 
For example, it is possible that some individuals in the resilient 
subsample are misclassified and should rightfully be in the vulnerable 
subsample. These individuals would need to represent a substantial por-
tion of the resilient subsample to undermine the identification strategy. 
This would occur if there are many individuals who fail to report their 
prior poor mental health status because of poor recall, fail to recog-
nize that they have mental health problems but their employers observe 
the problems, or the survey questions fail to identify those with mental 
health problems that employers observe. These individuals would be 
more likely to have a bout of poor mental health in the current year 
that causes unemployment. People may struggle to remember highly 
specific events, but the questionnaire is designed to identify general 
features of distress, such as being sad or feeling empty or discouraged. 
Therefore, we suspect that misclassification bias from failure to recall, 
poor recognition of their mental state, or inadequate questions is lim-
ited. A separate challenge to our identification strategy arises if a sub-
stantial group of individuals have mental health issues that are latent or 
dormant, these issues manifest themselves in the current year, or these 
individuals experience unemployment in the past 12 months as well. 
These individuals would be misclassified in our resilient subsample, 
belonging instead in the vulnerable subsample. 
The data also contain information on the number of weeks during 
the past year that the respondent spent employed; unemployed; legiti-
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mately out of the labor force (i.e., disabled, retired, in school, or taking 
care of a family member); and discouraged or out of the labor force 
but not for justifiable reasons. We treat the latter category as time spent 
unemployed. Following the literature we classify those who spent 26 or 
more weeks unemployed during the past year as having suffered from 
long-term unemployment, while those who spent less time unemployed 
are designated as having experienced short-term unemployment. 
Our primary interest is in examining the effect of involuntary unem-
ployment on mental health. Therefore, persons who are out of the labor 
force for acceptable or genuine reasons are excluded from the data.7 
Thus, we focus our investigation on whether those who experience 
either short- or long-term unemployment in the past year had a higher 
probability of experiencing their first lifetime bout of emotional distress 
than those who spent the past year fully employed while holding con-
stant other economic and social determinants of mental health. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis is conducted separately on the subsample of resilient 
persons, those who have either never experienced a spell of prolonged 
psychological distress or have in the past year had their first bout of 
poor emotional health, and on the subsample of vulnerable individuals 
who have experienced sustained psychological distress prior to the past 
12 months. Table 4.1 reveals that there are 5,485 persons in the resilient 
subsample, 5,421 of whom have never been “sad” or experienced a 
substantial period of poor mental health, while 64 individuals (slightly 
more than 1 percent of the subsample) were sad this past year for the 
first time. There are 2,109 respondents who have proven to be vulner-
able to bouts of poor emotional well-being prior to the current year. 
Forty percent (845) of these persons also were saddled with psychologi-
cal distress this past year, while 1,264 avoided poor mental health over 
the course of the previous 12 months. 
Table 4.1 also presents information on labor force status for those 
who experienced psychological distress in the past year and for those 
who were emotionally healthy throughout the past 12 months, for both 
the resilient and vulnerable subsamples. Of interest is whether a dispro-
portionate share of the individuals who are in distress this year experi-
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Table 4.1  History of Psychological Distress and Workforce Status 
Summary Statistics for Resilient and Vulnerable Subsamples 
Panel A: Workforce status—resilient subsample (n = 5,485) 
Psychological distress No psychological distress 
this past year this past year 
(n = 64 = 1%) (n = 5,421 = 99%) 
Employed 45 4,425 
(70%) (82%) 
Short-term unemployment 5 383 
(8%) (7%) 
Long-term unemployment 14 613 
(22%) (11%) 
Panel B: Workforce status—vulnerable subsample (n = 2,109) 
Psychological distress No psychological distress 
this past year this past year 
(n = 845 = 40%) (n = 1,264 = 60%) 
Employed 619 1,051 
(73%) (83%) 
Short-term unemployment 96 86 
(12%) (7%) 
Long-term unemployment 130 127 
(15%) (10%) 
NOTE: Resilient persons have either never experienced psychological distress—a
sustained period over at least one month in the past year of sadness/discouragement/ 
disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the past year. Vulnerable persons have 
experienced psychological distress prior to the past 12 months and may also have 
experienced a spell of distress in the past year. People who were unemployed in the 
past year and spent, in total, less than 26 weeks unemployed are identified as having 
experienced a bout of short-term unemployment. The long-term unemployed spent 26 
or more weeks in the past year unemployed. 
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. 
A large share (30 percent) of the persons in the resilient subsam-
ple who express being sad or distressed this year—for the first time in 
their lives—were exposed to unemployment during the past 12 months. 
Among those who experienced no psychological distress in the past 
year, only 18 percent spent some weeks unemployed. The same pat-
tern exists for the vulnerable subsample. There is a higher proportion 
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past year (27 percent) relative to those with good emotional health in 
the most recent year (17 percent). Thus, it appears that involuntary job-
lessness is associated with psychological distress, although caution is in 
order since we are not controlling for other determinants of emotional 
health that could be correlated with unemployment. 
Psychologists expect a variety of social and economic factors to 
cushion the impact of unemployment on emotional health.8 A valuable 
aspect of the NCS-R and the NLAAS data is the provision of informa-
tion on a myriad of factors, both economic and social, that are believed 
to buffer the impact of unemployment on psychological health. This 
makes it possible to account for these features of a person’s environ-
ment when examining the influence of unemployment on psychologi-
cal health. The potential buffers that we are able to control for in our 
analysis include the number of siblings, the number of adult children, 
the extent of their wealth, and if the respondent has a parent who is still 
living, is currently married, has friends he speaks to often, and is part of 
a close-knit religious community. Table 4A.1 in Appendix 4A provides 
detailed definitions for all of the variables used in our formal analyses 
of psychological health. 
The NCS-R and the NLAAS also provide extensive information 
on demographic factors that may contribute to psychological health, 
including a respondent’s gender, educational attainment, age, and racial/ 
ethnic heritage. Moreover, information is available on respondents’
family characteristics when they were youths, allowing us to control 
for whether they were raised by both of their parents, whether the fam-
ily received public assistance, and parents’ education. 
Appendix Table 4A.2 presents summary statistics on all of these 
variables used in our empirical analysis for both the resilient and vul-
nerable subsamples. We describe these characteristics below beginning 
with the resilient subsample. About half of the subsample is female (49 
percent), 67 percent are married, 55 percent completed more than high 
school or are highly educated, 72 percent are more than 30 years old, 34 
percent have young children in their homes, 44 percent are foreign born 
(unsurprising, since much of the data come from the NLAAS), and the 
average individual has accumulated $65,000 of net worth. The resilient 
subsample we analyze is very diverse with respect to race/ethnicity: 
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percent are Asian, and 32 percent are white. Most people were raised 
by both parents (79 percent), around half have highly educated moth-
ers (49 percent) and fathers (47 percent), and only 4 percent grew up in 
poor families. 
A third of the respondents in the resilient subsample had a mother 
who was still alive, and a quarter reported that their dad was still living. 
The typical person has 1.5 siblings and 1.3 adult children. Moreover, 
45 percent say they speak to friends regularly and are frequent partici-
pants in a religious community. The characteristics of the vulnerable 
subsample are similar to those of the resilient subsample on a number 
of dimensions. However, the vulnerable group, relative to the resilient 
group, are only half as likely to be born outside the United States, more 
likely to be female (63 percent), more likely to have young children, 
less likely to be Asian, twice as likely to have grown up in a family on 
welfare, and have amassed substantially less wealth. 
Empirical Procedures 
In order to investigate the impact on emotional well-being of expo-
sure to short- or long-term unemployment during the past year relative 
to employment throughout the past 12 months, we use Equation (4.1) to 
estimate the following model of psychological distress: 
(4.1) PsyDistress = α + β(ShortTermUnem) + ψ(LongTermUnem) 
+ δ(Buffer) + λ(X) + ε .
PsyDistress takes on a value of 1 if the respondent reports being sad, 
empty, discouraged, depressed, or disinterested most of the day nearly 
every day for either at least two weeks or every month in the past year, 
otherwise it is 0. Two bivariate indicators are used to capture the extent 
of a person’s unemployment experience over the past year. Those indi-
viduals who experienced some unemployment in the past year and the 
total number of weeks, whether or not they were concurrent, fall short 
of 26 weeks and are identified as having experienced short-term unem-
ployment, in which case ShortTermUnem = 1. The variable LongTerm-
Unem = 1 if an individual spent more than 25 weeks unemployed in the 
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variables expected to mitigate or exacerbate the impact of involuntary 
joblessness on emotional health. X is a vector of demographic and fam-
ily control variables. 
We estimate Equation (4.1) using a logistic regression to estimate 
the impact of unemployment and other factors on the odds that a person 
has suffered psychological distress in the past year. We report the odds 
ratios from the logistic regression. The odds ratios represent the effect 
of a unit increase in a continuous independent variable or a value of 1 
for a bivariate variable on the odds of experiencing psychological dis-
tress in the past 12 months, relative to the odds when that same variable 
takes on a value of 0. A coefficient greater than 1 indicates an increase 
in the odds of suffering psychological distress (i.e., a coefficient esti-
mate of 1.2 means a 20 percent increase in odds relative to when the 
bivariate variable is 0). A coefficient estimate of 1 suggests no change 
in the odds of poor emotional health occurring and a value less than 1 
means the probability of poor emotional well-being in the past year is 
reduced (i.e., an estimate of 0.8 means the odds are 20 percent smaller 
relative to when the bivariate variable is zero). 
For individuals in the resilient data set, the estimation of Equation 
(4.1) tests whether unemployment in the past year enhances the odds that 
a person will experience their first ever bout of sustained psychological 
distress in the past year. It is a commonly held belief that unemploy-
ment causes a decline in emotional well-being. The advantage of esti-
mating Equation (4.1) with these data is that if unemployment is found 
to be associated with a greater likelihood of poor emotional health, the 
impact can be interpreted as causal with a high degree of confidence. 
Since these are resilient individuals who have only experienced their 
first bout of poor emotional health in the past year, it seems question-
able that this bout of poor emotional health led to their current stretch of 
involuntary joblessness. A more likely story is that unemployment over 
the past year led to a deterioration of psychological well-being among 
persons with a history of sound psychological health. 
In addition, to explore whether social and economic support medi-
ates the impact of unemployment on contemporaneous emotional 
health, we stratify our subsamples by the presence (or not) of each buf-
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RESULTS
Unemployment and Psychological Distress 
Table 4.2 is a summary table that presents our estimates of the 
impact of both short- and long-term unemployment on the chances of 
experiencing psychological distress in the past year for the resilient 
subsample (Panel A) and the vulnerable subsample (Panel B). How-
ever, in our view reverse causality may mar the accuracy of the findings 
using the vulnerable population, while estimation of Equation (4.1) on 
a subsample of resilient persons may well purge the estimates of the 
endogeneity generated by reverse causality. Thus, the use of the resil-
ient subsample can produce estimates that are capable of illuminating 
whether unemployment causes deterioration in emotional well-being. 
Model 1 is a sparse specification of Equation (4.1), where psychologi-
cal distress is stipulated to depend solely on workforce status. Model 
2 adds controls for a host of social and economic buffers. Model 3, 
the most complete specification, further augments the model to account 
for individual characteristics and family features when growing up. 
Full results for the resilient subsample are presented in Table 4A.3 in 
Appendix 4A, and Table 4A.4 reports our complete set of findings for 
the vulnerable subsample. 
Panel A in Table 4.2 reveals that in all three models exposure to 
long-term unemployment in the past year significantly increases the 
odds that a resilient person will experience their first ever bout of poor 
emotional well-being in the current year relative to resilient individu-
als who were employed throughout the past year. The estimates range 
from a 125 percent increase in likelihood in Model 1 to a 218 percent 
increase in Model 2. However, those resilient persons who are subject 
to short-term unemployment during the past year have the same like-
lihood of experiencing their first bout of poor mental health as persons 
who were employed throughout the past year. Thus, our findings sug-
gest that long-term unemployment has a larger detrimental impact on 
emotional health than bouts of short-term unemployment. 
Recall that we classify people who have experienced poor mental 
health prior to the current year, regardless of the source of their poor 
emotional states, as vulnerable. Among these persons, exposure to 
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Table 4.2  Logit Estimates of the Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term 
Unemployment on the Odds of Currently Experiencing 
Psychological Distress for Resilient and Vulnerable 
Subsamples—Summary Table 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Panel A: Resilient subsample 
Workforce status 
Short-term unemployment 1.28 1.10 1.04 
(0.61) (0.53) (0.52) 
Long-term unemployment 2.25*** 3.18*** 2.85*** 
(0.69) (0.99) (0.96) 
Observations 5,485 5,485 5,485 
Panel B: Vulnerable subsample 
Workforce status 
Short-term unemployment 1.90*** 1.85*** 1.80*** 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29) 
Long-term unemployment 1.74*** 1.69*** 1.58*** 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.22) 
Observations 2,109 2,109 2,109 
Controls
    Buffers No Yes Yes
 Demographics & family factors No No Yes 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the 
previous year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged 
workers are counted as unemployed. The set of buffer variables includes measures 
of assets, marital status, parents living, number of living siblings, number of adult 
children, having close friends, being part of a religious community, and the lack of 
young children in the home (see Table 4A.1 for detailed definitions of all variables 
included in the estimated models). Demographic controls include indicators for for-
eign born, gender, education level, age cohort, and racial and ethnic heritage. Family 
characteristics as a youth contain indicators that reveal who raised the respondent, 
their parents’ education level, and the financial status of the family when the respon-
dent was a youth. In addition, Models 2 and 3 include indicators for missing data on 
assets, number of siblings, talking on the phone with friends, and regular attendance 
at religious services. 
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. 
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either short- or long-term unemployment over the past year leads to a 
significant increase in their reporting to have experienced poor emo-
tional health in the past year relative to similar persons who worked 
throughout the past year. For instance, vulnerable individuals who 
were subject to long-term unemployment were 58 percent more likely 
(Model 3) to experience psychological distress compared to those vul-
nerable persons in the labor force who worked the entire past year. 
Consistent with our theory, we find that a number of buffers—being 
married, having adult children, having friends with whom you are in 
regular contact, and being part of a religious community—significantly 
reduce the odds of experiencing psychological distress over the past 
year, regardless of exposure to unemployment, for vulnerable persons 
(see Appendix Table 4A.4). However, emotional health does not appear 
to be directly related to such buffers for resilient persons. 
Do Buffers Mediate the Link between Unemployment and 
Psychological Distress? 
An interesting question is whether social characteristics or features 
of a person’s life act to insulate them from the adverse impact of unem-
ployment on their psychological health. We explore this question by 
evaluating the link between unemployment and emotional well-being 
when a potential social buffer is present and when it is absent across 
both of our subsamples. Our findings for seven social buffers (i.e., 
being married or having a mother who is alive) are presented in Table 
4.3. Table 4A.4 presents evidence on the prevalence of the various buf-
fers in our data sets and on the size of the subsamples used to estimate 
the impact of unemployment on psychological health when a potential 
buffer is present and when it is absent. 
Among resilient persons (the left side of Table 4.3), long-term 
unemployment is positively associated with the odds of experiencing 
psychological distress (i.e., an estimated coefficient > 1) in all seven 
cases when the buffer is not present (on 4 occasions the estimate is 
statistically significant), but also for 6 of the seven scenarios when 
the buffer is present (again, 4 of the estimated impacts are statistically 
significant). Moreover, the odds of poor emotional health due to long-
term unemployment exposure are elevated to a greater extent when the 
buffer is not present relative to when it is present on three occasions 
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Table 4.3  The Impact of Social and Economic Buffers on the Effect of 
Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment on the Odds of 
Currently Experiencing Psychological Distress 
Resilient subsample Vulnerable subsample
                          Panel A: Marriage stratifications 
Not married Married Not married Married 
(n = 1,732) (n = 3,649) (n = 939) (n = 1,170) 
Short-term 1.63 0.45 2.61*** 1.30 
unemployment (1.03) (0.48) (0.63) (0.30) 
Long-term 4.03*** 1.92 1.84*** 1.41* 
unemployment (2.00) (0.93) (0.39) (0.28)
 Panel B: Mother stratifications 
Mom not alive Mom alive Mom not alive Mom alive 
(n = 3,531) (n = 1,731) (n = 975) (n = 1,134) 
Short-term 3.10* 0.49 1.47 1.99*** 
unemployment (1.92) (0.36) (0.41) (0.40) 
Long-term 4.366*** 2.03 1.45** 1.83** 
unemployment (2.21) (1.01) (0.26) (0.44)
 Panel C: Father stratifications 
Dad not alive Dad alive Dad not alive Dad alive 
(n = 763) (n = 1,376) (n = 607) (n = 851) 
Short-term 1.75 1.24 1.79** 1.51* 
unemployment (2.52) (0.72) (0.53) (0.37) 
Long-term 11.14*** 0.57 1.98** 1.12 
unemployment (8.10) (0.60) (0.54) (0.34)
                          Panel D: Adult children stratifications 
No adult No adult 
children Adult children children Adult children 
(n = 2,256) (n = 2,845) (n = 1,042) (n = 1,067) 
Short-term 0.84 1.730 1.59** 2.29*** 
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Table 4.3  (continued) 
Resilient subsample Vulnerable subsample 
                          Panel E: Talk to friends stratifications 
Talk rarely Talk often Talk rarely Talk often 
(n = 2,824) (n = 2,473) (n = 1,022) (n = 1,027) 
Short-term 1.12 1.30 1.56* 1.77** 
unemployment (0.90) (0.81) (0.38) (0.39) 
Long-term 1.88 4.26*** 1.72*** 1.40 
unemployment (1.06) (1.87) (0.35) (0.29)
                          Panel F: Attend religious services stratifications 
Attend Attend 
Attend rarely regularly Attend rarely regularly 
(n = 2,472) (n = 2,292) (n = 1,011) (n = 864) 
Short-term 1.27 0.71 2.31*** 1.26 
unemployment (0.75) (0.75) (0.54) (0.38) 
Long-term 1.52 4.44*** 1.91*** 1.30 
unemployment (0.88) (2.34) (0.38) (0.31)
                          Panel G: Young children in the home stratifications 
Children No children Children No children 
(n = 1,054) (426) (n = 626) (1,483) 
Short-term 1.02 0.99 1.82* 1.79*** 
unemployment (0.81) (0.65) (0.56) (0.36) 
Long-term 1.27 3.53*** 1.03 1.73*** 
unemployment (1.05) (1.43) (0.36) (0.28) 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. 
(marriage, mother alive, father alive), but for the other four social buf-
fers the deleterious impact of long-term unemployment on emotional 
well-being is larger when the buffer is present. Thus, the evidence is 
mixed on whether social factors considered buffers reduce the impact 
of long-term unemployment on mental health for resilient persons. Fur-
thermore, the results exhibit the same mixed pattern for the vulnerable 
population. 
Short-term unemployment is essentially unrelated to psychological 
health regardless of whether social buffers are present or not for resilient 
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damages emotional well-being for those without a mother who is alive 
in our resilient subsample. However, the situation is very different for 
the vulnerable who, prior to the current year, reported having suffered 
through bouts of poor emotional health. For them, whenever social buf-
fers are not present, short-term unemployment leads to elevated odds of 
psychological distress, and in 6 out of 7 cases, the impact is statistically 
significant. The same pattern holds when the social barrier is present, 
which suggests that for vulnerable people the presence of what could 
well be a buffer does not mitigate the deleterious impact of short-term 
unemployment on mental health status. Thus, for persons with a prior 
history of poor emotional well-being, short-term unemployment exhib-
its the same negative pattern of effects on psychological health as long-
term unemployment. 
Do Demographic Factors and Education Mediate the Link 
between Unemployment and Psychological Distress? 
It is possible that the connection between psychological well-being 
and unemployment is influenced by demographic factors such as age 
and gender, as well as skill level or educational investment. To explore 
this possibility we stratified our data sets by gender, education level 
(more than high school, high school or less), and age (30 years of age 
or older, less than 30 years old). The results, reported in Table 4.4, 
offer three key insights. First, for the resilient individuals, short-term 
unemployment is unrelated to emotional well-being, regardless of gen-
der, education level, or age cohort. Second, the results for the vulner-
able individuals are consistent with the findings in Table 4.2, Panel B: 
both short- and long-term unemployment significantly damage men-
tal health, regardless of gender, educational attainment, or age cohort. 
Finally, among the resilient population, those most negatively affected 
by long-term unemployment are males, highly educated, and older indi-
viduals—groups typically associated with being primary breadwinners. 
CONCLUSION 
A longstanding belief among social scientists is that unemploy-
ment, especially long bouts, has deleterious effects on emotional health. 
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Table 4.4  The Impact of Select Demographic Factors on the Effect of 
Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment on the Odds of 
Currently Experiencing Psychological Distress 
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                          Panel C: Age stratifications 
More than 29 Less than 30 More than 29 Less than 30 
(n = 3,934) (n = 1,443) (n = 1,565) (n = 544) 
Short-term 2.39 0.26 1.87*** 1.87** 
unemployment (1.33) (0.27) (0.38) (0.52) 
Long-term 4.03*** 1.96 1.63*** 1.21 
unemployment (1.81) (1.09) (0.26) (0.38) 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. 
There is extensive evidence of a direct link between mental health and 
involuntary joblessness; however, the possibility that poor emotional 
well-being leads to long periods of unemployment has left the question 
of causality unresolved. This chapter introduces a new approach to the 
assembly of data that allows estimation of the link between emotional 
health and unemployment that may address concerns about the direc-
tion of causality. Our estimates are conducted using a subsample of 
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enced poor mental health. If resilient individuals are exposed to unem-
ployment and exhibit poor mental health, it seems most likely that the 
joblessness harmed their psychological health. We find that long-term 
unemployment—but not short-term unemployment—promotes psy-
chological distress among resilient persons. Moreover, the negative 
psychological consequences of long-term unemployment are present 
even when buffers exist, suggesting that policymakers consider both the 
monetary and nonpecuniary costs of unemployment when formulating 
policy to address economic downturns. Our findings suggest that the 
Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery have likely generated 
extraordinary negative psychological consequences: at the peak of this 
recession, about 45 percent of the unemployed had been out of work six 
months or longer, and one-third of the unemployed were jobless for at 
least a year. 
Notes 
1. Warr’s (1987) vitamin model is similar to Jahoda’s (1982) functionality frame-
work, in that desired features of work—like vitamins—contribute to psychologi-
cal health, and when they are withheld or withdrawn through unemployment, 
emotional well-being is impaired. 
2. Similarly, the Life Event model advanced by Brenner (1976) and Catalano and 
Dooley (1977) argues that any alterations in life circumstances, especially those 
deemed important to personal identity and status such as joblessness, are stressful 
and thus may hamper psychological health. 
3. Poorer mental health status for the unemployed relative to the employed has been 
found for both men (Ensminger and Celentano 1990; Rowley and Feather 1987), 
and women (Dew, Bromet, and Penkower 1992), and long-term unemployment is 
especially damaging (Warr and Jackson 1985). 
4. For a meta-analysis review of cross-sectional studies of the link between various 
forms of emotional health and unemployment, see Paul and Moser (2009). 
5. For a meta-analytic review of longitudinal studies finding improvements in emo-
tional health for unemployed who find work, see McKee-Ryan et al. (2005). 
6. Kessler et al. (2003) combined respondents’ self-reports on a similar set of feel-
ings and emotions to construct a nonspecific psychological distress score to assess 
mental health. 
7. Examples of acceptable reasons included those who are retired, homemakers, in 
school, and physically or mentally unable to work. 
8. Numerous studies report that social support buffers the psychological distress asso-
ciated with unemployment. See, for instance, Atkinson, Liem, and Liem (1986). 
Appendix 4A 
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Table 4A.1  Definition of Variables Used in Logit Estimation of the 
Influence of Unemployment on Psychological Distress 
Variable name Variable definition 
Data sets 
Resilient 1 if respondent has never experienced psychological 
distress (see outcome definition below) or had their first 
bout in the past year, 0 otherwise 
Vulnerable 1 if respondent has experienced psychological distress 
prior to the current year, 0 otherwise 
Outcome 
PsyDistress 1 if respondent reports being sad, empty, discouraged, 
depressed, or disinterested most of the day nearly every 
day in the past year for either at least two weeks or 
every month, 0 otherwise 
Work force status 
Short-term 1 if experienced unemployment during the past year 
unemployment and the total weeks summed to 25 or fewer weeks, 0 
otherwise 
Long-term 1 if experienced unemployment during the past year 
unemployment and the total weeks summed to 26 or more weeks, 0 
otherwise 
Employed 1 if employed throughout the past year at least 40 




Assets Respondent’s estimated value of assets less debts in 
thousands 
Married 1 if respondent is currently married or cohabitating, 0 
otherwise 
Mother living 1 if respondent’s biological mother is still alive, 0 
otherwise 
Father living 1 if respondent’s biological father is still alive, 0 
otherwise 
Siblings Number of siblings respondent had while growing up, 
top coded at 8 
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Table 4A.1  (continued) 
Variable name Variable definition 
Economic & 
social buffers 
Adult children Total number of adult children respondent has that are 
living—both biological and nonbiological, 0 otherwise. 
Friends 1 if respondent often talks on phone or gets together 
with friends most every day or a few times a week, 0 if 
less often. 
Religious 1 if respondent attends religious services at least 3 
community times per month, 0 otherwise. 
Young children Total number of living biological and nonbiological 
children under 17 years of age living in respondent’s 
home. 
Demographics 
Foreign born 1 if respondent reports being born outside the United 
States, 0 otherwise. 
Female 1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise. 
Highly educated 1 if respondent reports having completed more than 12 
years of formal education, 0 otherwise. 
Young 1 if respondent is less than 31 years of age, 0 otherwise. 
African American 1 if respondent reports being African Caribbean or 
African American, 0 otherwise. 
Hispanic 1 if respondent reports being Hispanic, 0 otherwise. 
Asian 1 if respondent reports being Asian, 0 otherwise. 
Family characteristics 
Both parents 1 if respondent reports being raised by both their 
biological father and biological mother, 0 otherwise. 
Mother highly 1 if respondent reports their mother completed 12 or 
educated more years of formal education, 0 otherwise. 
Father highly 1 if respondent reports their father completed 12 or 
educated more years of formal education, 0 otherwise. 
Welfare 1 if respondent reports their family was on welfare at 
some time during their youth, 0 otherwise. 
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Resilient Vulnerable Resilient Vulnerable 
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Father highly educated 



















SOURCE: Data drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. Means are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Indicator variables are 
constructed that take on a value of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing value and a value of zero 
for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the 
observation to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable. 
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Table 4A.3  The Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment 
on the Odds of Currently Experiencing Psychological 
Distress for Resilient Individuals—Full Results 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Workforce status 
Short-term unemployment 1.28 1.10 1.04 
(0.61) (0.53) (0.52) 
Long-term unemployment 2.25*** 3.18*** 2.85*** 
(0.70) (0.99) (0.96) 
Buffers 
Assets 1.00 1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Assets—missing 1.07 1.04 
(0.32) (0.30) 
Married 0.71 0.80 
(0.193) (0.22) 
Mother living 1.20 1.12 
(0.47) (0.47) 
Father living 1.30 1.12 
(0.46) (0.42) 
Father living—missing 0.10** 0.03** 
(0.10) (0.04) 
Siblings 1.03 1.02 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Siblings—missing 4.19 5.02 
(43.00) (5.07) 
Adult children 0.98 1.02 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Friends 1.01 0.99 
(0.26) (0.26) 
Friends—missing 0.50 0.46 
(0.38) (0.36) 
Religious community 0.69 0.64 
(0.19) (0.18) 
Religious community—missing 0.77 0.82 
(0.34 (0.37) 
Young children 1.15 1.16 
(0.11) (0.13) 
Born in foreign country 0.93 0.86 
(0.40) (0.37) 
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Both parents 1.08 
(0.34) 
Mother highly educated 1.07 
(0.39) 
Mother highly educated—missing 0.92 
(0.46) 
Father highly educated 1.34 
(0.47) 






Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 5,485 5,485 5,485 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Resilient persons have either never expe-
rienced psychological distress—a sustained period over at least one month in the past 
year of sadness/discouragement/disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the 
past year. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the previous 
year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged workers 
are counted as unemployed. Indicator variables are constructed that take on a value 
of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing value 
and a value of zero for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable 
name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the observation 
to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable. 
SOURCE: Data are drawn from the NCS-R and the NLAAS. 
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Table 4A.4  The Impact of Short-Term and Long-Term Unemployment 
on the Odds of Currently Experiencing Psychological 
Distress for Vulnerable Individuals—Full Results 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Workforce status 
Short-term unemployment 1.90*** 1.85*** 1.80*** 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
Long-term unemployment 1.74*** 1.69*** 1.58*** 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.22) 
Buffers 
Assets 1.00*** 1.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Assets—missing 0.89 0.89 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Married 0.61*** 0.63*** 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Mother living 0.99 0.97 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Father living 0.97 0.99 
(0.12) (0.13) 
Father living—missing 1.86* 1.71 
(0.61) (0.59) 
Siblings 1.01 0.99 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Siblings—missing 0.66 0.79 
(0.22) (0.31) 
Adult children 0.93** 0.93** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Friends 0.77*** 0.77*** 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Friends—missing 0.73 0.69 
(0.21) (0.20) 
Religious community 0.82** 0.84* 
(0.08) (0.08) 
Religious community—missing 0.87 0.87 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Young children 1.03 1.01 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Born in foreign country 0.99 1.05 
(0.14) (0.15) 
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Both parents 0.92 
(0.11) 
Mother highly educated 0.93 
(0.11) 
Mother highly educated—missing 1.06 
(0.20) 
Father highly educated 0.95 
(0.12) 






Constant 0.59*** 1.11 1.31 
(0.03) (0.22) (0.35) 
Observations 2,109 2,109 2,109 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Vulnerable persons have experienced 
psychological distress—a sustained period over at least one month in the past year 
of sadness/discouragment/disinterest—or had their first spell of distress in the past 
year, prior to the past 12 months and may also have experienced a spell of distress in 
the past year. Reference group for unemployment is employed throughout the previ-
ous year, those out of the labor force are excluded from the data, and discouraged 
workers are counted as unemployed. Indicator variables are constructed that take on 
a value of 1 if the individual does not answer a question and therefore have a missing 
value and a value of zero for a valid response. We use the name construct of “variable 
name—missing” for each of these indicators. These indicators allow the observation 
to be included in the sample but not influence the coefficient of the related variable. 




90  Table 4A.5  Sample Size for Buffers and Demographics Used to Stratify the Data to Evaluate If the Impact of Unemployment on the Odds of Psychological Distress Depends on These Elements 
Resilient subsample Vulnerable subsample 
Variable status Variable status 
Variable (n prior to stratification) Yes No Variable (n prior to stratification) Yes No 
Buffers Buffers 
Married (n = 5,485) 66.5 33.5 Married (n = 2,109) 55.5 44.5 
Mother living (n = 5,485) 34.6 65.4 Mother living (n = 2,109) 53.8 46.2 
Father living (n = 2,356) 59.4 40.6 Father living (n = 1,458) 58.4 41.6 
Adult children (n = 5,485) 58.9 41.1 Adult children (n = 2,109) 50.6 49.4 
Friends (n = 5,297) 46.7 53.3 Friends (n = 2,049) 50.1 49.9 
Religious community (n = 4,921) 49.8 50.2 Religious community (n = 1,875) 46.1 53.9 
Young children (n = 5,485) 20.5 79.5 Young children (n = 2,109) 29.7 70.3 
Demographics Demographics 
Female (n = 5,485) 48.9 51.1 Female (n = 2,109) 62.5 37.5 
Highly educated (n = 5,485) 55.0 45.0 Highly educated (n = 2,109) 58.5 41.5 
Young (n = 5,485) 28.3 71.7 Young (n = 2,109) 25.8 74.2 
NOTE: Sample size prior to stratification may be smaller than the full subsamples used in the estimates presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In 
the full subsamples, some observations contain missing values for specific buffers or demographics. Estimates with the full subsample 
include separate indicator variables for missing values for each variable. The stratification analysis eliminates observations with a miss-
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Work Together to Let 
Everyone Work 
A Study of the Cooperative Job-
Placement Effort in the Netherlands 
Hilbrand Oldenhuis 
Louis Polstra 
Centre of Applied Labour Market Research and Innovation, 
Hanze University of Applied Sciences 
“We work together to let everyone work.” That was the message in 
November 2010 when a number of employers and governmental orga-
nizations in the Netherlands publicly announced that they would co-
operate with each other in order to let as many people participate in paid 
jobs as possible. From both an economic and a social perspective, it is 
clearly highly important to maximize the number of people that have 
paid jobs. At the end of 2008, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands 
was a historically low 2.7 percent. Dutch employers were having diffi-
culties finding workers. As a result, companies were forced to cooperate 
with the Dutch government to fill their vacancies. However, for most 
employers in times of economic recession (the Dutch unemployment 
rate almost doubled between 2009 and 2010), decreasing the number of 
unemployed people will not be their highest priority. 
Although on a national scale employers intend to cooperate with 
the government to reduce unemployment, it is not always the case for 
local governments. The local social services, which are responsible 
for local labor market policy, need information that would allow them 
to work more collaboratively with employers. More specifically, they 
wish to answer the question: Why would employers cooperate with 
social services by providing jobs to unemployed people via a social 
service agency? Two main reasons make this question a really impor-
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the short run to convince as many employers as possible to cooperate 
with them, resulting in an immediate decline in the unemployment rate. 
Additionally, in the long run, social services agencies that have a clear 
insight into employers’ needs and wishes will be better able to fill the 
gap between supply and demand in the Dutch labor market. That is, 
although the unemployment rate in the Netherlands is relatively high 
right now and the number of vacancies is relatively low, it is expected 
that, due to the aging of the Dutch population (the percentage of people 
over 65 years of age is predicted to be 25 percent in 2030 compared 
with 14 percent right now), there will be an increased need for high-
qualified personnel in the near future. In general, being unemployed 
does not make people highly qualified, but having a job does. Hence, it 
is important for the Dutch labor market to have as many people as pos-
sible participate in paid employment in order to avoid a large number 
of underqualified, long-term unemployed people while there is simulta-
neously a high number of unfilled vacancies. Such a situation would 
have devastating consequences for the whole Dutch economy. Hence, 
social service agencies and employers need to work together in order to 
let everyone work. 
In this chapter, we will argue that, based on a survey we conducted 
with employers, the willingness of Dutch employers to cooperate with 
social services is highly dependent on company size. Whereas all 
employers underline the importance of financial considerations when it 
comes to their intention to cooperate with social services, employers at 
small companies (less than 11 employees) are especially sensitive to a 
more idealistic approach (“making a difference”) compared to employ-
ers at middle-sized (11–100 employees) and large companies (over 100 
employees). 
THEORy OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR 
When it comes to determining which factors influence behavior such 
as cooperating with a social service, an important social psychologi-
cal theory that comes to mind is the theory of planned behavior (TPB) 
(Ajzen 1985, 1991). In short, the theory states that the most important 
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a way. Applied to our subject, the TPB means that cooperating with a 
social service agency is primarily predicted by the intention to do so. 
Furthermore, this intention is predicted by three determinants. The first 
is the individual’s attitude, that is, the global evaluation of the behavior. 
The second determinant, subjective norms, refers to perceived social 
pressure to engage in the behavior. The third determinant is perceived 
behavioral control: the degree to which an individual expects that he or 
she is capable of performing the given behavior. Especially in health 
psychology, the TPB has been applied to the prediction of various 
health-related behaviors (see Conner and Sparks [2005] for a review). 
But also when it comes to, for example, the prediction of traffic behav-
ior, such as speeding (Forward 1997), dangerous passing (Parker et al. 
1992), and pedestrian violations of regulations (Moyano Díaz 2002), 
the TPB proved to be a relatively successful framework for predict-
ing behavior. In a meta-analytical review, Armitage and Conner (2001) 
report that the TPB explained an average of 39 percent of the variance 
in intention and 27 percent of the variance in behavior. Therefore, the 
TPB should be a useful theoretical framework for answering the ques-
tion of which factors determine employers’ willingness to cooperate 
with social services. 
Behavioral Beliefs 
Concerning attitudes, Ajzen (1991) states that so-called behavioral 
beliefs determine how positive or how negative an attitude about the 
given behavior will be: “Each belief links the behavior to a certain out-
come, or to some other attribute such as the cost incurred by performing 
the behavior. Since the attributes that come to be linked to the behav-
ior are already valued positively or negatively, we automatically and 
simultaneously acquire an attitude toward the behavior” (p. 191). Sev-
eral beliefs concerning the outcomes of cooperating with a social ser-
vice agency multiplied by their respective subjective values therefore 
determine how positively or how negatively an employer in general 
thinks about cooperating with a social service agency. Thus, we set out 
to determine which are the salient behavioral beliefs for employers that 
predict their willingness to do so. 
In the preparation phase of this study, we conducted several inter-
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financial factors. In the end, a company must stay in business, so coop-
eration should not cost a lot of money and time. Related to that, some 
employers reported that cooperation could be a convenient way to 
reduce a shortage of staff without having to expend too many resources. 
In addition, some employers mentioned the word proud as part of their 
belief system. That is, they showed a desire to make a difference. As a 
result, they expected to feel proud when cooperating with a social ser-
vice agency to help an unemployed person to find a (new) job. Indeed, 
in a case study, Humphreys and Brown (2008) find that an important 
motive for altruistic behavior of employees of a bank is the desire to 
make a difference and as a result to feel proud. This is illustrated by the 
following quote: “You need to be proud of what you’re doing, you need 
to be able to put your head on the pillow at night you know, thinking 
‘I’ve made a difference today,’ and you need to be able to tell your Mum 
what you’ve done” (p. 408). Related to feeling proud, some employers 
reported that cooperation with a social service would be in line with 
their personal values, in terms of giving each individual a chance to 
climb up the societal ladder. Therefore, in our study we investigate the 
relative importance of each of these behavioral beliefs (money, time, 
reducing shortage of staff in a convenient way, pride, and the degree 
to which cooperation is congruent with personal values) in relation to 
cooperation with a social service agency. 
Subjective Norms 
Usually, subjective norms are posited as perceptions of social pres-
sure to behave in a particular way that derive from judgments of this 
behavior from salient others, weighted by the motivation to comply 
with this pressure. For example, if an employer’s friends find it really 
important to be socially responsible, yet the employer is not moti-
vated to comply with the view of their friends, subjective norms will 
not strongly increase the intention to cooperate with social services. 
A few employers who were interviewed did mention important others 
who expressed norms compatible with cooperating with social services 
and indicated an associated increase in their likelihood to act similarly. 
Therefore, we decided to include a measure of subjective norms in our 
study. 
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Perceived Behavioral Control 
In many studies, perceived behavioral control proved to be an 
important predictor of intentions and resulting behavior (e.g., Norman 
2011; Askelson et al. 2010; White, Terry, and Hogg 1994). However, 
based on our interviews, we omitted this factor from our study. Among 
the employers we interviewed, we did not find any concerns that related 
to whether or not they believed that they would be able to perform the 
given behavior. That is, no employer perceived any external or internal 
barriers that would stand in the way of cooperating with a social ser-
vice. Most of the research on perceived behavioral control deals with 
behavior that seems harder to perform than cooperating with a social 
service agency, such as exercise behavior (White, Terry, and Hogg 
1994), attempts to reduce binge drinking behavior (Norman 2011), or 
vaccinating girls against human papillomavirus (Askelson et al. 2010). 
Cooperating with a social service agency is, in the eyes of the inter-
viewed employers, under complete volitional control, whereas, in gen-
eral, the aforementioned behaviors are under less volitional control. 
When a given behavior is perceived to be under complete volitional 
control, the actor believes that he or she is able to engage in the given 
behavior (high perceived behavioral control). For behaviors that are 
under less volitional control, the extent to which individuals believe 
they can perform the behavior will be especially important as a predic-
tor of the intention to act. Still, it is necessary for employers to expect 
that they will be able to cooperate with social services before actually 
intending to cooperate. However, based on our interviews, we expected 
that feelings of perceived behavioral control would be relatively high 
for all employers. Thus, unlike behavioral beliefs and subjective norms, 
we did not expect that perceived behavioral control would significantly 
contribute to the prediction of (differences in) intention to cooperate 
with social services. We did not want to ask our respondents relatively 
superfluous questions, and therefore we did not consider perceived 
behavioral control. However, based on the TPB, we did consider behav-
ioral beliefs and the subjective norms concerning cooperating with a 
social service. 
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Belief in a Just World 
Another theoretical notion that could be useful in predicting 
employers’ willingness to cooperate with social services is the “just-
world hypothesis” (Lerner and Miller 1978). People with a strong belief 
in a just world hold a belief system that people deserve what they get 
and get what they deserve. It could be argued that people who strongly 
believe in a just world are not highly motivated to help unfortunate peo-
ple (such as unemployed people) because they are likely to believe that 
those people themselves are to be blamed for their unfortunate position 
(see, for example, Hafer [2000]). On the other hand, employers with 
a weak belief in a just world could be more willing to help the unem-
ployed. Thus, in our interviews, one employer mentioned his conviction 
that he himself could end up being unemployed just as easily as the 
“real” unemployed people (for example, by getting in an accident), and 
that this conviction was a strong motivation for him to cooperate with 
a social service agency. Therefore, we decided to investigate the role 
of this factor as it relates to predicting the intention to cooperate with 
social services. 
Company’s Goals 
The last factor we considered important deals with the concept of 
corporate social responsibility, which is a major issue in the world of 
industry and business. Many companies state their commitment to social 
responsibility in their official communications and have the explicit 
goal of being socially responsible. Hence, we investigated whether the 
degree to which an employer states that his or her company expresses an 
explicit goal related to corporate social responsibility would affect the 
intention to provide an unemployed person with a job via a social service 
agency. Specifically, we examined the role of several behavioral beliefs 
(those that deal with money, time, reducing shortage of staff, pride, and 
the expectation that it would be in line with personal values); subjective 
norms; the degree to which an employer believes that being unemployed 
only happens to people who deserve it (belief in a just world); and the 
company’s goals in relation to corporate social responsibility. Further-
more, on an exploratory basis we investigated whether there would 
be differences between companies as a function of their size. It seems 
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plausible that employers or HR-managers of large companies will have 
a solely “bureaucratic” viewpoint when it comes to cooperating with 
a social service agency. As a result, it could be that among managers 
or employers at large companies, there is less room to act on idealisti-
cally motivated reasons to cooperate with a social service compared to 
employers at smaller companies. 
METHOD 
Respondents 
We sent a digital questionnaire to a total of 7,870 companies in the 
city of Groningen (the Netherlands) and asked that the respondents be 
those who were responsible for recruiting and hiring. We received 697 
responses from employers (response rate = 8.8 percent). Among those, 
283 were self-employed earners, and analyses showed that these employ-
ers on average do not have a high intention to cooperate with social 
services (1.93 on a 5-point scale) and thus we excluded them from our 
study. We based our results on the remaining 414 respondents. Among 
them there were 197 employers at small companies (2–10 employees), 
156 employers at middle-sized companies (11–100 employees), and 61 
employers at large companies (over 100 employees). 
Measures 
The questionnaire consisted of several parts constructed to measure 
intention to cooperate, behavioral beliefs regarding cooperation with a 
social service agency, subjective norms, belief in a just world, and the 
company’s important goals, respectively. 
Intention 
The main dependent variable, intention to cooperate, was measured 
by a single item: “To what extent do you intend to cooperate with a 
social service agency within the next two years?” Respondents could 
answer on a 5-point scale (1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely; M = 2.89, 
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Behavioral beliefs 
Respondents evaluated the importance and likelihood of the follow-
ing aspects of cooperating with social services: pride, congruent with 
personal values, financially desirable outcomes, saving time, and use-
ful for reducing shortage of staff. First, respondents rated the impor-
tance of these aspects when it comes to deciding whether or not to co-
operate with a social service agency, on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(extremely unimportant) to 5 (extremely important). Next, respondents 
indicated the likelihood that cooperation with a social service agency 
would result in these outcomes. Scores were rated on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 5 (extremely likely). Scores for 
each behavioral belief were computed by constructing the product of 
the importance and likelihood of each aspect (see Table 5.1 for an over-
view of the means and standard deviations for each behavioral belief). 
Subjective norms 
Subjective norms were measured by computing the product of two 
items. On the first item the respondents were asked to rate their esti-
mation of the opinion of important others in their social environment 
about cooperation with a social service agency in order to help unem-
ployed people to reintegrate to work. Their answer could vary from 1 
(extremely negative) to 5 (extremely positive). On the second item the 
respondents were asked to rate their motivation to comply with these 
others’ opinions on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much; M of 
the product of these two items = 6.06, SD = 4.97). 
Belief in a just world 
To measure to what extent the respondents think that people get 
what they deserve when it comes to being unemployed, we constructed 
two items: 1) “It is not possible for someone who really wants to work to 
be unemployed for a long period,” and 2) “Unemployed people should 
primarily blame themselves for their unemployment.” The respondents 
could answer these two items by stating their level of agreement, rang-
ing from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). They were combined 
into a single score by computing the average response on both items
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Table 5.1  Means and Standard Deviations of Behavioral Beliefs 
Mean Standard deviation 
Pride 9.10 4.87 
Consistent with personal values 11.72 6.00 
Saving money 10.35 6.07 
Saving time 7.42 5.24 
Reducing shortage of staff 9.40 6.34 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
Company’s goals 
Two items were constructed to measure the extent to which the com-
pany had an explicit goal of engaging in corporate social responsibility:
1) “Making money is an important goal of my company” (M = 3.13, 
SD = 1.23), and 2) “Expressing a social image is an important goal of 
my company” (M = 2.96, SD = 1.09). Respondents could answer by 
stating their level of agreement, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 
(totally agree). These two items were unrelated, r = −0.07, df = 412, 
p = 0.14. Therefore, these two items were treated as separate variables. 
The questionnaire ended with several questions regarding company 
size and respondents’ gender and age. The latter two did not yield any 
significant effects concerning the intention to cooperate with a social 
service agency; therefore, we omit these variables from our description 
of the results. 
RESULTS 
We divided the total number of 414 respondents into three groups 
based on company size. In general, the large (N = 61) and middle-sized 
companies (N = 156) showed the highest intention to cooperate with 
social services (M = 3.28, SD = 1.31 and M = 3.06, SD = 1.23 respec-
tively). The difference between large and middle-sized companies did 
not reach significance. Compared to the large and middle-sized compa-
nies a post hoc test showed that small companies (N = 197) expressed a 
significantly lower intention to cooperate with social services than large 
and middle-sized companies: M = 2.64, SD = 1.22; highest p < 0.01. 
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We conducted three separate regression analyses (for small com-
panies, middle-sized companies, and large companies) to detect which 
factors contribute to the prediction of the intention to cooperate with 
social services. This criterion variable was regressed on each behavioral 
belief separately, subjective norms, the measure concerning belief in a 
just world, and the company’s goal (each predictor was standardized). 
It is possible to summarize all these behavioral beliefs into one single 
“global attitude” measure (see, for example, De Groot and Steg [2007]). 
However, in our opinion it is more interesting to explore the role of 
each behavioral belief separately. In so doing, we can make more clear-
cut practical recommendations than if we combined these behavioral 
beliefs into one, more abstract global attitude measure. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the regression coefficients for the small 
companies, middle-sized companies, and large companies. For small 
companies the following factors reached significance: pride, financially 
desirable outcomes, saving time, and subjective norms. For middle-
sized companies, the only factors that reached significance were finan-
cially desirable outcomes and saving time, and for large companies it 
was only saving time. 
To conclude, for small companies, economically driven motives 
such as time and money, along with more idealistically and personally 
driven motives such as expecting to feel proud and to be respected, con-
tribute significantly to the prediction of the intention to cooperate with 
social services. For middle-sized and large companies no such factors 
are important. For these companies, primarily economic considerations 
(time and money) determine whether they are willing to cooperate with 
social services. Finally, no other factors, such as the belief in a just 
world or the degree to which it is important for a company to express 
a social image, reached significance for small, middle-sized, or large 
companies. 
DISCUSSION 
Why would employers cooperate with social services by providing 
unemployed people with a job? The (beginning of the) answer is, “Well, 
that depends.” It depends on the size of the company. While employ-
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Table 5.2  Regression of Intention to Cooperate with Social Services on Behavioral Beliefs, Subjective Norms, Belief 
in a Just World, and Company’s Goals 
Small companies Middle-sized companies Large companies 
β t R2 F df β t R2 F df β t R2 F df 
0.25*** 6.77 9,187 0.25*** 5.43 9,146 0.38** 3.36 9,500 
Pride 0.26 2.72** 0.10 0.90 0.09 0.44 
Consistent with 0.14 1.74 0.13 1.14 0.19 1.11 
personal values 
Saving money 0.22 2.58 0.32 3.10** −0.16 −1.20 
Saving time 0.25 2.91** 0.23 2.51* 0.49 3.28** 
Reducing shortage −0.11 −1.32 0.07 0.82 0.10 0.77 
of staff 
Subjective norms 0.22 2.87** 0.12 1.38 −0.05 −0.27 
Belief in a just world −0.02 −0.24 −0.12 −1.36 −0.14 −1.12 
Goal: social 0.06 0.80 0.12 1.36 −0.15 −1.14 
responsibility 
Goal: making money −0.13 −1.53 0.03 0.39 0.03 0.25 
NOTE: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
106 Oldenhuis and Polstra 
ers of middle-sized and large companies primarily base their intentions 
on economic considerations, employers of small companies base their 
intentions on more idealistically and personally driven motivations. 
Why did we find these results? Although our study was not set up to 
answer this question, and more research is needed to fully explore it, we 
do have a suggestion: It is very conceivable that for employers of small 
companies there is a strong connection between their personal self and 
their company. If this is the case, it is not surprising that in addition to 
more economic considerations concerning time and money, subjective 
norms and expecting to feel proud are also important factors for deter-
mining the intent to cooperate with social services. 
In our study, for small companies, the questionnaire was probably 
filled out by the owner of the company (since the owner is responsible 
for recruiting and hiring new staff), while for the larger companies, the 
questionnaire was probably filled out by a human resources manager. In 
the latter case, the connection between the respondent and the company 
is in general less strong, resulting in a less important role for idealism 
and personality. In addition, this line of reasoning may also account 
for the less important role of the behavioral belief concerning money 
among large companies. Since the respondents in this group are, in gen-
eral, not the owners themselves, it is not their money that they spend 
or save by cooperating with a social service agency—more likely, it 
is primarily their own time that they will win or save. Hence, time for 
them is a more important consideration than money. 
Based on the results of our study, we would advise social services 
in the Netherlands to take company size into account when they try to 
find cooperation partners. Smaller companies seem to be more sensitive 
to idealism and an approach based on subjective norms (“Think of how 
others will appreciate you!”) than middle-sized and large companies. 
However, based on our above reasoning, it might be especially impor-
tant for social services, over and above company size, to determine how 
strong the connection is between the person with whom they are deal-
ing and the given company. An approach that is based more on ideal-
ism (“making a difference”) is probably more effective in the case of a 
strong connection than when this connection is less strong. Importantly, 
whether the connection between the person and the company is stronger 
or weaker, the economic picture, especially in terms of time, should 
always be appealing, since for all companies economic considerations 
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are important factors to act on when it comes to cooperating with a 
social service agency. 
Another remarkable finding is the lack of an effect of the company’s 
goals in our study. Whether the company has an explicit goal concern-
ing making money and/or an explicit goal concerning being socially 
responsible, it does not affect the employers’ intention to cooperate with 
a social service agency. On the one hand, it is reassuring for the social 
services that apparently employers perceive no discrepancy between 
making money and cooperating with a social service (otherwise there 
should have been a negative correlation between the degree to which 
the respondents stated that making money is an important goal of their 
company and the intention to cooperate). On the other hand, it is some-
what disappointing for social services that stating that your company 
has an explicit goal to be socially responsible does not result in a higher 
intention to cooperate with social services. It is possible that employers 
in general just do not know whether cooperating with a social service 
agency makes sense when they have explicit corporate social responsi-
bility goals. However, it is also conceivable that expressing such goals 
primarily serves a marketing function—it gives companies the oppor-
tunity to express a positive image. More research is needed to explore 
whether employers in general express their company’s goals in terms 
of corporate social responsibility primarily for marketing reasons, and 
to explore under what circumstances employers will and will not act on 
their corporate social responsibility goals by cooperating with social 
services. 
Theoretical Implications 
During the formulation of our study, we were guided by several 
theoretical perspectives, the first of which was the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1991). Besides an attitudinal influence (based on 
the separate behavioral beliefs) on intention, we only found evidence for 
a significant influence of subjective norms among employers at small 
companies. We used a rather general measure of subjective norms (only 
based on the perceived norm of “important others”) instead of measur-
ing the norms of several reference groups. According to Armitage and 
Conner (2001), measuring subjective norms by means of a single item 
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correlation between subjective norms and intention. However, in their 
meta-analysis the subjective norm-intention correlation is significantly 
weaker than, for example, the attitude-intention correlation. In line with 
Armitage and Conner, we could conclude that while “this does not pres-
ent sufficient evidence to warrant discarding the construct, it does per-
haps indicate that it is the part of the theory of planned behavior that 
most requires further study” (p. 482). To fully identify the normative 
component of human behavior and to increase the predictive power of 
the theory of planned behavior, one should probably take into account 
that there are many types of norms, besides subjective norms (see, for 
example, Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno [1991]), which could all have 
profound influences on intention and behavior. In addition to that, our 
results show that a subjective norm is only an important factor, when 
the consequences of the given behavior solely shine on the actor, as was 
the case for the employers of the small companies in our study. 
The second theoretical viewpoint we used was the notion of the 
“just-world hypothesis” (Lerner and Miller 1978). Believing that being 
unemployed is something that people deserve should lower the inten-
tion to cooperate with a social service agency. However, we did not 
find any evidence for this line of reasoning. Contrary to other stud-
ies, such as Fox et al. (2010) and Van den Bos and Maas (2009), we 
used a situation-specific measure of belief in a just world. That is, we 
asked respondents whether they viewed unemployment as something 
that unemployed people simply deserve. We did so because there is no 
theoretical reason to expect that a strong general belief in a just world 
(i.e., the belief that the world is just for people generally) should be 
closely related to a more situation-specific measure of belief in a just 
world. That is, if individuals believe that people in general get what 
they deserve, then it is plausible that they also believe that unemployed 
people get what they deserve, namely, unemployment. Yet, such a blunt 
measure might have led to more socially desirable answers and, as such, 
a less expressed belief in a just world concerning unemployed people 
among respondents with a strong belief in a just world. 
In line with our reasoning concerning the strength of the connect-
edness between the respondent and the company, however, it is not 
inconceivable that at least for the middle-sized and the large compa-
nies, the connection between the respondent and the company was too 
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does not account, however, for the absence of significant results among 
employers of small companies. The role of the “belief in a just world” 
concept therefore remains unclear when it comes to employers’ inten-
tion to cooperate with social services. 
CONCLUSION 
Why would employers cooperate with social service agencies by 
providing unemployed people with a job? The answer to this question 
should have far-reaching implications for the policies that social ser-
vice agencies undertake to find employers that are willing to cooperate 
with them. When employers have difficulties finding sufficient numbers 
of new employees, as is the case during periods of economic boom, 
social service agencies do not really need to put themselves into the 
employer’s psychological frame of reference. However, when unem-
ployment rates are high, as is the case now, it becomes clear that these 
agencies need to know what is considered important by employers, who 
have to decide whether or not they will cooperate with them. Social 
service agencies that are apt to take an employer’s perspective will be 
better able to decrease immediately the number of unemployed people. 
Moreover, getting to know employers’ needs and wishes is especially 
important for Dutch social service agencies in order to be better able 
to reduce the expected mismatch of the Dutch labor market in the long 
run. Due to the aging of the population, Dutch society simply cannot 
afford to exclude people for a long period from the labor market. 
Our results suggest that social service agencies should take company 
size into account. We found that employers of small companies (2–10 
employees) are much more willing to cooperate with social service 
agencies due to idealistic motives than are employers of middle-sized 
(11–100 employees) and large companies (more than 100 employees). 
In contrast, for middle-sized and large companies, more rational factors 
such as (the lack of) time and money determine whether or not they 
are willing to cooperate with social service agencies. Hence, although 
most companies do officially state their social responsibility, our results 
show that only for small companies is cooperating with social service 
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size the importance of economic factors). In trying to persuade employ-
ers to cooperate with them, social service agencies should differenti-
ate the rationale for their policies as a function of company size. That 
is, when contacting small companies, they should base their approach 
on economic motives such as time and money, as well as on an ideal-
istic desire to “do the right thing” and on subjective norms, whereas 
with middle-sized and large companies, they should primarily adopt an 
approach that is based on motives such as time and money. 
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One response to the Great Recession of 2008–2009 in several econ-
omies of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) was increased reliance on short-time compensation (STC) and 
other work-sharing arrangements that temporarily reduce weekly hours 
to ease labor market dislocations and to avoid the personal and eco-
nomic costs of elevated levels of long-term unemployment. Short-time 
compensation has been credited with helping to stabilize employment in 
the face of sharp reductions in real gross domestic product (GDP). The 
research conducted by Burda and Hunt (2011) and Boeri and Bruecker 
(2011) concludes that the STC program in Germany (Kurzarbeit) was a 
major contributor in stabilizing German employment in 2009 and 2010. 
As labor markets in the United States recover from the Great Reces-
sion, it is appropriate to assess the performance of the economy during 
this period and consider ways of structuring labor market institutions 
to lessen the economic hardships of future recessions. Not only did 
U.S. product markets deteriorate, but labor markets also experienced 
sharp decreases in employment, steep increases in unemployment, and 
record high levels of long-term unemployment. Given the severity of 
labor market conditions since 2007, this chapter examines the recent 
performance of STC in states with such programs and assesses their 
impact on employment. The chapter begins with an introduction to STC 
and a description of some of the important features of the program, 
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17 states that have operated programs for several years. The next sec-
tion reviews foreign experience with STC, with particular attention to 
the performance of STC programs in Canada, Germany, and Belgium. 
The following section discusses ways to increase STC usage in the 
United States. While some suggestions are obvious, others would make 
changes in the way STC plans currently function within state unem-
ployment insurance (UI) programs. 
The chapter reaches three main conclusions. First, STC has the 
potential to prevent layoffs and stabilize employment in short-run cycli-
cal fluctuations. While program usage increases sharply at the start of 
a recession, the increased utilization lasts for a comparatively short 
period. Second, the programs in the United States are small in scale and 
do not meaningfully affect labor market adjustments at the macro level. 
Third, if STC were to play a larger role during the economic recovery as 
well as a larger role in future recessions, the programs would need to be 
enlarged and the pace of adoptions expanded. In addition to presenting 
suggestions for increasing STC usage, the chapter assesses the Febru-
ary 2012 legislation: the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 
of 2012 (PL12-96). 
AN OVERVIEW OF WORk SHARING 
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs, now present in 
many economies, are intended to reduce the volume of layoffs during 
periods of slack labor demand.1 Rather than reducing hours by laying 
off (nonprejudicial separations) some workers, a wider pool of workers 
at the workplace is retained but at reduced weekly hours of work. For 
example, to reduce hours by 20 percent in a work unit that employs 
100 persons working 40-hour weeks, there would need to be 20 lay-
offs. Alternatively, all 100 in the work unit could be placed on 32-hour 
schedules. Both measures would reduce hours by 20 percent. 
These employment retention programs provide partial unemploy-
ment compensation (UC) benefits to workers placed on shorter sched-
ules. For example, if UC benefits replace half of previous weekly wages, 
then someone on a 32-hour schedule would receive 80 percent of their 
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wages. Thus, part of the reduction in income caused by the reduction in 
hours is offset by partial UC benefits. In this simple example, partici-
pants in STC would receive take-home pay equal to 90 percent of their 
full weekly wages.2 
In the United States in 2011, 21 states had STC programs that were 
generally small in scale. While 4 states introduced STC programs dur-
ing 2010 and 2011, the other 17 states have operated these programs for 
20 years or longer. A program for STC is established through legislation 
as part of a state’s UI law. Short-time compensation plans, administered 
as part of UI, are initiated when an employer files an application with 
the UI agency. To be eligible to participate in STC, the employer must 
be experience rated, not delinquent in paying UI taxes, and explain the 
reason(s) for needing to adjust work hours. Plans submitted to the UI 
agency are often approved within one or two weeks. 
Short-time compensation plans need to conform to state require-
ments regarding a minimum percentage reduction in hours at the 
affected work unit, plan duration, the minimum and maximum reduc-
tion in hours for affected workers, and the maximum number of weeks 
STC benefits will be paid. Table 6A.1 in Appendix 6A displays impor-
tant state-level requirements for 17 states with long-standing STC 
programs. Plans generally last 25 or 52 weeks and maximum payable 
weeks are usually 26 or 52. For affected workers, the reduction in hours 
is bounded between a minimum (10–20 percent in all states) and a max-
imum (40–50 percent in nearly all states). Plans also must specify the 
treatment of fringe benefits (usually either full maintenance or reduced 
by the proportionate reduction in hours worked). When workers are 
unionized, the plan must be approved by the collective bargaining unit. 
Certain features of STC are linked to standard UI provisions. One is 
that the benefits paid to participants count against the experience-rated 
UI taxes paid by the employer. Since the employer initiates this reduc-
tion in hours, STC payments are experience rated in the same way as a 
layoff. When claimants start to collect STC, the payments count against 
their maximum potential payment for the benefit year (the 12-month 
period for which current UI eligibility applies). For example, someone 
otherwise eligible for 26 weeks of benefits under full unemployment 
would only be eligible for 24 weeks if they collected STC one day per 
week for 10 weeks earlier in the same benefit year. Most states make 
regular recipients serve a waiting week before collecting benefits. For 
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STC recipients, this requirement means they can start collecting in the 
second week of the STC claim. While regular UI recipients are required 
to search for work, this requirement is waived for STC recipients since 
they remain employed. 
EMPIRICAL ANALySIS OF STC IN THE UNITED STATES 
The STC reporting system generates monthly data that can be com-
pared with regular state UI data. Initial claims, first payments, weeks 
claimed, weeks compensated, exhaustions and total benefit payments 
are routinely reported, along with equivalent initial claims and equiva-
lent weeks claimed. In the latter two series, claims are converted to 
equivalent full weeks; that is, a week claimed by five persons working 
under a 20 percent reduction in weekly hours represents one equiva-
lent week claimed. Under certain assumptions, the equivalent weeks 
claimed show the number of layoffs and weeks of full unemployment 
avoided by the use of STC. 
The empirical analysis focuses on STC equivalent weeks claimed 
measured as a percentage of regular UI weeks claimed in annual data 
for the past three business cycles. For 13 of 17 states, the data extend 
from 1989 to 2010; there are fewer years in four states.3 All regression 
equations use the same specification: the equivalent-weeks-claimed 
percentage is explained by the total unemployment rate (TUR) in the 
state and a linear trend. The TUR is entered for both the current year 
and the previous year. Both the current TUR and the lagged TUR coef-
ficients show how equivalent weeks claimed behave relative to regular 
weeks claimed. A positive coefficient for the TUR indicates that STC 
equivalent weeks increase more rapidly than regular weeks in a reces-
sion when the TUR increases. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the 17 regression equations by showing the 
distribution of the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients. 
Table 6B.1 in Appendix 6B displays the full regression results. All 17 
coefficients for the current TUR are positive and statistically signifi-
cant. A remarkably consistent pattern is present in all 17 states: when 
unemployment increases, STC equivalent weeks increase more rapidly 
than regular UI weeks claimed. 
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Table 6.1  Coefficients from STC Regressions, 1989–2010 
Positive, Negative, 
Positive, not not Negative, 
significant significant significant significant Total 
Constant 1 4 4 8 17 
State unemp. 17 0 0 0 17 
rate—TUR% 
State TUR% 0 0 4 13 17 
lagged 
Linear trend 9 5 1 2 17 
SOURCE: Regression equations displayed in Table 6B.1 of Appendix 6B. 
The effect of the lagged TUR is also consistent. All 17 slope coeffi-
cients are negative and 13 are statistically significant: equivalent weeks 
of STC decline relative to regular weeks in the second year of a reces-
sionary period. As the economy travels further through a recession, 
the volume of STC claims decreases even though unemployment may 
remain high or even increase. Comparing the absolute size of the two 
sets of coefficients, those for the lagged TUR are generally from half to 
fully equal to the current TUR coefficients. Not only is there a falloff, 
but the falloff is also large relative to the increase in the first year of the 
recession. 
The linear trend coefficients in Table 6.1 present a more mixed pic-
ture.4 For 14 of the 17 states there is an upward (positive) trend in STC 
usage with nine trends statistically significant. Three states exhibit a 
negative trend, and in two of them the trend is statistically significant 
(Florida and Maryland). Despite the predominance of positive trends, 
STC programs are, and remain, small in all states. Note in Table 6B.1 
of Appendix 6B that the STC equivalent-weeks percentage exceeds 1.0 
percent in just one state (Rhode Island) for the full data period; the per-
centage exceeds 0.4 in just four other states for the same period (Cali-
fornia, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont). 
The underlying data illustrate not only the unusual severity of the 
Great Recession but also its effect on the scale of STC usage. Over 
the 22 years from 1989 to 2010, the highest equivalent-weeks-claimed 
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Even though the TUR was higher in 2010 than in 2009 in most of the 
17 states, the equivalent-weeks-claimed percentage in 2010 fell below 
the 2009 percentage in all but one state (Washington). 
The regression results shown in Table 6B.1 and summarized in 
Table 6.1 portray a remarkably consistent pattern. When the economy 
enters a recession, STC usage increases sharply and much more rap-
idly than regular UI claims. Usage then falls, however, even in the face 
of continued high unemployment. The interpretation of the regression 
results seems obvious. Going into a recession, employers establish STC 
plans and place workers on reduced weekly schedules. These workers, 
however, do not remain on short schedules for very long. As the reces-
sion lengthens they exit through two outflows. While some workers 
return to full weekly work schedules, others experience full layoffs. For 
the latter group, STC delays the onset of full unemployment. For par-
ticipating employers, STC provides more time to observe the depth and 
duration of the downturn and yields improved information upon which 
to make better informed adjustments in staffing. 
For firms that retain long-run viability, there are two important 
advantages in utilizing STC programs: 1) the increased level of worker 
retention, and 2) reduced training costs since fewer new hires are needed 
in the ensuing upturn. For workers, there are fewer layoffs early in the 
recession and a different pattern of burden sharing (wider but smaller 
per-person losses for affected workers) due to reduced layoffs. One dis-
advantage for workers who eventually do lose their jobs is that STC 
only delays the layoffs—it is not avoided. For them STC has simply 
delayed the timing of the job loss.5 
Some other aspects of worker experiences with STC can be inferred 
from state reports. Because the states report both weeks claimed and 
equivalent weeks claimed, the size of the reductions in weekly sched-
ules can be ascertained. The higher the ratio of equivalent weeks to 
total weeks, the larger the reduction in work schedules; for example, 
a ratio of 0.20 suggests a reduction of one day from a five-day week. 
Overall, the reductions in work schedules have generally been modest. 
For 14 states, the equivalent weeks to weeks ratio between 2000 and 
2010 averaged between 0.176 and 0.265. Ratios in this range suggest 
that reductions for STC participants usually averaged one to one-and-
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individuals participating in STC is 3–5 times larger than suggested by 
the equivalent weeks ratios examined in the regressions. 
As with temporary layoff unemployment, participation in STC is 
generally short term. Between 2000 and 2010, the mean duration of 
STC was shorter than for regular UI benefits in 13 of the 14 states with 
reliable STC duration data.6 The ratio of the two averages was below 
0.80 in 10 states, and only in Rhode Island and Vermont were they 
similar in size. Moreover, exhaustion of benefits while on STC is rare 
because duration is short and a compensated week usually involves 
only one or two days in benefit status. Exhaustion rates between 2000 
and 2010 were significantly lower for persons receiving first payments 
under STC compared to the regular UI program in 15 of the 17 states 
with STC programs. The average exhaustion rate for these 11 years was 
almost always less than 5 percent for STC recipients compared to 30 
percent or higher for regular UI program recipients. 
One would expect STC recipients to have higher wages and, hence, 
higher weekly benefits than those on layoff and other job losers because 
a layoff typically affects less senior workers. The STC data support this 
expectation. In the 13 states where full weekly benefits for STC recipi-
ents can be calculated, their average STC benefits consistently exceeded 
average weekly benefits in the regular UI program. The ratio of the STC 
average to the regular program average during the 2000–2010 period 
ranged between 1.00 and 1.15 for 10 of the 13 states. Since the reported 
data do not identify the occupations of STC participants, we cannot 
compare the skill levels of participants to regular UI recipients. 
Three concluding comments are appropriate as a summary of the 
empirical work in this section of the chapter. First, utilization of STC 
was very sensitive to the business cycle over the last three recessions 
for which reported data are available. Second, the utilization of STC 
was highest during the early stages of the Great Recession. Third, the 
scale of STC utilization has been consistently small in all 17 states. 
This last comment provides a logical connection to the next section 
of the chapter, which examines international experience with STC and 
provides a brief description of STC programs in three other advanced 
countries. 
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COMPARISONS OF STC IN FOUR COUNTRIES 
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs are present in the 
majority of advanced economies with new adoptions occurring in sev-
eral after the onset of the Great Recession. Hijzen and Venn (2011) note 
that 22 OECD economies reported either introducing new measures 
or making adjustments to existing programs in response to the most 
recent downturn. Program details vary widely across countries. Here 
we briefly examine three foreign programs: 1) Canada, 2) Germany, 
and 3) Belgium. The choice of these countries is based on past experi-
ences of the authors and knowledge of their differing scales. While all 
three foreign programs are larger than STC in the United States, the 
Canadian program can be described as similar in size. The programs in 
Germany and Belgium have a much larger presence in their respective 
labor markets. We recently reviewed the Canadian program, while the 
German and Belgian programs were the subject of comparative analysis 
in the early 1990s (Vroman 1992). 
Cyclical adjustments in hours worked occur at two margins, the 
extensive and intensive margins, or as changes in employment and 
changes in hours per employed person. Germany and Belgium have 
extensive safety nets for employed workers that include other measures 
besides STC, which also facilitate adjustments in hours per employee. 
Prominent among these other features are working-time accounts (pres-
ent in both Germany and Belgium), working-time corridors (Germany), 
and career interruption benefits (Belgium). Burda and Hunt (2011) and 
Boeri and Bruecker (2011) conclude that working-time accounts, along 
with STC, have played an important part in stabilizing German employ-
ment in 2009–2010. While we focus on STC, readers are reminded that 
other factors can influence adjustments on the intensive margin. These 
other factors are part of a broad framework of labor market “flexicu-
rity” present in many OECD economies (see Chapter 2 in this volume). 
Because flexicurity provisions are generally not present in the United 
States, we merely note their relevance to the analysis of STC in other 
countries. 
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Canada 
Canada has supported an STC program since the early 1980s. While 
it has been comparatively small in scale, it operates in all provinces of 
the country and exhibits strong cyclical sensitivity. Interested employ-
ers file STC plans with the Employment Insurance (EI) agency, and 
claimants receive partial EI benefits under approved plans.7 Claimants 
must be monetarily eligible under the same requirements as regular EI 
claimants. Unlike claimants for regular EI benefits, who are subject 
to a two-week waiting period, STC recipients are paid during the first 
week of eligibility. The STC payments received do not reduce future 
EI entitlement if the claimant subsequently becomes fully unemployed 
through a layoff. 
With the onset of the Great Recession, Canada modified STC to 
broaden the scope of the program. Potential benefit duration was 
increased in early 2009 from 38 to 52 weeks and then to 78 weeks. 
Employer participation was encouraged through advertisements in the 
media and revised program requirements that broadened coverage and 
eased the application process. One change was the temporary waiver of 
a detailed plan to return to full work schedules. During 2009 participa-
tion in STC was the highest in the history of the Canadian program. 
Germany 
Short-time compensation has been present in Germany since the 
end of the nineteenth century and widely used since the late 1920s. 
During the Great Recession the STC program, termed Kurzarbeit, 
expanded dramatically from 50,000 participants in September 2008 to 
1.46 million in May 2009. Over the same period the number of partici-
pating employers increased from 1,491 to 14,936. The large increase 
in participation reflects the increased usage of the program by large 
establishments. 
The STC program in Germany has a number of key features. Plans 
can be established if there is a “significant loss of work,” the definition 
of which was eased in February 2009 to broaden the scope of potential 
STC use. The initiative to establish an STC plan can originate from the 
employer or from worker representatives, and both must agree on the 
details of the plan if workers are unionized. In nonrecessionary periods, 
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STC plans usually last six months, but extensions to 12 months are 
common. During the Great Recession, the maximum duration increased 
to 18 months in January 2009 and to 24 months in June. Maximum 
duration throughout 2010 was 18 months. 
After the establishment of an STC plan, payments are administered 
by the employer through the company’s payroll system with reimburse-
ment to the employer from the German administrative agency, Bundes-
anstalt für Arbeit (BA). Employers are required to maintain fringe 
benefit contributions (for health insurance and retirement) so that 
employer fringe benefit costs increase for their STC workers. 
Utilization of STC during the Great Recession was high, and sev-
eral researchers have credited STC with the maintenance of employ-
ment during 2009 and 2010 (Boeri and Bruecker 2011; Burda and Hunt 
2011; Crimmann, Wießner, and Bellmann 2010). The authors conclude 
that absent STC, the level of unemployment in 2009 would have been 
250,000–400,000 higher in Germany. 
Other factors have also contributed to the so-called German employ-
ment miracle of 2009–2010. Working-time accounts were widely used. 
These accounts accumulate balances when workers log overtime and, 
rather than receiving take-home pay immediately, the overtime pay is 
deposited into the accounts. Workers can then withdraw from these 
accounts at a later time when weekly hours are reduced. While these 
accounts have existed for more than 20 years and accumulated sub-
stantial balances, they were reduced by large withdrawals during 2009 
and 2010. Both Boeri and Bruecker (2011) and Burda and Hunt (2011) 
attribute the large employment-stabilizing effects in Germany during 
the Great Recession to the utilization of these accounts. 
The list of other factors operative in Germany also includes deliber-
ate employer decisions to forgo overtime hours in favor of employment-
stabilizing adjustments to total hours. Of some importance are working-
time “corridors,” which employers can use to shorten the weekly hours 
of less senior workers. In sum, several factors contributed to the stabili-
zation of employment and unemployment in the face of large reductions 
in real output in Germany. While STC was important, other factors also 
played a major role in stabilizing employment and unemployment (see 
Chapter 2 in this volume). 
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Belgium 
Belgium operates an STC program of substantial size. Between 
2007 and 2009 the number of beneficiaries of chomeurs temporaires
(temporary unemployment schemes) doubled, restraining the increase 
in open unemployment. The program was expanded during 2009 and 
2010 by increasing potential benefit duration and expanding the occu-
pational coverage to white-collar workers. 
Two other programs in Belgium pay benefits to part-time work-
ers. Career interruption benefits are paid to those who reduce hours to 
pursue non–labor market activities, such as child rearing. Interruptions 
are temporary and may be either total or partial. Credit time accounts, 
first initiated in 2002, is a much smaller program than the working-time 
accounts in Germany, and participation did not expand much in 2009– 
2010. Thus in Belgium, the stabilization of employment and unemploy-
ment was attributable mainly to the program of chomeurs temporaires. 
Table 6.2 displays comparative data on STC for the United States, 
Canada, Germany, and Belgium. The table has annual data for the four 
years from 2007 to 2010. For the United States, the data pertain to the 
17 states with STC at the end of 2009. This total includes the four larg-
est states, and the 17 states combined represent about half of the labor 
force and unemployment.8 Note that for Canada and Germany certain 
data have been inferred. Total unemployment for all four countries is 
based on own-country labor force surveys. 
Four aspects of Table 6.2 warrant comments. First, the table rein-
forces the point made in the previous section that the scale of STC in 
the United States is small. Even restricting the data to the 17 states with 
long-standing STC programs, the size in 2009, the year of highest uti-
lization, is only 1.1 percent of regular UI recipients. Second, the strong 
cyclicality of STC utilization in all four economies is evident. The fall-
off in utilization during 2010 relative to 2009 is obvious, with the Ger-
man STC percentage (column [6]) falling to half of the 2009 percent-
age. As stated previously, STC is utilized most intensively in the early 
stages of a recession. If the program is to perform a useful stabilization 
function, it has to be established prior to the recession, not after it has 
begun. Furthermore, in this slow recovery from the recession, reduc-
ing layoffs can make an important contribution to improving the labor 
market. Data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through its Job 
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Table 6.2  Comparisons of STC Programs in Four Countries, 2007–2010 
STC Equiv. ben./ 
Total Regular STC equivalent Equiv. ben./ regular 
unemploy- UC bene- bene- STC ben. ben. (%) 
ment recipients ficiaries ficiaries (4)/(3) (4)/(2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
United Statesa 
2007 3,495 1,060 12.0 3.2 0.267 0.303 
2008 4,531 1,396 22.6 6.2 0.275 0.445 
2009 7,123 2,454 104.0 27.7 0.266 1.127 
2010 7,608 1,954 67.7 16.8 0.249 0.862 
Canada 
2007 1,079 479 2.6 0.7 0.286b 0.152 
2008 1,117 486 4.8 1.4 0.286b 0.280 
2009 1,516 734 48.3 13.8 0.286b 1.884 
2010 1,484 683 30.9 8.9 0.286b 1.296 
Germany 
2007 3,601 1,080 68.0 36.0 0.528 3.337 
2008 3,141 917 102.0 46.0 0.451 4.994 
2009 3,227 1,141 1,139.0 372.0 0.326 32.603 
2010 2,936 1,027 535.0c 174.0c 0.326c 16.999 
Belgium 
2007 353 429 115.0 30.1 0.261 6.983 
2008 334 404 134.7 32.4 0.240 8.018 
2009 380 434 210.9 60.6 0.287 13.951 
2010 408 438 173.3 49.8 0.287 11.353 
a17 states with STC in 2009. 
bRatio assumed by the authors based on fiscal year data from 1991–2009. 
cBased on part-year data. 
SOURCE: Data developed by the authors from national sources. Data in columns (1)– 
(4) are in thousands. 
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicate that even now, 
22 months into the recovery, 1.8 million jobs are lost each month due to 
involuntary separations. Greater use of STC could further reduce these 
involuntary separations—resulting in a net increase of jobs—or appar-
ent job growth. 
Third, the most obvious feature of Table 6.2 is the much larger scale 
of the STC programs in Germany and Belgium. Column (6) shows 
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averages during 2009 and 2010 are about 25 percent in Germany and 12 
percent in Belgium. The corresponding two-year averages in the United 
States and Canada were 1.0 and 1.6 percent. Fourth, note the extent of 
the reductions from full schedules suggested by column (5): the ratio 
of full equivalent STC beneficiaries to the weekly/monthly numbers 
of STC beneficiaries. For the United States and Belgium, the propor-
tions consistently fall between 0.25 and 0.30, whereas for Germany 
they show a sharp decrease in 2009–2010. In Germany the reduction in 
weekly schedules was about half in 2007–2008 but about one-third in 
2009–2010. The average number of recipients in STC grew much more 
rapidly than the number of full equivalent STC recipients in 2009–2010. 
A final observation about the information in Table 6.2 is the scale 
of the increase in unemployment in the United States compared to the 
other three countries. Unemployment in 2010 was more than twice its 
level of 2007—7.608 million versus 3.495 million.9 The next largest 
increase was in Canada, roughly 50 percent. The increase in Belgium 
was less than 20 percent, while German unemployment did not increase 
in 2009–2010 despite a sharp falloff in real GDP, especially in 2009. 
These data merely reinforce the widely understood point that German 
workers fared comparatively well during the Great Recession. 
OPTIONS FOR INCREASING STC UTILIzATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 
We believe STC needs to be more widely utilized in the United 
States on both equity and efficiency grounds. Equity is promoted by 
sharing the burden of adjustment more equally across the workforce, 
and efficiency is advanced by preventing temporary factors from 
destroying valuable job matches (OECD 2010). 
We find two aspects of STC particularly attractive when compared 
to the adjustments in hours worked accomplished through layoffs. First, 
we think STC provides a better pattern of burden sharing among work-
ers. A wider pool is affected under STC but the reduction in income 
among affected persons is smaller than under layoffs. Not only does 
STC reduce the volume of worker dislocation but also the adjustment 
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reduced reemployment wage rates, and loss of health insurance and 
other fringe benefits. In the language of labor economics, STC shifts 
the locus of changes in hours worked from the extensive margin (lay-
offs) to the intensive margin (hours per worker). Second, training costs 
are reduced because workers remain employed and many return to full-
time schedules at their jobs when sales and production recover to pre-
recession levels. 
Based on this judgment, we suggest four specific actions to increase 
STC utilization: 
1) Disseminate information about STC and its advantages to 
employers and workers. While dissemination of timely information can 
be accomplished by various means, the following are obvious: advertise 
in the media, especially during the earliest stages of a recession; include 
information in UI tax notices to employers; and provide information 
to employers and workers in mass-layoff situations. The latter can be 
activated by the advance notice requirements of WARN legislation that 
requires employers with 50 or more employees to give notice 60 days 
prior to a planned mass layoff. State labor departments then send rapid 
response teams to the worksite to help plan for the subsequent devel-
opments. Rapid response teams include UI specialists who can inform 
employers and workers about STC and potentially influence the type of 
adjustments to be made. 
Rhode Island, the state with the largest STC program (relative to 
the state labor market), has experience with avoiding plant closings 
when employers and workers have been informed about the STC pro-
gram. This experience at plant sites has helped save jobs that eventually 
returned to full schedules when company sales rebounded. 
2) Because of the uncertainty surrounding employer staffing deci-
sions at the early stages of a downturn, STC plans must be compar-
atively easy to implement. At present, the employer must submit the 
STC plan to the UI agency to start the process. An alternative approach 
would be to let the employer initiate the STC plan, commence it imme-
diately and administer payments within their existing payroll system, 
but inform the UI agency at the same time. Partial UI benefits can be 
paid by the employer, who is then reimbursed by the agency.10 Under 
this arrangement workers would not need to apply for benefits as they 
are automatically enrolled and paid.11 To ensure that plans adhere to 
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plans and respond to complaints. This approach would resemble the one 
followed in Germany. The advantage is that it would have a rapid start-
up and, more than likely, higher worker participation than at present 
where take-up is far from universal in STC work units.12 
If a state deemed this approach inappropriate, an alternative would 
be to ease the application procedure and expedite the approval of STC 
applications during a recession. The UI agency would acknowledge the 
importance of STC by having internal administrative procedures mak-
ing it of equal importance to timely payments for fully unemployed 
claimants. 
3) A salient feature of UI in the United States is experience rating. 
Higher payments to laid-off employees cause future employer UI pay-
roll taxes to increase. Experience rating is imperfect, and on average 
only about 60 percent of benefit payments are charged to the former 
employers. Situations that escape experience rating include payments 
that follow quits, benefits to workers when firms cease operations, and 
payments by employers taxed at the maximum tax rate. These pay-
ments are termed noncharged and ineffectively charged benefits. They 
are typically financed by a common tax, where all employers pay the 
same tax rate. 
The payment of STC benefits could be treated as a category of non-
charged benefits. In effect, the cost of STC benefits would be spread 
to all covered employers rather than assigned to STC employers. This 
procedure would provide an explicit reward for maintaining employ-
ment and reducing the volume of layoffs. In other words, STC employ-
ers would be rewarded for making adjustments at the intensive margin 
rather than the extensive margin. If some STC participants were sub-
sequently severed, the later payments for full unemployment would be 
treated the same as other charged benefits. 
4) A second aspect of STC benefit payments could also be treated 
differentially from regular UI benefits. When a claimant files for regu-
lar benefits and is deemed eligible, a benefit year is established. The 
benefit year is a 52-week period within which the claimant can collect a 
maximum total amount of UI benefits. For most claimants (roughly 80 
percent) this amount (the maximum benefit amount [MBA]) is limited 
to 26 times their weekly benefit. Any payments within an established 
benefit year reduce the available balance from their MBA. When the 
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their claim for that year. Currently STC payments reduce the MBA
remaining balance in the same way as full weekly benefits, just at a 
slower weekly rate that reflects the reduction from the full work sched-
ule. Someone otherwise eligible for 26 weeks who collects STC for 10 
days would only be eligible for 24 weeks of full UI benefits in the same 
benefit year. 
This aspect of eligibility treats STC claimants like fully unem-
ployed claimants even though they have remained employed. To the 
extent that STC-eligible persons are concerned about becoming fully 
unemployed, this treatment of their remaining MBA would inhibit their 
participation in STC. The United States is the only country where draw-
ing STC benefits reduces potential benefits for full unemployment. In 
effect, we treat the STC participants as unemployed while other STC 
programs treat participants as employed. Worker participation in STC 
would be encouraged if STC payments did not reduce the remaining 
balance in the MBA. 
Administration of this changed treatment would require states to 
separately record STC benefits and delay establishing a new benefit 
year when STC would otherwise be the first payment of a new benefit 
year. A simple way to accomplish this would be to have the federal 
partner fully finance STC benefit payments. This financial arrangement 
would involve reimbursing state UI agencies directly for STC pay-
ments. Employers in states with STC would avoid associated UI taxes 
altogether (including some socialized charges if STC benefits were 
treated as noncharged items). 
Throughout its 30-year history in the United States, STC has been a 
small program, even in the states with STC. Implementing the four sug-
gested changes would increase STC utilization, making it available to a 
wider set of workers than at present. In unionized situations there would 
need to be agreement by the union as to the plan’s details. 
Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island has tried to foster increased 
use of STC and introduced STC legislation in 2010 and in 2011 with 
Senators Richard Durbin and Sherrod Brown (S.386.IS—Unemploy-
ment Insurance Solvency Act of 2011). Most provisions of their bill 
were included in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 
of 2012 (PL12-96). The legislation includes three categories of provi-
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for STC-related purposes, and 3) increased federal responsibilities for 
promoting STC. 
The first provision of the legislation relates to temporary federal 
financing of STC programs. This provision not only rewards states 
that have existing programs, but also encourages other states to adopt 
STC. For states with existing programs, 100 percent of the cost of STC 
benefits is paid by the federal partner for three full years. States that 
introduce STC programs will have 50 percent of the cost of benefits 
subsidized for three years. 
The second provision authorizes $100 million in grants to states for 
STC-related purposes. Grants will be disbursed for two types of activi-
ties: 1) implementing newly enacted STC programs and improving 
administration, and 2) promoting and enrolling employers in STC pro-
grams. The allocation formula for disbursing these grants to the states is 
one-third for the first activity and two-thirds for the second. 
The third provision relates to increased federal and state responsibil-
ities for promoting STC. Three new areas of responsibilities are added 
to the authority of the U.S. Department of Labor. First, new model lan-
guage for STC legislation in the states will be prepared, updating legis-
lative language drafted some 25 years ago. Second, technical assistance 
and guidance will be provided to the states in establishing and admin-
istering STC. The third establishes the requirements for reporting STC 
activities, a small extension to the existing reporting requirements. 
Compared to the suggestions we have proposed above, the 2012 
legislation includes substantial direct financial support both for STC 
benefit payments and for STC benefits administration. It also provides 
financial rewards for effective outreach to employers, whereas we rely 
more on information dissemination through various channels to reach 
employers and increase utilization. The legislation does not speak to 
the treatment of STC benefit charges in affecting employer UI tax rates 
or the treatment of the STC usage in reducing the claimant’s remaining 
MBA. To the extent that money talks, the financial carrots of the legisla-
tion could encourage adoptions by states. While we have emphasized 
the role of STC at the start of a recession, it could also provide a useful 
role during the recovery phase of the business cycle. During the recov-
ery phase, however, STC would play a smaller role because the volume 
of layoffs is much lower. 
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Notes 
1. The term work sharing as used here means reducing hours for the purpose of pre-
serving overall employment. It does not refer to, say, two people sharing a single 
full-time job with each working part time. 
2. Personal taxes are not considered in this example. 
3. For Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Rhode Island the first year is either 1991 
or 1992. 
4. The linear trend variable is equal to 1 in 1989 and increases by increments of 1 in 
subsequent years. This variable is needed to control for slowly evolving trends. 
An upward trend could reflect slowly increasing awareness of STC by employers 
and/or workers. 
5. With an STC program in place, one can expect fewer layoffs and a reduction in the 
economic costs associated with a job separation. It is also possible that receipt of 
STC acts as a signal to modify behavior and adapt to changed economic circum-
stances; for example, increase the rate of saving. 
6. Duration for regular UI benefits and for STC is measured as the ratio of weeks 
compensated to first payments. 
7. The UI program in Canada is called Employment Insurance. Monetary eligibility 
is based on hours of work in the past year. The minimum hours requirement varies 
from 420 to 700 depending upon the provincial unemployment rate. 
8. The total unemployment of 7.608 million in 2010 was 51 percent of the national 
total of 14.825 million. 
9. The national numbers for the two periods were 14.815 million versus 7.078 mil-
lion, an increase of 109 percent. 
10. In unionized situations there would have to be agreement by the union as to the 
plan’s details. 
11. Certain states in the Southeast, for example, the Carolinas and Georgia, already 
have employer-filed UI claims. 
12. This aspect of STC is one finding of the Berkeley Planning Associates 1997 study 




State STC Provisions in 2010 
Table 6A.1 displays four key requirements that STC plans must satisfy to 
be approved by the UI agency. The table covers the 17 states where STC plans 
were operative at the end of 2009. As noted in the text, three more states cre-
ated STC programs in 2010 and one in 2011.   
Table 6A.1  State STC Plan Requirements in 2010 
Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Plan approval STC weeks reduction in reduction in 
period (weeks) payable hours (%) hours (%) 
Arizona 52 26a 10 40 
Arkansas 52 26 10 40 
California 26  b 10 
Connecticut 26 26c 20 40 
Florida 52 25 10 40 
Iowa 104 52 20 50 
Kansas 52 26 20 40 
Maryland 26 26 10 50 
Massachusetts 25 26 10 60 
Minnesota 52 52 20 40 
Missouri 52 26 20 40 
New York 20 20 60 
Oregon 52 52 20 40 
Rhode Island 52 52 10 50 
Texas 52 52 10 40 
Vermont 26 26 20 50 
Washington 52 52 10 50 
aLonger limit if the state-insured unemployment rate exceeds 4.0 percent of covered 
employment. 
bNo limit on weeks but payments cannot exceed 26 times the weekly benefit amount 
(WBA). 
c26-week extension possible. 








Regression Analysis of STC 
Utilization in 17 States 
Table 6B.1 displays results for 17 state-level regression equations typi-
cally spanning the years 1989–2010. The dependent variable is annual STC 
equivalent weeks claimed measured as a percentage of annual weeks in the 
regular UI program of each state. Each regression equation has three explana-
tory variables: 1) the current year’s state total unemployment rate (TUR), 2) 
the TUR lagged one year, and 3) a linear time trend that starts in 1989. Adja-
cent to each estimated slope coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio. The 
summary measures on the right-hand side of Table 6B.1 are the adjusted R2s, 
the standard error of estimate, and the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). The final 
columns display the mean of the dependent variable and the maximum per-
centage. The table also identifies four states where STC data were not available 
from 1989 due to later start dates for the programs (1991 for Iowa and Rhode 
Island; 1992 for Connecticut and Minnesota). 
For most states the fits are quite satisfactory, with adjusted R2s of at least 
0.50 for 13 states and standard errors below 0.30 for 15 states. The generally 
small scale of STC is vividly illustrated by the small means in the right-hand 
column of Table 6B.1. Rhode Island is the only state where the mean over the 
full period exceeds 1.0 percent of regular UI claims. Only four other states 
have means that exceed 0.40 (California, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont). 
The small scale of STC is also illustrated by the maximum annual percent-
ages during the estimation period. While most exceed 1.0 percent, only two 
maxima exceed 2.0 percent, Kansas and Rhode Island at 3.24 and 4.17 percent, 
respectively. 
While the summary measures in Table 6B.1 show the small scale of STC, 
the regression results point to a pattern of strong cyclical sensitivity. All 17 slope 
coefficients on the current year TUR are positive and their t-ratios all exceed 
2.0, the threshold for statistical significance. The t-ratios in eight states even 
exceed 5.0; the slopes are highly significant. When unemployment increases, 
utilization of STC increases relative to utilization of regular UI claims. 
The patterns for the lagged TUR coefficients are nearly as consistent. All 
17 are negative and 13 have t-ratios of 2.0 or larger. In the year after the TUR 
increases there is a sharp falloff in STC usage. Short-time compensation usage 
decreases noticeably in the second year of a recessionary period. This falloff 
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occurs even if the TUR is higher in the second year of a recession as in 2010 
relative to 2009. For 16 of 17 states the percentage was higher in 2009 than in 
2010. Finally, the underlying data also illustrate the severe nature of the recent 
recession. The highest usage of STC over the full period occurred in 2009 for 
14 of 17 states. 
 Table 6B.1  Regressions Explaining STC Equivalent Weeks as a Percentage of Regular Weeks, 1989–2010 
Mean Maximum 
State Constant TUR TUR Lag Trend Adj. R2 Std. error DW (%) (%) 
Arizona 0.289 (2.3) 0.064 (2.6) −0.051 (1.7) −0.0062 (1.4) 0.161 0.121 2.62 0.297 0.629 
Arkansas −0.149 (1.3) 0.102 (3.6) −0.072 (2.3) 0.0020 (0.6) 0.441 0.074 1.33 0.048 0.407 
California −0.185 (2.3)  0.162 (10.8) −0.085 (4.8) 0.0021 (0.7) 0.890 0.083 1.82 0.414 1.053 
Connecticut 1992 −0.172 (0.6) 0.232 (3.3) −0.170 (2.1) 0.0106 (0.8) 0.495 0.258 2.04 0.308 1.622 
Florida 0.036 (1.1) 0.031 (4.8) −0.020 (2.5) −0.0027 (2.2) 0.584 0.033 1.50 0.073 0.183 
Iowa 1991 −0.397 (1.8) 0.339 (3.5) −0.224 (2.1) 0.0023 (0.3) 0.523 0.168 2.15 0.110 1.006 
Kansas 0.648 (0.8) 0.501 (2.4) −0.610 (2.7) 0.0459 (2.0) 0.377 0.598 1.86 0.723 3.237 
Maryland −0.116 (3.2) 0.063 (7.6) −0.026 (2.6) −0.0019 (1.9) 0.783 0.030 1.96 0.048 0.213 
Massachusetts −0.209 (2.6) 0.107 (6.0) −0.076 (4.1) 0.0132 (4.2) 0.714 0.094 1.96 0.132 0.765 
Minnesota 1992 −0.216 (2.4) 0.175 (5.3) −0.120 (3.6) 0.0094 (1.9) 0.770 0.098 1.50 0.166 0.790 
Missouri 0.003 (0.0) 0.162 (5.5) −0.138 (4.0) 0.0275 (6.7) 0.858 0.111 2.01 0.476 1.354 
New York −0.436 (2.6) 0.172 (5.6) −0.101 (3.1) 0.0201 (4.4) 0.698 0.135 1.84 0.257 1.141 
Oregon −0.524 (4.6) 0.135 (6.5) −0.050 (2.1) 0.0103 (2.4) 0.803 0.110 1.31 0.163 1.010 
Rhode Island 1991 −1.410 (3.0) 0.302 (2.9) −0.109 (0.9) 0.1021 (5.2) 0.773 0.456 1.67 1.122 4.173 
Texas −0.581 (1.7) 0.178 (3.1) −0.119 (1.8) 0.0496 (6.4) 0.776 0.192 0.92 0.345 1.501 
Vermont 0.090 (0.4) 0.208 (3.6) −0.227 (4.0) 0.0462 (6.6) 0.744 0.208 1.75 0.540 1.511 
Washington −1.128 (4.9) 0.227 (5.7) −0.053 (1.1) 0.0259 (3.9) 0.781 0.188 0.64 0.256 1.562 
SOURCE: Regressions based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and OUI. Absolute values of t-ratios 
adjacent to coefficients. 
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FRAMING THE ISSUE 
Following the GDP decreases resulting from the severe economic 
crisis, EU member states experienced, each to a different extent, higher 
levels of unemployment. However, the implementation of so-called 
anticrisis measures limited such increases in unemployment—in some 
cases they were not as high as expected—in the majority of EU member 
states. Intending to minimize the impact of the downturn in social terms 
and support both companies and employees, the EU took a number of 
actions to drive the economic recovery and coordinate EU member 
states’ public interventions, with member states either adapting exist-
ing labor market policies or introducing new ones (European Commis-
sion 2008).1 In this context, the majority of member states launched ad 
hoc and comprehensive “anticrisis packages” consisting of a variety 
of measures to cope with the recession and resulting in a wide range 
of public policy tools aimed at reducing the impact of the crisis on the 
labor market. 
During the economic downturn, some countries have performed 
much better than others. We set out to determine whether this hap-
pened by chance or if it was a consequence of the national social model 
and the choices governments made in applying specific labor market 









138 Tiraboschi and Spattini 
were particular legal devices and policies that helped some EU mem-
ber states to face and withstand the crisis better than others. Studying 
the different measures implemented by the member states and consid-
ering the national legal framework and labor regulations, this chapter 
offers some possible interpretations of the different national reactions 
to the crisis. These interpretations take into account EU member states’
different labor market policy combinations and their social protection 
systems and employment protection legislation, which is also viewed 
as a combination of flexibility and security tools. The study has an inter-
disciplinary approach, though it is not an economic analysis. However, 
it aims to give suggestions and make some hypotheses on the effective-
ness of labor market policy combinations and social models (including 
the relevant legal framework) in tackling the crisis, which economists 
may then prove through their analyses. 
THE CRISIS IN FIGURES 
The starting point of the study is the set of figures describing the 
changes in the European labor market from the beginning of the cri-
sis (see Figures 7.1–7.3 and Table 7.1). Between the second quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the real GDP in the EU (27 mem-
ber states) fell by almost 5 percent. 
The fall in GDP caused a reduction of labor demand and, accord-
ingly, an increase in unemployment and a decrease in employment. But, 
if you compare the two series of data—GDP and employment change 
from the previous period (Table 7.1)—the degree of the reduction is 
different, and in particular job losses are limited by comparison with 
the decrease of real GDP. As is well-known, in fact, GDP growth and 
employment generally evolve differently (Bell and Blanchflower 2011), 
since employment reacts to economic developments with a certain time 
lag (Hijman 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009). 
The figures show a considerable difference in the impact of the crisis 
on the 27 EU member states, particularly if we compare unemployment 
rates in July 2008—that is, before the crisis—and July 2010. Although 
Spain and Ireland were regarded as emerging economies before the 
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2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 
EU 27 
SOURCE: Eurostat, seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days. 
specifically, the levels of unemployment almost doubled in a two-year 
span, an issue that has become a matter of serious concern. The same 
happened in the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), which 
experienced the highest rates of unemployment in Europe (Figure 7.2). 
Looking at the trends in Figure 7.3, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ire-
land, and Spain also had the highest decrease in employment rates. A
case in point of the negative impact of the economic crisis on employ-
ment was Denmark. Before the crisis, Denmark had a low level of unem-
ployment and has experienced a worsening of its labor market situation 
during the economic downturn. Despite Danish unemployment levels 
(7.3 percent in July 2010) remaining lower than the EU average (9.7 
percent), Denmark experienced a critical increase in unemployment, 
which doubled over a two-year period. At the same time, the employ-
ment rate dropped by 4.2 percent, which was more than the EU average. 
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Figure 7.2  Unemployment Rate Change and Unemployment Rate, 
2010q2 
Lithuania 11.9 18.3 
Latvia 10.8 18.3 
Estonia 9.9 16.0 
Spain 8.9 20.3 
Ireland 7.2 13.7 
Greece 5.4 13.0 
Slovakia 5.1 14.4 
Bulgaria 4.5 10.1 
Denmark 4.1 7.3 
Hungary 3.4 11.2 
Portugal 3.3 11.1 
Cyprus 3.0 6.6 
Czech Republic 2.9 7.2 
Slovenia 2.8 7.2 
EU27 2.7 9.7 
Poland 2.5 9.5 
Sweden 2.3 8.5 
France 2.0 9.8 
United Kingdom 2.0 7.7 
Finland 2.0 8.4 
Italy 1.8 8.4 
Netherlands 1.6 4.6 
Romania 1.5 7.3 
Belgium 1.2 8.4 
Malta 0.9 6.8 
Austria 0.8 4.4 
Germany −0.4 7.0 
Luxembourg −0.5 4.5 
Unemployment rate change
2010Q2 − 2008Q2 
Unemployment rate 2010Q2 
−5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data. 
The labor market is less worrisome in countries like Germany, Aus-
tria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, where the rise in the unem-
ployment rate was in no case higher than 1.8 percent and the decrease 
in the rate of employment was not as significant as in the countries men-
tioned above. Indeed, Germany represents a unique case: after a very 
limited increase in unemployment (0.4 percent in July 2009 compared 
to July 2008), an unexpected reduction was reported in 2010, with the 
levels of employment experiencing a growth (ILO 2011a). Such vari-
25.0 
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SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data. 
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Table 7.1  GDP and Employment Change between 2008q2 and 2009q2 
Member state GDP Employment Member state GDP Employment 
EU27 −5.1 −1.9 Lithuania −16.0 −6.0 
Belgium −4.1 −0.2 Luxembourg −7.8 1.2 
Bulgaria −4.6 −1.8 Hungary −7.4 −2.3 
Czech Republic −4.8 −0.9 Malta −4.4 −0.1a 
Denmark −7.3 −2.2 Netherlands −5.1 −1.2 
Germany −5.5 −0.0 Austria −5.4 −1.0 
Estonia −16.5 −9.9 Poland +1.4 +0.8 
Ireland −7.7 −8.3 Portugal −3.0 −2.7 
Greece −2.0 −0.7 Romania −8.3 −2.0a 
Spain −4.4 −7.0 Slovenia −9.5 −1.4 
France −3.1 −1.3 Slovakia −4.9 −1.5 
Italy −6.4 −1.4 Finland −10.2 −2.9 
Cyprus −1.7 −0.4a Sweden −6.3 −2.2a 
Latvia −17.3 −13.2 United Kingdom −5.9 −2.1 
aNot seasonally adjusted data. 
SOURCE: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
ability among European countries, and the fact that the recession had 
little impact on some of them, seems not to be coincidental. There is 
some empirical evidence that the different performance levels within 
national labor markets could result from the diversified legal framework 
of labor regulation and existing labor market policies and institutions, 
along with new measures taken by governments to combat the crisis. 
ANTICRISIS MEASURES ACROSS EUROPE 
The combination of several factors at the national level produced, 
in fact, 27 different ways in which the economic downturn hit the EU 
member states. In addition, there were 27 different responses to the cri-
sis. Each country has adopted a set of measures—not a single action— 
among which it is possible to identify the most frequently implemented 
ones (European Commission 2009). Moreover, it is necessary to take 
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ernments vary considerably, especially in terms of issues concerning the 
role played by social partners in each country. Each country’s partici-
pation in the development and implementation of anticrisis measures 
and with the adjustment of existing labor market tools differs across 
Europe. Differences are also found when one considers the level and 
the extent of the involvement of each EU member state in public policy 
design. Policy development and implementation depend on the diver-
sity of functions performed by the social dialogue at the time, and the 
power of each government. 
In Austria, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands—coun-
tries with a well-established social partnership—agreements between 
social partners contributed considerably to the creation of stimu-
lus packages. With regard to collective bargaining, opening clauses 
allowed company-level agreements to deviate from sectoral collective 
agreements in order to cut costs and safeguard employment (i.e., devia-
tion from the general framework). These agreements usually envisage 
an extension in working time without full compensation in pay, cuts in 
working time, cuts in benefits, or delays in agreed pay increases (ILO 
2011b). 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the adopted policies, it is nec-
essary to review existing legislation and classify measures implemented 
by every European country in accordance with a simple scheme. The 
classification of policy measures is a preliminary step for verifying 
whether there is a relationship between patterns of labor market policies 
adopted by member states and the trends of the national labor market 
during the crisis. To date, key reports from the European Commission 
(Arpaia et al. 2010; Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 2009), the 
OECD (2010), and EU institutions (Employment Committee [EMCO] 
and the European Commission [EC] 2010) have analyzed public inter-
ventions in the labor market. In particular, the Eurofound has provided 
a useful classification of crisis-related measures implemented in the EU 
member states (see Table 7.2) (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl and Salvatore 
2009). This classification is based on three different types of interven-
tions: 1) measures to create employment or to promote reintegration,
2) measures to maintain employment, and 3) income support measures 
for the unemployed. 
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Table 7.2  Classification of Labor Market Measures 
Measures to create employment Income support measures 
or to promote reintegration for the unemployed Measures to maintain employment 
Job matching, counseling, career 
guidance:
•	 Improving public employment 
services 
•	 Support for workers to find a job 
Incentives for companies to employ 
additional workers 
•	 Wage subsidies 
•	 Reduction of/exemption from non-
wage labor costs
•	 Nonfinancial incentives 
(Re-) Training of the unemployed: 
•	 Income support while in training
•	 Advice/consultancy, skill assessment 
tools 
•	 Provision/organization of training 
•	 Contribution to training costs 
Mobility grants
•	 Tax incentives 
•	 Travel/accommodation allowances 




•	 Duration of support for entitlement 
groups of workers 
Other instruments 
•	 early retirement payment
•	 child benefits 
•	 housing/heating 
Support of short-time work or temporary 
layoff
•	 Wage subsidies 
•	 Social security contributions 
Training support
•	 Advice/consultancy to enterprises
•	 Contribution to training costs
•	 Wage subsidy 
Reduction/deferral of nonwage labor 
costs 
•	 Social security contributions
•	 Taxes 
Direct enterprise support
•	 risk-capital schemes, guarantees, 
direct subsidies 
•	 reduction of company taxes 
   145 
Support of self-employment Indirect enterprise support
•	 Advice/consultancy, training •	 Public investment 
•	 Start-up grants •	 Incentives for consumers’ purchases 
•	 Reduction/deferral of social security 
payments 
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Measures to Create Employment and to Promote Reintegration 
Measures to create employment (Mandl and Salvatore 2009) aim 
to promote the hiring of employees by means of economic incentives, 
mainly consisting of a reduction of nonwage labor costs and wage subsi-
dies or public sector job creation. In some countries (Germany, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden), the economic incentives for 
companies are provided for hiring special target groups. Support mea-
sures for self-employment, based on the provision of consultancy and 
training (the U.K. and Bulgaria), or the reduction/deferment of social 
security payments also falls within this category. Several member states 
(Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Portugal, and the U.K.) have introduced or 
extended subsidies for business start-ups. 
Measures to promote reintegration into employment (Hurley et 
al. 2009), put into action by employment services, try to enhance the 
transition from unemployment to employment by addressing job mis-
match, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guid-
ance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employ-
ability through training. Efforts have been made to improve and adapt 
public employment services in order to manage the higher number of 
“clients” (for example, hiring additional staff, as in Germany, Norway, 
Spain, and the U.K.) and to economically support private employment 
agencies through economic and/or normative incentives (the Nether-
lands and Italy). In the same vein, and with the goal of making workers 
more willing to accept a new job, mobility grants are envisaged (Slo-
vakia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic). In Belgium, for instance, 
employees who agree to relocate in order to accept a job offer obtain 
tax benefits. 
Income Support for Unemployed People 
Income support for unemployed people (Hurley et al. 2009; Mandl 
and Salvatore 2009) mainly consists of unemployment benefits, pro-
vided to reduce the socioeconomic consequences of job loss. Unem-
ployment benefit systems exist in every EU member state, even though 
amendments (in some cases temporary) have been made at a national 
level to their regulations in order to respond to the increased number 
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been particularly concerned with the following areas: eligibility crite-
ria, amount, duration of entitlement, and beneficiaries. More specifi-
cally, some countries relaxed the rules for entitlement to unemployment 
benefits (France, Finland, and Sweden), while others extended the dura-
tion: Romania has envisaged an extension of 3 months, Latvia extended 
the unemployment benefit receipt period to 9 months, and in Poland it 
moved from 12 to 18 months. In the Czech Republic, the government 
has opted for an increase in the amount of funds, while Italy introduced 
(on a temporary basis) special benefits for quasi-subordinate workers. 
Measures to Maintain Employment 
Measures to maintain employment are intended to prevent dismiss-
als and preserve existing jobs. Among these instruments, the main ones 
are short-time work (STW) arrangements and compensation. 
Short-time work schemes 
Short-time work may take the form of a temporary reduction in 
working time or a temporary layoff. In both cases, the employment 
relationship between employer and employee persists and the arrange-
ments have a limited duration (Arpaia et al. 2010). In the case of STW, 
compensation for income loss is usually envisaged in the form of social 
security payments. This compensation is either publicly funded—by 
means of taxes—or based on social security contributions. Neverthe-
less, STW compensation systems across Europe differ considerably 
from each other in terms of procedures, degree of involvement of trade 
unions, “back-to-normal” plans, coverage, compensations amount, 
and eligibility criteria. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between 
well-established systems and new schemes introduced to face the crisis 
(Table 7.3). 
In the first case (which includes Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Italy, among others), the compensation system is part of the unem-
ployment benefit (insurance) system, in that employers and employees 
pay social contributions to a fund or to the UI system so that in the event 
of STW or temporary layoff, employees are covered by this fund for the 
lost income as a consequence of a working hours reduction. Conversely, 
in member states (such as the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, and Slova-
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Table 7.3  Different Systems of Short-Time Work 
Group I—Existing and/or adapted Group II—Systems introduced to 
systems (Germany, Austria, Belgium, face the crisis (the Netherlands, 
France, Italy, etc.) Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, etc.) 
STW arrangements are part of the 
unemployment benefit/insurance 
system 
The employer and (in some cases) 
the employees pay social 
contributions to a fund or to the 
UI system 
In the event of STW or temporary 
layoff, employees are covered for 
the lost income 
STW arrangements are not part of 
the unemployment benefit/insurance 
system 
STW arrangements are funded by 
taxes 
a new measure during the crisis, such new arrangements are not part of 
the UI system and therefore they are funded by the state through taxes. 
STW compensation systems may also be classified on the basis of 
their function (Arpaia et al. 2010). In some national systems, they are 
part-time unemployment benefits. This means that employees working 
reduced hours or on temporary layoff are regarded as people working 
on a part-time basis seeking full-time employment. In some cases, they 
may have to be available for a new job despite the fact that the employ-
ment contract with their current employer is still in force. Regardless of 
function, in the majority of EU member states, this is true even if STW
schemes envisage lost income compensation within the unemployment 
insurance system. Indeed, STW schemes represent a form of job protec-
tion against dismissal. 
With reference to this measure, it is possible to point out that it might 
be beneficial to different actors involved in the national economic arena. 
Needless to say, employees benefit from STW schemes since measures 
of this kind avoid dismissal and help maintain existing jobs, at the same 
time ensuring income support by compensating lost income. However, 
STW schemes also have many advantages for employers. First, these 
arrangements allow companies to preserve human capital and skills that 
will be necessary in the recovery phase. Second, they reduce potential 
costs related to personnel turnover, dismissal, the recruitment process, 
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and training. Governments view STW compensation systems as conve-
nient measures, as they help maintain social peace and cohesion in that 
employers and employees share the impact of a downturn. Finally, such 
arrangements represent a flexible tool for governments, such that they 
are able to control, to some extent, the adjustment of the labor market. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LABOR MARkET MEASURES 
This research tries to identify the system and policies that provide 
a higher level of effectiveness in tackling the crisis and unemployment, 
and to collect information that could be useful on a general basis while 
deciding which labor market policies to implement and which legal 
framework to apply. It is generally acknowledged that it takes time 
to evaluate the effectiveness of labor market measures. However, in a 
joint paper, EMCO and the EC provide some evidence for the effective-
ness of the main labor market policies adopted and implemented by 
EU member states during the crisis, and, more generally, they review 
evaluations of the effectiveness of similar measures implemented in the 
past (EMCO and EC 2010). The OECD, on the other hand, gives evi-
dence for the effectiveness of STW schemes applied during this reces-
sion (OECD 2010). 
Considering the three different types of labor market policies exam-
ined in this chapter (measures to create employment or to promote rein-
tegration, measures to maintain employment, and income support for 
unemployed), measures to maintain employment in the form of STW
arrangements, wage subsidies, or nonwage cost reductions are deemed 
to have been most successful in limiting the decrease in employ-
ment rates (Governatori et al. 2010) and the rise of unemployment, 
by preventing layoffs. Among measures of this kind implemented by 
the member states, some of them—particularly STW schemes—have 
proved more effective than others in preserving jobs (EMCO and EC 
2010; OECD 2010). Nevertheless, researchers point out critical issues 
related to STW arrangements, such as the fact that they may artificially 
maintain employment in declining industries instead of allowing for an 
efficient reallocation of employment. There is general agreement about 
the potential negative impact—the deadweight loss—from distortions 
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due to this policy (OECD 2010). However, countermeasures can be 
taken to address these distortions. In particular, STW schemes can be 
provided for a shorter period of time and can be arranged on the basis 
of more precise eligibility criteria. 
Regarding measures to create employment, job subsidies consist-
ing of hiring incentives or the reduction of nonwage labor costs are 
effective in terms of job creation, but they are costly measures that can 
lead to negative consequences in terms of the deadweight effect. At the 
same time, public sector job creation is less likely than other policies to 
provide positive impacts (Kluve 2006, 2008). 
With respect to measures that promote reintegration, training has 
a modest positive impact on employment. This kind of impact is more 
likely to be associated with times of high unemployment. But, in gen-
eral, positive training effects become evident in the long run, and it is 
not clear whether there is a positive or negative relation between the 
economic cycle and the effectiveness of this kind of measure. There-
fore, it is difficult to state how effective training programs may be dur-
ing the economic crisis (Kluve 2008). On the other hand, job search 
assistance and activation measures have a positive impact on employ-
ment and are effective in the short run, but they need an economic con-
text characterized by a growing or stable labor demand. In fact, only if 
there is labor demand is it possible to support job search and matching 
and help with reintegration into the labor market. For this reason, such 
measures are mainly appropriate in the recovery phase. 
Generally speaking, income supports for the unemployed may have 
a negative effect on unemployment (OECD 2006) since their generosity 
(replacement rate and duration) discourage job search and reintegra-
tion into the labor market. In order to reduce the negative effects in 
terms of efficiency, some adjustments can be and have been made, such 
as decreasing the amount of benefits and reducing the period through 
which such support is provided. In addition, unemployment benefits 
have to be made conditional on availability for suitable work and par-
ticipation in active labor market policies (ALMPs) and activation poli-
cies (OECD 2010). The majority of EU member states have moved in 
this direction, since in their systems, as shown in Table 7.4, unemploy-
ment benefit recipients are required to actively search for work (in 18 
cases out of 27), to be immediately available for suitable work (almost 
all member states) and accept suitable job offers, and to be ready to 
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Table 7.4  Obligations of Unemployment Benefit Recipients 
Participation Available for 
Country Active job search in ALMP suitable work 
Belgium x x 
Bulgaria x 
Czech Republic 
Denmark x x x 
Germany x x x 
Estonia x x 
Greece x x 
Spain x x x 
France x x 
Ireland x x 
Italy x x 
Cyprus x x 
Latvia x x 
Lithuania x x x 
Luxembourg x x 
Hungary x x x 
Malta x 
The Netherlands x x 
Austria x x 
Poland x 
Portugal x x 
Romania x x 
Finland x x x 
Slovenia x x 
Slovakia x x x 
Sweden x x x 
United Kingdom x x x 
participate in the ALMPs (in 17 cases out of 27) commonly agreed on 
in an individual action plan or client contract. The plan or contract is 
established between the unemployment benefit recipient and the public 
employment service and identifies the rights and duties of both parties. 
Moreover, in the view of assuring the effectiveness of this conditional-
ity, sanctions are applied to recipients in cases of noncompliance with 
the above-mentioned obligations. 
        
  
 
152 Tiraboschi and Spattini 
THE ROLE OF EMPLOyMENT SERVICES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALMPs 
Public employment services are generally able to implement labor 
market measures. Therefore, they play a key role in supporting the
(re)integration of the unemployed into the labor market and, in the end, 
employment levels. It is well known that the effective implementation 
of labor market policies depends on the efficiency of public employ-
ment services (EC 2002). However, they may achieve their goals not 
only by acting directly through their organizations, but also through 
cooperation with other actors and stakeholders (i.e., other public orga-
nizations, social security institutions, social partners, other service 
providers, or education and training providers). From this perspective, 
European institutions themselves encourage the collaboration of public 
employment services with other service providers (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2001, 2002; EC 1998). This relationship may even take the 
form of subcontracting services to private employment agencies, which 
generally allows public employment services to better deliver specific 
services for particular target groups among the unemployed (Anderson 
et al. 2009). 
Employment services also play an important role with regard to 
the effectiveness of the conditionality of unemployment benefits on 
participation in ALMPs and on accepting suitable job offers. Looking 
at public employment services, the purpose of a consistent strategy is 
to facilitate the return of the unemployed and unemployment benefit 
recipients into the labor market. To achieve this, public employment 
services and social security institutions must cooperate closely, which 
may develop into a merger between the two (Anderson et al. 2009). 
Indeed, in a number of EU member states (see Table 7.5) there is a 
single institution responsible for the provision of employment services 
and unemployment benefits. This trend is confirmed by recent mergers 
in France and the Netherlands in 2009. 
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Table 7.5  Institutions Responsible for the Provision of Employment 
Services and Unemployment Benefits 
Austria Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS) 
France Pôle emploi: (ANPE + Assedic) 
Germany Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency) 
Estonia Eesti Töötukassa 
Greece Greek Manpower Employment Organization (OAED) 
Luxembourg Administration de l’emploi (ADEM) 
Slovenia Employment Service of Slovenia 
The Netherlands Location for Work and Income: Centre for Work and 
Income + Uitvoeringsinstitut werknemersverzekeringen 
(Employee Insurance Agency) 
United Kingdom Jobcentre Plus (merger of Employment Service and 
Benefits Agency, 2002) 
PUBLIC ExPENDITURE ON LABOR MARkET POLICIES 
The question of effectiveness of labor market policies is funda-
mental not only with regard to crisis-related measures, but also for EU 
member states because of a rise in budgetary constraints. European 
institutions have reported that in 2009 EU countries increased their 
expenditure on labor market interventions and income supports by 0.7 
percent of annual GDP, while before the crisis, public expenditure on 
labor market policies had experienced a decline (EMCO and EC 2010). 
In fact, in 2008, public expenditure on labor market policies in the EU 
amounted to just 1.6 percent of total EU-27 GDP, although there was 
considerable variation between member states (see Figure 7.4).2 For 
this reason, EU governments need to be aware of the most effective 
policy mix in order to direct the public expenditure. It is interesting to 
compare data on labor market policy expenditures and trends in unem-
ployment rates among the different EU countries during the crisis. The 
data on public expenditures for all countries are available only 18–20 
months after the reference period, and as a result, Eurostat provides, at 
the moment, only data for 2008. 
      
154  




























0.380.27 0.48 0.1 
0.5 
0.8 0.8 
1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
1.7 1.9 
2.0 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
2.5 





11.2 Total LMP expenditure 2008 Unemployment rate change 2009Q2–2008Q2 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat data. 
 
 





Labor Market Measures in Social Models 155 
In any case, considering that the impact of labor market policies 
(LMPs) on the labor market requires a period of time to become evident, 
it seems reasonable to compare data on public expenditure for 2008 and 
unemployment rate growth over the last two years. Member states that 
had the lowest increases in unemployment rates in 2009 compared to 
2008 were those that spent the most on labor market policies in 2008. 
As Figure 7.4 shows, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria 
spent more than 1.8 percent of their GDP on LMPs and saw very small 
levels of unemployment growth or even declines in unemployment dur-
ing this period. Figure 7.5 shows that this trend is confirmed even if we 
compare the growth in unemployment rate between 2008 and 2010 and 
the labor market policies expenditure for 2008. 
When the data on public expenditures for 2009 are available for all 
countries, it will also be interesting to verify if and to what extent the 
increase in unemployment affected public expenditure. 
POLICIES ADAPTED OR ADOPTED By THE EU 
MEMBER STATES 
By analyzing the different measures implemented by the EU mem-
ber states, it is possible to observe a relationship between different 
combinations of labor market measures applied by EU countries and 
their social models. From this perspective, it is necessary to consider 
in toto the set of labor market policies—both new and amended—that 
the EU member states put into action to face the crisis. Table 7.6 repre-
sents, without the pretention of being exhaustive, the measures adopted 
or adapted (if already existing) by each EU member state against this 
background. The EU countries have been identified by their levels of 
unemployment rate growth (considering the difference between July 
2010 and July 2008), ranked from the best to the worst in terms of per-
formance. It should be pointed out that those countries with the most 
significant increases in unemployment rates are those that did not envis-
age or did not amend existing STW schemes. 
On the other hand, EU member states with good labor market per-
formance, such as Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, and, to 
some extent, Italy, already had measures of this kind in their labor mar-
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ket systems. Furthermore, these countries made such labor market poli-
cies more flexible over the past few years, in consideration of the needs 
of the moment, and improved or adapted these policies by combining 
them with training and/or activation measures. Other well-performing 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Romania, have introduced (even 
on a temporary basis) STW schemes to face the recession. 
The next step is to contextualize these different combinations of 
policies in the wider regulatory framework of national labor markets. 
In this view, two main social models are taken into consideration: the 
welfare system model and the flexicurity model (Table 7.7). 
The first system is characterized by rigid employment protection 
legislation (particularly in the event of dismissal), an ungenerous unem-
ployment benefit system, and a minimum level of implementation of 
ALMPs and activation of policies through public employment services. 
It is noteworthy that the welfare system model developed over the years 
an active component, which in the past was very limited or absent. On 
the other hand, the flexicurity model is based on a nonrestrictive dis-
missal protection legislation, a generous unemployment benefit system, 
high levels of implementation of ALMPs and activation policies, and 
efficient public employment services. Examples of the first model can 
be found in countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Italy, while 
Denmark has always been the model for flexicurity, together with Fin-
land, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MODELS 
By looking at the labor market performance of the EU member 
states, and by considering their social models, some interesting remarks 
and comments are possible. 
Regarding growth in the unemployment rate during the crisis, Ger-
many, Belgium, Austria, and to some extent Italy, are considered to be 
the countries with the lowest increases. The social model of all these 
EU member states is classified as a welfare system. On the other hand, 
Denmark, which, as mentioned, is regarded as a role model of flexicu-
rity, experienced a high increase in unemployment. This country has 
been and still is, in fact, an interesting case with reference to the per-
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Table 7.6  Policies Mix 
Training 
activities 
Change in during the time Reduction/ 
unemployment off/training deferral of 
rate 2010Q2– STW support for nonwage Public 
2008Q2 compensations employees labor costs expenditure 
Luxembourg −0.5 + + 
Germany −0.4 + + + 
Austria 0.8 + + 
Malta 0.9 + 
Belgium 1.2 + + + 
Romania 1.5 new + 
Netherlands 1.6 new compulsory + 
Italy 1.8 + + 
Finland 2.0 
United Kingdom 2.0 + 
France 2.0 + + + 
Sweden 2.3 + 
Poland 2.5 new 
EU 27 2.7 
Slovenia 2.8 new compulsory 
Czech Republic 2.9 new compulsory + 
Cyprus 3.0 + 
Portugal 3.3 + + + 
Hungary 3.4 new compulsory + 
Denmark 4.1 
Bulgaria 4.5 new + 
Slovakia 5.1 + 
Greece 5.4 + 
Ireland 7.2 + 
Spain 8.9 + 
Estonia 9.9 
Latvia 10.8 + 
Lithuania 11.9 + 
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formance of the labor market during the crisis. Before the crisis, this 
system ensured a low unemployment rate and a quick reintegration of 
jobseekers into the labor market. During the crisis, however, this sys-
tem proved to have some shortcomings. In fact, by September 2009, 
Denmark had doubled its level of unemployment: from 3.2 percent in 
July 2008 to 6.5 percent in September 2009 (Denmark reached its high-
est level of unemployment, 7.4 percent, in April 2010). 
The aim of this system is not to prevent dismissal but rather to 
support a quick job-to-job transition and reintegration into the labor 
market. Nevertheless, if the labor demand is low, then reintegration 
is impossible or very difficult. In addition, Denmark does not envis-
age a “real” STW compensation system even though companies may 
use STW arrangements and employees involved are eligible for part-
time unemployment benefits. Employees must fulfill the contributory 
requirements for eligibility for total unemployment benefits and have to 
be available for a new working activity despite the fact that the employ-
ment contract with their current employer is still in force. However, in 
practice this provision is not strictly applied if the employee has the 
possibility of staying with his or her current company. 
Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands (plus Norway, which is not 
an EU member) also use the flexicurity system. While they had better 
labor market performance than Denmark during the recession, these 
countries still experienced an increase in their unemployment rates 
amounting to more than 2 percent (the Netherlands was the only excep-
tion, with an increase of 1.6 percent). There is an important difference 
between Denmark and the other flexicurity countries—employment 
protection legislation. Denmark has liberally oriented employment pro-
tection legislation, while the other flexicurity countries, which utilize 
a welfare system, have more stringent employment protection legisla-
tion (see Table 7.8). Among flexicurity countries, the Netherlands is the 
only country characterized by a lower rise in its unemployment rate. It 
introduced a temporary STW compensation, while Finland’s is similar 
to Denmark, and Sweden does not envisage any. 
On the basis of these observations, it clearly emerges that countries 
utilizing the welfare system model had lower increases in unemploy-
ment rates, while flexicurity countries, especially Denmark, experi-
enced higher rises. Thus, the welfare system model appears to be more 
effective in facing the crisis, while the flexicurity system has difficul-
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Table 7.8  OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index 
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ties controlling the increase in unemployment. This situation seems to 
depend on the presence in welfare system models of two complemen-
tary and interrelated elements: STW arrangements and a stringent regu-
lation against (individual or collective) dismissal. However, consider-
ing social models and labor market policy combinations applied by EU 
member states, there is no unique “best solution” to tackle “different 
kinds” of economic recessions. It is also important to understand the 
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context and the legal framework in which any possible solution has to 
be implemented. 
CONCLUSION: LESSON FROM THE CRISIS
The financial crisis has created a sort of laboratory in which it was 
possible to conduct natural experiments on the functioning of differ-
ent national systems, created through a combination of the social secu-
rity system, employment protection legislation, the public employment 
services system, and labor market policies. Over the last two decades, 
when considering labor market policies to be implemented by Euro-
pean countries, the OECD and European Commission put an empha-
sis mainly on active labor market policies rather than passive ones, 
thus supporting mainly public interventions utilizing active measures. 
Therefore, before the crisis, these international institutions largely rec-
ommended flexicurity principles dominated by external flexibility and 
employment security based on nonrestrictive or low-restrictive employ-
ment protection legislation (and dismissal protection legislation), sup-
ported by a generous unemployment benefit system, efficient public 
employment services, and high levels of ALMPs. From this point of 
view, prevailing measures aimed to create employment or, better yet, 
promote reintegration, giving momentum to job-to-job transition. In 
fact, by launching the EU flexicurity strategy, the EU promoted internal 
and external flexicurity “accompanied by secure transition from job to 
job” (European Commission 2007). 
Looking from this standpoint at policy packages applied by EU 
member states, at the beginning of the crisis there was a critical view 
of STW arrangements. In fact, observers and commentators constantly 
pointed out the labor market distortions and limitations associated with 
these schemes. One frequent criticism was that since they were income 
support measures, they demonstrated the passive nature of labor mar-
ket policy. But more recently, and perhaps thanks to the effectiveness 
in tackling the crisis, authors look at these schemes in a different way. 
Indeed, a report from the Eurofound (Mandl et al. 2010) describing 
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flexicurity principle by stressing how they serve the implementation of 
flexicurity. Considering how STW schemes function, it is easy to see 
them as tools for flexicurity, combining internal flexibility and job and 
income security. In fact, the possibility of reducing work hours (up to 
zero hours) allows internal flexibility for employers (based exactly on 
flexible working-time arrangements). At the same time, this provision 
prevents dismissals and helps employees stay in their current positions, 
enhancing job security. Moreover, wage compensation linked to STW
arrangements ensures income security for the employees, thanks to the 
continuity of income granted through either a wage or unemployment 
benefits. 
Considering now the other types of labor market policy measures 
mentioned above in terms of flexicurity, measures to promote reinte-
gration and to create employment are fundamental resources for guar-
anteeing employment security, at least through continuity of employ-
ment, although not necessarily with the same employer. On the other 
hand, income support for unemployed people has the obvious purpose 
of ensuring income security in case of dismissal and can be seen as 
complementary to external flexibility. Before the crisis, EU institu-
tions pressed for welfare systems to move toward the flexicurity model. 
But the economic downturn raised the awareness of the fact that the 
EU formulation of the flexicurity strategy was suitable for a period of 
economic growth and to face structural unemployment, which needs 
particular measures to support (re-)integration by addressing job mis-
match, supporting job matching by means of counseling, career guid-
ance, search assistance, activation measures, and by increasing employ-
ability through training. 
Indeed, a flexicurity strategy based on external flexibility and 
employment security was not able to withstand the impact of the reces-
sion. In such a situation, in fact, in order to limit the related socio-
economic consequences, policy measures to maintain employment and 
keep employees at work turned out to be indispensable. A lesson has 
been provided by the crisis: both welfare and flexicurity models under-
went changes due to the adaptation or introduction of specific labor 
market policies to face the crisis. For example, welfare models have 
developed activation and training measures, while some flexicurity 
models adopted some kind of STW arrangements. Each model has taken 
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the crisis. This process of adjustment due to the recession resulted in a 
convergence of the two social models. 
Notes 
1. At the international level, the International Labour Conference (2009) adopted a 
Global Jobs pact. 
2. At the moment of closing the article, Eurostat provided data for 2009 just for a few 
EU member states. 
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